




# AIR UNIVERSITY **review**

MARCH-APRIL 1970



**MIND  
AND  
HAND**





# AIR UNIVERSITY review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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the cover

Mind and hand working in concert suggest the function of the Hq USAF staff for plans and operations, which, according to the Deputy Chief of Staff, P&O, Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., "plays a central role in the Air Force contribution to national security policies and the development of the postures and capabilities required to support them." General Clay and others discuss the activities within the purview of P&O.



# SHAPING THE AIR FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL STRATEGY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY, JR.

THE strategic environment of the past two decades, largely shaped by the national and international security interests of the world's major powers, has confronted the United States with unprecedented challenges. Meeting the exigencies of the cold war has required major political, economic, and military efforts on our part. The grave and continuing threats posed to our national survival have necessitated the establishment of large sophisticated forces-in-being, capable of responding to various challenges. Management of such forces has been a task requiring coordination between political leaders and military decision-makers involved with the management of U.S. strategic postures and capabilities. The Hq USAF Deputate for Plans and Operations plays a central role in the Air Force contribution to national security policies and the development of the postures and capabilities required to support them. This includes efforts on every level, from broad strategic concepts and doctrine to the employment of specific elements of hardware. As a result of World War II and postwar technological progress and because of their size and natural strength, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major powers on the world scene. This, together with their strongly contending ideologies, led to a polarization of political and economic interests, reinforced by strategic alliances. Leadership of the Communist world, possession of nuclear weapons, and a formidable array of conventional power in Eastern Europe combined to make the Soviet Union a superpower capable of threatening the survival of Western Europe

and the United States in its role as leader of the free world. Unprecedented developments in weapons technology have endowed both the United States and the Soviet Union with military power never before possible. Their mutual assured-destruction capability is so overwhelming that both powers have undertaken to arrive at understandings concerning the limitation and control of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear capabilities which for so long provided a shared monopoly of military power have, paradoxically, allowed other nations greater leverage in the international environment than heretofore possible. Many nations, having regained strength lost in World War II, have begun to assume positions of greater confidence and independence. Britain, France, and Communist China now have nuclear weapons; others possess the requisite technology to develop similar capabilities. While the two superpowers remain strategically predominant, the polarization of other powers around them has thus gradually declined, leading to the emergence of a multipolar environment. The European NATO members are speaking with more independence than before as they seek greater leverage in their own defense and other affairs as well. The term "satellite" no longer reflects the true status of the lesser Communist nations. The Czechoslovakian crisis demonstrates the ferment and potential for crisis that underlie Soviet relations with her Eastern European allies.

The existence of five nuclear powers and the potential for further nuclear proliferation have greatly increased the complexity of international relations. This changing international relationship has required fundamental changes in our thinking and a reshaping of

capabilities to ensure military responsiveness to U.S. national security objectives.

United States national security objectives reflect our basic national aims and undertakings, our intentions with respect to possible threats to our national security, our attitudes toward external political and social problems, and our assessment of the international environment in which we operate. In broad terms, our objectives emphasize the search for a world community of free and independent nations, secure from the threat of aggression and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law.

To support these goals, this nation will require balanced and sophisticated military strategies and weapon systems that are capable of dealing with a wide variety of contingencies. To provide the required range of alternatives, there has to be a constant reassessment and readjustment of our capabilities as well as in our ways of thinking about and dealing with our problems.

An appreciation of the versatility and range of the required capabilities can perhaps best be gained by a brief look at the three basic types of conflict possibilities which the United States must be prepared for, now and in the future.

#### *war between the United States and a superpower*

A superpower is any state that can threaten the survival of all other states; that is, a nation having in effect an assured-destruction capability. Such a conflict between the United States and another superpower currently means war with the Soviet Union, and perhaps at some time in the distant future it could include Communist China as well. Though deliberate initiation of nuclear war between superpowers is unlikely, the consequences of such a war are so grave that we must prepare for it as a matter of first priority. For some time, the term "general war" has been used as the label for such a war, but using that term obscures the different forms such a war might take. While "general war" has come to be equated with massive, delib-

*General Clay relinquished his post as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, on 1 February 1970, to become Vice Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces. Lieutenant General Russell E. Dougherty replaced him on the Air Staff.*

erate exchanges of thermonuclear weapons, a war between superpowers could take other forms as well, depending on how the war begins, the objectives of the opponents, and their military capabilities. In fact, given the existence of convincing assured-destruction forces, nuclear war is more likely to be approached cautiously from lesser forms of confrontation that have gradually escalated than to erupt in the form of an unexpected sudden onslaught.

Considerations such as these have led to a belief in the need to broaden the basis of deterrence. It is well known that in the past our national strategy for deterring Soviet military action has emphasized the two tasks of assured destruction and damage limitation. Assured destruction (AD) is and will remain the foundation of deterrence; a damage-limiting capability makes our deterrent threat credible. However, the Air Force believes that additional capabilities are required, capabilities beyond those adapted exclusively to the assured-destruction role. A U.S. strategic force structured exclusively to achieve the AD mission could fail to provide the flexibility and range of options which the National Command Authorities might want in order to back up lesser-intensity U.S. actions or to dominate and hence control the escalation possibilities in a particular crisis. Accordingly, this task requires forces which are usable in a discriminating and responsive manner under conditions of utmost control and precision. Such forces would provide an option of controlling escalation and bringing a conflict to an acceptable end. Their objective would be to provide national decision-makers with usable military power (as opposed to deterrent power) in forms that are politically relevant, forms that can be used to influence or coerce an opponent. These are capabilities specifically geared to discrimination and a different order of enemy values from those addressed by our deterrent forces. They would have a capability for communicating both intent to limit war-fighting actions and readiness to negotiate on reasonable terms. The Air Force can make a unique contribution in this respect because the attributes of

aerospace power—and this is especially true of manned systems—lend themselves particularly well to the conduct of operations in a highly controlled environment.

#### *wars between the United States and lesser powers*

The kind of conflict in which we are most likely to be tested is that with other than superpowers. Limited political objectives and the tailoring of military means to those objectives will generally characterize such wars. "Winning" in this type of conflict means achieving the national objectives involved rather than the old simplistic objective of destroying the enemy. It requires not only a convincing military superiority but also closely coordinated efforts between political and military decision-makers. Owing to the dual political and military objective in most conflicts of this type, the exercise of control in the use of military force is a central characteristic. The problem in constructing strategy for such wars is that of developing effective military means, policies, weapons, tactics, and techniques capable of achieving the limited political objectives within the constraints imposed.

#### *insurgency*

In the complex and subtle form of conflict known as insurgency, military measures may be less important than political, economic, psychological, and police measures. Dealing with insurgency through counterinsurgency combat tactics alone can be a very expensive approach. Air power may have its most lasting effect in the civic action, nation-building, and pacification aspects of countering insurgency, although the use of military air power in most of its traditional roles will continue. The intensity of its use would be lower than in the other two categories of warfare, though, and would be conditioned further by an emphasis on indigenous capabilities wherever possible. Airlift, in several operational categories, will be especially important. Among several very real opportunities for the Air

Force in the nation-building role will be the development of air lines of communication in lieu of surface routes and assistance to a developing country in the establishment of national command, control, and communications to foster peaceful development.

These, then, are but the barest outlines of the three most basic types of possible conflict. It is only too likely that the changing world environment noted earlier, particularly developments in multipolarity and nuclear proliferation, will compound the possibilities for conflict that could involve the United States.

**I**N the complex new dynamics of the world environment, the national leadership of the United States needs all the more to maintain its capability to respond to rapidly evolving crisis situations so as to achieve desired objectives with the least amount of risk. As a matter of ordinary foresight and preparedness, national decision-makers need to be provided with an array of usable options ranging from diplomatic through psychological and economic actions to the direct application of force as a last resort. If the alternatives in a given situation include the employment of military power, the strategy used must take into account not only all possible alternative options but also unforeseen developments, such as technological or enemy-inspired surprise. It must provide for a mix of different forms and gradations of power to deal effectively with particular conflict situations, while avoiding artificial distinctions between levels of warfare that would lead to the fragmenting of U.S. forces into separate and less efficient elements. Finally, the required military advice and counsel in support of various alternative courses of action must be capable of effective interaction with other instruments of national power and must be responsive to the changing dictates of national policy.

The organizational and procedural framework for meeting such requirements and for projecting military capabilities is embodied in statutory prescription and in military doctrines

that have evolved in response to changing environmental circumstances and national security imperatives. The basic operational command structure that has evolved emphasizes the increased centralization of the Department of Defense policy-making machinery. In theory, the services generate the forces and provide required support, while the unified and specified commanders employ them in the operational role. However, service responsibilities do not suddenly terminate when their forces are assigned to one of the unified or specified commands. The total responsibility for generating air forces, putting them in a combat-ready posture, and sustaining that posture belongs to the Air Force. The dual role of the Chief of Staff places the Air Force squarely in the middle of both the operational and the support functions. The central feature of Air Force involvement is the application of aerospace power as engineered by the Air Staff in its interaction with the Joint Staff.

The focal point within the Air Staff where the operational and support chains meet is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations. The DCS/P&O is unique among the five Deputy Chiefs of Staff in that, aside from performing Air Staff functions in the plans and operations areas, he provides the Air Staff channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). He is responsible to the Chief of Staff for providing operationally ready forces to the unified and specified commands, developing operational concepts and doctrines for the employment of weapon systems and forces, and providing advice and response to the Chief of Staff on all Air Force matters considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he functions as the Chief of Staff's Operations Deputy, the Chief's principal assistant for JCS matters. In the latter capacity, he becomes responsible to the Chief of Staff for USAF participation in joint and combined policy-making and planning activities; as such he becomes the focal point for a wide range of JCS issues that are referred to the Air Force for resolution. This organization evolved on the basis of experience gained during the Cuban crisis. The objective was to integrate Air Staff planning with the day-to-day operations of the Air



Force, so as to provide a capability for prompt responses to any national emergency.

There are three directorates under the DCS/P&O: Plans; Operations; and Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives.

### *Plans*

The Directorate of Plans consists of two deputy directorates—Force Development, and Plans and Policy—plus an Assistant Director for Joint and National Security Council (NSC) matters. The latter is responsible for providing principal support to the Director and the DCS/P&O for the development of Air Staff positions on all JCS and NSC matters.

The *Deputy Directorate for Force Development* evaluates existing and programmed forces, capabilities, resources, procurement, and development programs and conducts studies to determine the USAF force objectives required to meet the threat and support the strategy. From these evaluations evolves the Air Force portion of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). This organization also develops the USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), which provides basic guidance for military and industrial readiness planning. Included in the WMP are wartime aircraft activity and munitions planning factors for the computation of War Readiness Material (WRM) requirements. Additionally, the organization develops Air Staff positions on matters related to the Single-Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) and the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and determines nuclear and nonnuclear weapons requirements. Another important facet of its responsibility is the development and monitorship of the overall USAF mobility and bare-base programs as published in the USAF Mobility Plan.

The *Plans and Policy* Deputy Directorate monitors, reviews, and develops the Air Staff position on matters pertaining to war planning actions of the unified and specified commands. It maintains liaison with the Department of State; monitors worldwide political developments; participates in politico-military planning, and initiates action to obtain foreign military rights for the Air Force. It also

develops Air Staff positions on military assistance and disarmament, nuclear weapons policy, airlift policy, and joint planning, including command and organizational relationships among principal DOD elements; develops Air Staff positions on counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare objectives, and prisoner of war matters, including escape and evasion.

### *Operations*

The Directorate of Operations supervises operational functions with regard to the statutory responsibilities of the Air Force and operations in support of the unified and specified command structure. This directorate is responsible for the staff supervision of all training and equipping of USAF combat and support forces. A close day-by-day monitoring and evaluation of Southeast Asia operations is carried out to ensure maximum success of this effort. There are four deputy directorates within the organizational structure of the directorate.

The *Strike Forces* Deputy Directorate exercises staff supervision over strategic, tactical, and air defense weapon systems, including crew training and operations, general war and contingency planning for employment of these weapon systems, and requirements and special activities as required by the Director of Operations. Additionally, the Deputy Directorate monitors, supports, and articulates, as appropriate, operational concepts or requirements during study, research, programming, development, and procurement phases of weapon systems and munitions acquisition.

The *Strike Support* Deputy Directorate provides operational guidance to the strike support forces, develops operational concepts and directives for, and exercises staff supervision over, tactical and strategic airlift, tactical and strategic reconnaissance, electronic warfare support, air rescue, weather, and mapping and geodetic activities. It is also responsible for all major management matters related to the total USAF audio-visual effort and serves as the Air Force focal point for civil disturbance airlift requirements, matters pertaining to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(CRAF), and operational matters pertaining to Air Force Reserve affairs.

The *Operational Test and Evaluation* Deputy Directorate is responsible for planning, directing, and evaluating all Air Force operational test and evaluation programs and for providing centralized Air Force management and policy guidance over all non-R&D test programs.

The mission of the *USAF Command Post* Deputy Directorate, with its worldwide command and control systems, is to minimize the reaction time of the Air Force to any unusual or emergency situation. The communications network of the Command Post allows the Chief of Staff and key Air Staff personnel to convene a telephone conference with all major commanders in less than two minutes. This capability is available as backup for National Military Command Center War Room. As the focal point for contingency and battle staff actions, the Command Post is a storehouse of operational information on all emergency war plans of the major commands. The Command Post operates continuously to monitor the status of forces and operations around the world and to provide current information on the readiness of these forces to execute emergency war plans. Automatic data processing and computer technology are used extensively to provide timely information to the Chief of Staff and the Battle Staff.

### *Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives*

The Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives has the responsibility for preparing the Air Force for evolutionary change. There is an increasing need to devote effort to the development of the more abstract concepts and objectives, which seem deferrable in the stress of day-to-day problems but which alone can lay the groundwork for future Air Force developments. The functioning of this directorate is dependent upon original, creative thinking toward the Air Force of the future and the forward-looking aspects of Air Force strategy in the light of anticipated political and technological change. This means studying world political, economic, and social

environments and technological developments as they affect future strategy and force concepts. It includes maintaining liaison between the Air Force and the scientific, academic, and industrial communities.

The *USAF Planning Concepts* document, prepared and distributed by this directorate, articulates Air Force long-range concepts and desired capabilities and serves as a base from which the Air Force can align its efforts toward its long-term objectives. In close harmony with its long-range planning efforts, this directorate also develops and articulates basic and functional Air Force doctrine, ensuring its proper implementation and understanding, and participates in the development and articulation of Joint doctrine.

FROM the foregoing rundown of the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, it is clear that a principal feature of DCS/P&O responsibility centers upon the planning process. It is through this medium and through frequent interactions with the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the air components of the unified and specified commands that current Air Force thinking relevant to doctrine and concepts is interjected into the decision/action process. In the course of the planning process, choices must be made and strategies developed which, while perhaps not optimal for any one projected environment, will endow future Air Forces with sufficient flexibility to counter a broad range of possible opponents. Accordingly, a controlling imperative in the planning process is the requirement for flexibility. While the Air Force must be tenacious in pursuit of necessary capabilities, it must also be prepared to revise its goals as changes in the threat develop. Military capabilities must be shaped long before the nature of future conflict environments is made clear. Notwithstanding the constraints and uncertainties inherent in our assumptions about future environments, planning must place high premium upon strategies and force postures that are flexible and adequately suited to a wide variety of military roles. Planning

for a single or worst-case conflict scenario will inevitably constrain our ability to deal with the broad spectrum of lesser-intensity actions and compromise our responsiveness to the National Command Authorities.

Obviously, the plans and operations community must plan in concert with the research and development community, each exploiting its special expertise to move the whole towards goals mutually formulated and agreed upon. The crucial concerns of trying to provide strategic guidance for technological development can best be summarized as time span, scarce resources, and changing threat: time span in that technology and weapon systems take years to develop; scarce resources in that all possible or even all desirable weapon systems cannot be afforded; and changing threat in that weapon systems available today may not be those really wanted today and weapons wanted for tomorrow may not be those that are really required tomorrow.

The crux of the problem is that many fields of technology are growing increasingly complex and expensive but must be supported in some rational manner that will hold open the option to develop or modify promising weapon systems as the need arises. The unpredictable quality of crisis situations does not allow for the normal lead time in research and development. Crisis situations require effective forces-in-being. Therefore, politico-military planning must include continuous and sophisticated attention to R&D. Deficiencies in this area can seriously undermine our ability to deal with possible crises. Here, the purposeful influence of strategy can be valuable to lend central direction and consistency to the commitment of technological resources.

While needed Air Force capabilities should evolve from the direction provided by our strategic goals, this in turn depends on an objective assessment of the total environment within which we seek to attain those goals: the external one which deals with the

threat and the internal one which deals with the constraints on the size and scope of our military forces. Thus, technological dynamism has provided us with an unprecedented capability for strategic deterrence. But the same weapon capabilities in the hands of a potential aggressor have exposed us and our allies to unprecedented new threats. Similarly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to several nations now requires U.S. policy-makers to deal with a multitude of potential new policy and systems interactions. With respect to the internal domestic environment, Air Force planners must obviously be concerned with the matter of what strategy the national leadership would elect to follow to achieve its objectives, including its view of the overall utility of armed strength in the pursuit of such objectives.

Clearly, the planning function is not a linear or static phenomenon. Rather, it is a highly interactive and iterative process requiring inputs of political, economic, military, technological, and social considerations and demanding a high order of intellectual expertise and military judgment.

In closing, I would like to borrow from Marshal Ferdinand Foch:

The stroke of genius that turns the fate of battle? I don't believe in it. A battle is a complicated operation, that you prepare laboriously. If the enemy does this, you say to yourself I will do that. If such and such happens, these are the steps I shall take to meet it. You think out every possible development and decide on the way to deal with the situation created. One of these developments occurs; you put your plan in operation, and everyone says, "What genius . . .," whereas the credit is really due to the labor of preparation.

Herein lies the central feature of the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, and his contribution to the operational forces of the United States Air Force.

*Hq United States Air Force*

A CONCEPT FOR DIRECTING  
COMBAT AIR  
OPERATIONS

MAJOR GENERAL SAM J. BYERLEY



AS early as 1946, Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, speaking of the capabilities which modern tactical air forces had demonstrated during the European air war, observed that flexibility in the application of air forces was necessary in order to achieve maximum results. Flexibility, he stated, enabled air forces to achieve maximum responsiveness and effectiveness in coordinated efforts with other military forces and permitted the diversion of tactical air power to meet critical situations on the ground rapidly. He further observed that, to achieve the degree of flexibility required, direct control of all available air power should be centralized under a single air force commander.

The validity of the concept of "centralized control/single management" of air resources within tactical areas of responsibility was demonstrated in World War II and in the Korean conflict. Unfortunately, the concept and the organization developed to administer it lost substantial support at the conclusion of each of those wars, and significant time and effort were required to re-establish an adequate system during subsequent conflicts.

#### *doctrine in the sixties*

Current doctrine remains in basic agreement with General Vandenberg. Tactical air forces are organized, equipped, and trained to conduct sustained air operations against enemy military forces at any level of conflict which national policy may require. To fully exploit the flexibility of air power, a highly mobile complex of forces is required. If tactical air forces are to maximize their potential, they must be capable of responding quickly and selectively, be versatile, and be able to concentrate precise striking power against selected targets. Air Force Manual 2-7 warns that:

Precautions must be taken to avoid operational demands of a divisive nature which segment the forces concerned and diffuse their effort in unrelated, infeasible or excessively costly undertakings. When forces are segmented, the full advantages of flexibility

are lost, the unity of air forces involved destroyed, and their strength dissipated in a fragmented effort.

#### *an air control system*

An effective tactical air control system is an integral and basic part of the concept of single management of air resources. Such a system should provide a single manager with the organization, equipment, and trained personnel necessary to plan, direct, and control tactical air operations and coordinate joint operations with components of other military services. Utilizing such an air control system, a commander can shift, deploy, and concentrate his forces to cope with rapidly changing situations in the most efficient and economical manner.

Since a tactical air control system is a basic part of the concept of single management of air resources, an effective control system should be maintained in readiness for rapid deployment to any combat zone where air forces are required. The maintenance and improvement of the system should be supported with the same vigor given any weapon system. The system, comprising equipment, proven procedures, and trained personnel, should be an in-being, viable organization and fully subscribed to by all services and their participants.

#### *single air management*

The concept of placing all air resources in a combat zone under the direction of a single air manager is not new. As indicated earlier, the concept surfaced during World War II and again during the Korean conflict. Late in the Korean War the air resources of the Fifth Air Force, Seventh Fleet, and 1st Marine Air Wing were placed under the direction of the Joint Operations Center of the Fifth Air Force. The commanders of Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet determined that air combat operations of the two services had to be integrated in order to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy with greater efficiency and economy of force. The Seventh

Fleet accordingly granted the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center positive control of close air support assignments. Although integration of Navy resources came very late in the course of the war, it was considered the final step in creating the centralized control so necessary to efficient tactical air operations. At the end of hostilities a joint board, including Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy officers, recommended the establishment of an approved official joint doctrine for air-ground operations that would facilitate the training, organizing, and equipping of all three military services.

Although single air management proved to be a valuable and effective concept during the Korean conflict, the concept was not established in an approved joint doctrine during the ensuing period of peace. Consequently single management of fixed-wing tactical forces was not an accepted joint concept at the start of the Vietnam conflict. It was only after five years of active U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia (SEA) that single management became a reality.

Prior to March 1968 there were two independently controlled tactical air control systems in-being in South Vietnam: one operated by 7AF throughout the country and another operated in I Corps by the Marines. The resultant overlapping control arrangements in I Corps were operationally inefficient, and there was no central agency responsible for determining target priorities. Overkill and/or target omission were often the result. The duplicate systems did not provide a coordinated plan for the flow of tactical air, the result being periods of excessive congestion followed by periods of little or no coverage. Tasking responsibilities for supplementary roles of tactical air (e.g., airlift, escort, herbicide, etc.) were not clearly defined, and there was no single source of information to assist in determining the adequacy or inadequacy of tactical air operations. However, the most significant weakness of the dual system was the inability to allocate air resources in support of all allied ground forces in an optimum manner to meet changing enemy tactics and threats.

The initial impetus that led to the establishment of a single air manager in South Vietnam stemmed from a sharp increase in enemy offensives during the early months of 1968. In February, during the Tet offensive, the enemy waged major offensive operations throughout South Vietnam, the most intensive pressure being brought to bear on free world forces just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in I Corps. Friendly reinforcements quickly moved into that area, and the battle of Khe Sanh ensued. Planning and application of air resources during the first few weeks of the defense of Khe Sanh were not adequately centralized. The resultant problems were a product of the sheer magnitude of air support directed into an extremely small geographic area. The overwhelming need for effective air allocation and cycling, airspace control, targeting, bomb assessment, and overall responsibility pointed to a major problem in the management and control of air resources. Commitment of USAF, U.S. Marine, U.S. Navy, and VNAF air resources to support multinational ground force operations on a high-density basis firmly identified the immediate need for management by a single authority, to integrate the air effort, prevent mutual interference, and provide the needed air support for all ground and support units operating in the area.

On 8 March 1968, the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) designated the Commander, Seventh Air Force (his Deputy for Air Operations), as the single manager of fixed-wing tactical fighter and reconnaissance air operations in South Vietnam and charged him with the responsibility for coordinating and directing the entire fixed-wing tactical fighter and reconnaissance air effort. This decision made it possible for the Deputy for Air Operations to apply the total force in the most effective manner in support of the MACV mission, distributing force application as the ground situation dictated.

The change to a single air manager for fixed-wing tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircraft in South Vietnam provided COMUSMACV with a method of allocating and con-

trolling air resources that permitted the inherent flexibility of tactical air power to be fully exploited. It provided centralized control and decentralized execution of operations. It also fostered rapid coordination, close integration of operations, and flexibility in force allocation.

Once again the validity of the concept of centralized control/single management of air resources in a combat zone was proven.

The single air manager system developed in Vietnam provides a significant stepping-stone toward our ultimate goal of an in-being single air manager concept. We should not let this progress falter. We must aggressively work toward establishing joint doctrine, subscribed to by all services, which will allow the immediate implementation of the single air manager concept in future conflicts. In addition, during peacetime the concept should be exercised through its supporting tactical air control system, so that all users understand completely the flexibility and potential of air power when properly controlled and applied.

#### *Air Force tactical air control units*

Regardless of how worthy or how acceptable the single manager concept is, it cannot be implemented without the physical facilities, equipment, and personnel necessary to administer the system. Tactical air control units of this type have functioned as the air force commanders' primary control agency for operational air activities during the last two wars. Unfortunately, the tactical air control organizations and their equipment and personnel were not maintained at the conclusion of each war—primarily because of budgetary considerations—at the levels subsequently required for deployment at the onset of each succeeding conflict. The tactical air control equipment available for a war has more often than not been that remaining from the previous conflict. Expansion and improvements were initiated after combat had begun. Personnel were taken out of other critical positions to man the Tactical Air Control System. Bits and pieces were scraped together from equipment-short Air Force squadrons or even

from our sister services. The results, as might be expected, have been less than optimum, and the commander often was seriously handicapped for lack of an adequate control system.

#### *trained personnel a major problem*

Failure to maintain a fully manned cadre of experienced tactical air control personnel between the wars has been a major factor in the initial performance of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS). For example, the end of the Korean War saw the immediate dispersion of most of the trained personnel, leaving only a relatively small cadre that had so efficiently operated the control system in the latter phases of the war. We did not adequately maintain the identity of either the operators or the technicians who had manned the tactical operations centers within the Fifth Air Force.

Likewise, insufficient effort was expended during the intervening years between the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts to train Air Force personnel not previously assigned to the TACS in the intricacies of tactical air control. With the exception of a short academic course presented by the Joint Air Ground Operations School and some joint air-ground exercises, there were few opportunities for training service personnel in tactical air control concepts, procedures, and techniques.

U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia brought out once again the pressing need for trained personnel to operate a Tactical Air Control System. The first TACS elements were deployed in 1961, manned with hastily indoctrinated replacement personnel. Meanwhile, in the United States, tactical units were being stripped of highly qualified pilots and technicians to train and man the new TACS elements, particularly the Tactical Air Control Parties.

Southeast Asia has provided us with the opportunity to gain valuable experience in the techniques of tactical control. Literally thousands of Air Force people have been involved in the daily TACS operations and have become expert in the system. But once again, as happened after Korea, the talent is being ab-



## Forward Air Controller Aircraft

*The Tactical Air Control System relies on airborne forward air controllers for information required in directing strikes against targets they identify. FAC aircraft include the T-6, which carried phosphorous rockets for marking targets during the Korean War . . . the O-2A, shown during preflight briefing for a mission above the demilitarized zone . . . and the O-1 Bird Dog, borrowed from the Army for instantaneous capability in Vietnam.*

sorbed into other units. Although manning authorizations have been established for our post-SEA system, adequate, skilled TACS personnel will not be available for the next conflict unless the Air Force continues to maintain fully manned Tactical Air Control Systems as a portion of the combat-ready general-purpose forces. It is also essential that individuals who have had experience in the TACS be permanently identified so that any future expansion of the systems can be accomplished with a minimum of additional training.

### *TACS aircraft discarded*

As in the historic lack of emphasis given to TACS personnel requirements, little priority

was given to retention of an inventory of TACS aircraft. Throughout World War II and into the Korean conflict, the basic philosophy behind a forward air controller (FAC) centered in his function as adviser to ground force commanders and in the direction of air strikes from the ground. The utility of an airborne vantage point for controlling air came to light only in the latter stages of the European war when artillery spotters in light observation aircraft found it advantageous to assist the ground controller in sorting out enemy and friendly troops and pinpointing the target for air strikes. Unfortunately, with subsequent demobilization, the airborne FAC concept was submerged.

The outbreak of the Korean War saw the





FAC again directing strikes from the ground. It was not until the war was well under way that the idea of an airborne FAC re-emerged, and T-6 aircraft were modified to carry white phosphorous rockets for target marking. These "Mosquito" aircraft again proved the value of an airborne forward air controller and provided the basis for today's doctrine and procedures. As in the past, however, the airborne FAC concept was given a low priority in the demobilization which began in 1953, and the T-6 aircraft were phased out of the USAF inventory.

Ten years later military activity in South Vietnam increased, and the idea of an airborne FAC was rekindled. Because little interest had been generated in retaining an air-

borne FAC capability, it is not surprising that the Air Force was unable to find a suitable FAC aircraft within its inventory to meet this new requirement. However, by borrowing from the U.S. Army, a force of O-1 aircraft was assembled at Bien Hoa in July 1963.

The remainder of the FAC aircraft story is common knowledge. The O-1 Bird Dog continued to be the only FAC aircraft in service until early 1967, when an off-the-shelf commercial aircraft, the O-2, began service. Five years after the activation of the Bien Hoa O-1 squadron, and roughly a quarter of a century after the airborne artillery spotter began his unofficial control of air strikes, the first aircraft designed for the FAC role, the OV-10 Bronco, entered combat. From that time the

OV-10 has repeatedly justified its worth as a specially designed combat aircraft.

The airborne FAC concept has proved to be an integral, necessary part of the Tactical Air Control System. However, the FAC aircraft force has historically disappeared from the inventory between wars and has not reappeared until the next conflict forced us to re-equip. Until the Bronco arrived, the aircraft which filled the requirement had been hand-me-down or off-the-shelf commercial aircraft needing modification to meet exacting performance requirements. We can ill afford to discard our FAC aircraft again as we have done after each of the past wars. The day is past when it is practical to buy a commercial, liaison-type aircraft to perform the mission and satisfy the needs of the commander for strike control. In future conflicts we may not be permitted the extended development time that we have been allowed in past conflicts.

*retention of facilities and equipment also critical*

The requirement for facilities and equipment associated with the TACS also lost significant support soon after termination of the Korean War. An effort was made during the nonwar years to develop portions of a total TACS facility, but many of the programs failed or were discarded almost as soon as they were introduced. For example, the 412L Air Weapons Control System, which was to be an air-mobile control system, failed to meet specifications, and the project was abandoned.\* In any event, our development efforts and buy programs were marginal, and as a result the early TACS facilities and equipment available for Vietnam were limited in number and provided less than satisfactory service. Extra-

\*The equipment for the single 412L system that was produced before the project was abandoned eventually became a portion of the fixed control system currently in use in USAFE.

*An EC-121D Warning Star of the College Eye Task Force heads out over the Gulf of Tonkin to provide radar surveillance of the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.*



ordinary initiative and an unrelenting determination by the pioneers of the USAF TACS in Vietnam combined to overcome most of the handicaps, and a workable system has been developed.

Again we must not let support for the system die when the aggression in SEA stops. It is essential that we continue to emphasize the requirement to provide our new tactical air control units with the best equipment available if we are to retain a state of readiness for future conflicts.

#### *R&D support for the TACS*

The decisive nature of modern warfare may deny us the time to improve the equipment of our TACS after hostilities have begun. Therefore, system capabilities must be continuously improved if we are to enhance our ability to exploit effectively the inherent flexibility of tactical air power. The dynamic pace of technological development makes it imperative that R&D support for the TACS not be de-emphasized after a Vietnam settlement as it was after World War II and the Korean War. For example, as a result of the low priority given research and development support for the TACS after World War II, command and control communication capabilities in Korea were inadequate. A makeshift U.S. Army radio-teletype system, in conjunction with a radio relay capability improvised by airborne forward air controllers, served as the only means by which air support could be requested. The inflexibility of this system prevented the optimum utilization of tactical air resources.

R&D efforts, resulting from experience in SEA, have already provided numerous improvements to the current Tactical Air Control System. These include more sophisticated FAC aircraft, improved communication vehicles and radios for use by the forward air controllers, new lightweight radar and ancillary support equipment, and compact air-ground communication facilities. These improvements have significantly increased present tactical air control capabilities.

Other projects under way are designed to

improve the current TACS. For example, the 407L program provides a significant improvement in the mobility and quality of the TACS ground elements. This program is evolutionary and requires continued support for the development of improved equipment. Equally important is the requirement for an airborne warning and control capability for the TACS to deploy worldwide on a moment's notice in support of any contingency. To meet this need we have under development a Tactical Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which will be an integral part of the TACS. Housed in a jet airframe, the Tactical AWACS will be an integrated and self-contained control element equipped with sophisticated sensor and communications capabilities that will provide surveillance and control deep into enemy territory, far beyond the line-of-sight capability provided by present ground-based elements of the TACS. The requirement for continued support and development of these capabilities will not end with the onset of a cease-fire.

The premise of a future TACS is that it be a system with built-in growth potential. Automation must be emphasized so that future needs can be met by merely adapting the anticipated expansions of technology to the current requirement. It should be mobile enough to provide an immediate capability to control tactical air power in any area of the world. The hardware to be utilized by sub-components of the TACS should be easily transportable by either surface or air vehicle. Operations centers should be developed that are lightweight and quickly erectable, yet which can be hardened sufficiently to withstand ground attack. Other foreseeable improvements should include an improved three-dimensional radar, compact processors for message centers, and electronic direct-dialing systems to replace switchboards. Powerful yet easily transportable radios for use throughout the system are a basic necessity. Finally, a new FAC aircraft is needed to operate in the more hostile defense environments of the future.

R&D support for the TACS must be maintained and emphasized after the end of the



*A secondary explosion, with smoke billowing a hundred feet high, erupts from an enemy communications site, which was destroyed by fighter-bombers of the Seventh Air Force that were called in as a result of observations by a forward air controller.*

Vietnam conflict. The consequences of our failure to ensure adequate R&D support for TACS development after World War II and Korea provide ample incentive to emphasize this support beyond Vietnam.

*challenge for the future*

The requirement for an effective in-being system at the onset of any future conflict is reflected in the current Air Force Programming Documents. We have provided for five post-SEA TACS, which will include air liaison officers/forward air controllers and FAC aircraft. These requirements should be aggressively supported. The shortcomings of the past must not be repeated if the concept of single air management within a joint centralized system is to be realized. If the single manager concept can provide both economy and efficiency to air operations at all levels of

warfare, its effectiveness must be protected and expanded with the same vigor given any weapon system or developmental project.


The single air management concept and the tactical air control system selected for retention should be actively supported by all services and should be available, viable, and responsive to the needs of the highest national authorities. Developmental tasks should be identified that will provide significant R&D improvements to tactical equipment and operating capabilities across the entire air control spectrum. Above all, TACS capabilities must not be subordinated in the future as they were after World War II and Korea. Today's requirement is to add to the knowledge we have gained in this and previous conflicts and to ensure that a system and a capability for the integrated direction of all combat air are available for tomorrow.

*Hq United States Air Force*

# CONCEPTS, OBJECTIVES, AND DOCTRINE

*Guidelines for  
Air Force  
Thought  
and Action*

CAPTAIN HENRY VICCELLIO, JR.



LET'S face it—it's hard to find much fun in planning. Saddled with the responsibility for making theory and practice compatible, more than one good man has gone down for the third time. While a quick look around can usually reassure us that things in general are running smoothly, daily experiences often seem to indicate that perfection is indeed unattainable. Sometimes things just won't work out the way one would like them to. For the eager and capable junior officer, nearly every regulation may seem to say the same thing: "If you haven't done it, you can't do it." One hoping to make it home on leave cannot understand why that C-141 is taking off nearly empty while the passenger-terminal types insist that no seats are available, pointing out some obscure subparagraph as justification. Finally, despite best management practices, things are costing too much—that one is certainly at the top of quite a few lists today!

If you have never been one of the planners, you have undoubtedly often cursed those upon whom you seem to be eternally dependent. Trapped in an endless web of seemingly inadequate regulations, procedures, restrictions *ad infinitum*, you become sure that everyone involved has reached what a recent best-seller refers to as his "level of incompetence."<sup>1</sup> Obviously, something has happened between theory and reality—in a manner that has drastically compromised the feasibility of the former.

While the situation is seldom as hopeless as it may seem during moments like these, problems do exist. In fact, the difficulties of making things work are by no means peculiar to the simple regulation of daily activities. As the scope of one's responsibility increases, so do the consequences of inadequate preparation and planning. The load is perhaps greatest on those who are responsible for shaping and effecting Air Force contributions to the broadest interests, national security policy.

Given some of the popular conceptions (or misconceptions) of the Air Force, the nature and scope of its contributions to national objectives might be easily misinter-

preted. Even the seemingly simple, well-known "to fly and fight" mission statement belies, in a way, the true nature of the organization. Functional requirements and responsibilities in a variety of fields demand interests and efforts of diverse character. For example, behind the obvious operational capabilities of our forces lie scores of management and support activities which, when considered apart, often seem to bear little or no relation to the end product. Ensuring that efforts "across the board" and at every level maintain relevance to our basic purposes and goals is an essential task. Each agency and, indeed, each individual must have some common denominator to which goals can be related and efforts directed. Efforts to provide such a common basis for thought and action have resulted in concepts, objectives, and doctrine that constitute guidelines for Air Force-wide congruent efforts.

#### *early efforts*

In itself, the need for planning guidelines—for concepts, objectives, and doctrine—is not a revolutionary thought. In fact, it is widely recognized as an important function of good management. While various agencies within the Air Force have pursued such activity for some time, it has traditionally been in a rather disorganized manner without adequate inter-agency coordination. It was not until 1961 that an office within the Air Staff was established to look at planning in a truly corporate sense. Under the auspices of this group, the Air Force developed some thirty-three Objective Series (AFOS) papers, each concerned with a specific problem area, to be used as the basis for long-range planning. Although centrally directed and managed, these papers still represented fragmented, autonomous areas of interest from which the "big picture" was difficult to discern. Moreover, continuity within the series was soon lost, since initiation and revision of a given paper were carried out on an "as needed" basis. As a result, the AFOS papers failed to provide sufficient interrelationship and coordination between individual objectives; ad hoc interpretation and action

characterized the undertakings themselves; and Air Force staff officers had no generally accredited source from which to develop long-term analyses or positions.

Fully recognizing the need for effective long-range planning, the Air Force carefully analyzed the shortcomings of the AFOS papers, as well as the rationale originally supporting the effort. The underlying problem was the "shotgun" approach to planning induced by lack of coordination. Although it seemed reasonable to break down the whole of long-range planning into independently manageable parts, the sum of such parts did not present an Air Force-wide "position." Generally speaking, it had become obvious that overall conceptual views needed to be formulated and expressed within a framework of realistic trends and constraints, while at the same time achieving and retaining a consistency among objectives. As a result, on 18 November 1964 the Vice Chief of Staff announced: "The determination has been made to publish a single USAF objective planning document . . . to be known as *The Air Force Plan* . . . to be published and revised annually. . . ." This announcement constituted only the first of several actions aimed at giving the Air Force a centrally directed agency specifically and singularly responsible for the development of planning guidelines—an agency such as exists today.

#### *current organization*

Within the Air Staff and subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, is the Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives. This directorate has primary responsibility for the formulation and evaluation of the planning guidelines. In essence, this means that the directorate is the focal point for Air Force-wide efforts affecting concept, objective, and doctrine formulation.

Since its inception in 1966, a primary responsibility of the directorate has been the annual preparation and publication of *USAF Planning Concepts*. Evolved from the aforementioned *Air Force Plan* concept, this document provides much of the broad guidance

upon which planning for the next fifteen years should be based. By recording conceptual philosophy and expressing basic beliefs against an outline of environmental limitations, it provides an authoritative view of what the Air Force stands for, as well as a basis for understanding the context within which we operate. Attention is focused on issues and attitudes given high priority within the Air Force. It allows the Air Force for the first time to actively present its views in an integrated form—an obvious improvement over local reactive response to inquiries and challenge.

The development of *USAF Planning Concepts* reflects the decreasing scope of responsibility as one moves from the general terms of national interests to the more specific nature of Air Force contributions to those interests. Inasmuch as the only legitimate purpose of military forces is to support national objectives and policies, Air Force concepts and objectives must of necessity be derived from an understanding of national policy considerations. By clearly understanding such broad objectives, commanders and planners at lower levels can avoid much of the inflexibility that comes from being overly specific or having a narrow view of situations. This pitfall has special significance for the Air Force, since we often perceive things in terms directly related to operational capabilities. For example, strategies and postures have at times been shaped by hardware characteristics, in spite of management efforts aimed at making technological progress responsive to policy and strategy. The best-known illustration is the atomic bomb—a reality long before the development of a strategy for its peacetime employment.

*USAF Planning Concepts* reflects most major expressions of national policy in order to provide responsible Air Force personnel with a uniform and adequate assessment of the situation, a clear understanding of the Air Force position, and a close familiarity with desired objectives. It then relates both current and envisioned Air Force roles, missions, and capabilities to national policy.

The first step in this process is the formulation of a strategic appraisal. If a reasoned assessment of the future environment is ap-



plied to strategic concepts, then our strengths, weaknesses, and needed changes become more apparent. Building upon such a revelation—and objective analysis can indeed yield that kind of result—the capabilities required for continued effectiveness can be better ascertained, enabling a desired or objective force to be given the character needed to guide planners. Besides contributing to congruence of thought and effort within the Air Force itself, such a logical statement of principles and requirements can provide direction for R&D efforts relating to current and envisioned mission fields. Moreover—and of particular consequence today—the Secretary of Defense and Congress can be provided a sound rationale in support of requested budgetary allocations.

*USAF Planning Concepts* represents, then, an important first step in the planning process which determines the USAF contribution to national security objectives. This in no way implies, however, that it applies solely at the highest levels of staff effort. On the contrary, it represents some of the most basic thoughts and principles governing our efforts—thoughts and principles that must, in order to retain their relevance, relate to and affect every level of Air Force activity.

Another important function of the directorate is the authoritative delineation of aerospace doctrine. Perhaps most often defined in layman's terms as "that which we believe," doctrine is in essence the principles and proven concepts which govern the structure and employment of our combat and peace-keeping capabilities. Generally, doctrine is derived from the accumulation of knowledge gained through study, research, and, above all, military experience. In the more specific terms of day-to-day activities, doctrine is embodied in the definitions, characteristics, requirements, procedures, and clearly depicted considerations which determine the nature of Air Force activities.

Doctrine can be classified according to either its orientation or the scope of its applicability. In the most general sense, and at the most fundamental level, it is expressed in the form of broad, general principles and is re-

ferred to as *basic doctrine*. In such form, it clearly relates the existence of aerospace forces to overall national security objectives and describes the ways in which such forces can best be employed in support of these objectives. Of a more specific nature is *operational doctrine*, which covers the principles and procedures for accomplishing the various functions assigned to the Air Force. Directly influenced by both technological advance and operational capabilities, operational doctrine serves to determine the nature and direction of subsequent developmental and operational endeavor. Finally, *unified doctrine* relates to the employment of military forces in support of joint operations; it is promulgated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It pertains to much more than just aerospace forces, being applicable to all participating services and guiding the operations of the unified and specified commands.<sup>2</sup>

The staff activities associated with the promulgation of aerospace doctrine can be both complex and difficult. To become effective, doctrine must be implemented as well as formulated. Within the context of current Department of Defense organization, implementation of doctrine is often directly related to the definition and justification of our roles and missions as a military service. This in itself can become an activity of major proportion which must be continually supported and sustained by relevant, credible concepts, objectives, and doctrine. These basic tenets—our guidelines for thought and action—must reflect a continuing effort to acknowledge and respond effectively to a changing situation and changing needs. Doctrine characterized by relevance, responsiveness, and sensitivity is our best insurance against dogma parochially protected through reaction and pride. If the Air Force is going to sustain its important contributions to national objectives, the doctrine for which it stands—the principles on which it bases its very existence—must always remain valid.

#### *associated activities*

In support of these primary functions, the

Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives is responsible for maintaining an active liaison with various agencies not directly involved in the Air Force planning process.<sup>3</sup> Through various programs, a continuous dialogue is effected with civilian and military scientific communities, prominent "lay strategists," and industrial elements directly related to the field of national security policy. By maintaining such an interchange of conceptual ideas, Air Force principles and policies are actively presented in an attempt to promote correlation between military and related civilian activities. At the same time these tenets are themselves subjected to scrutiny, often from a fresh viewpoint. The result is an improvement in the quality and scope of our planning guidelines.

A Policy Planning Studies Program was established in 1962 to provide Air Force planners with contractual, interdisciplinary studies concerned with defense policy and military strategy, future strategic problems, and operational capabilities. National and international developments bearing direct relation to U.S. Air Force interests are analyzed. The probable nature of future political, economic, and military environments is investigated to provide a firm foundation for our expected requirements. Conducted by civilian research organizations employing political-military analysts of varied backgrounds, these studies are aimed at helping planners think more systematically about reasonably anticipated situations that will directly influence Air Force activities. More specifically, the studies aid in the development of new ideas, concepts, and insights concerning national security problems, in foreseeing the character of future environments, and in the composition and employment of future force structures.

While the scope of subjects for possible study is enormous, considerable effort is expended to ensure that the subjects chosen for study adequately correspond to known gaps in the knowledge required for formulation of our planning guidelines. Filling such gaps is essential to ensure that military strategy does not lag behind environmental change or technological progress. First, a screening process

rejects those proposed studies that are not relevant to Air Force needs. Subsequently, and throughout the period of actual research, a program monitor is responsible for providing guidance and indirect supervision to the principal investigator and for reporting periodically on the progress being made. At the termination of the research, an evaluation of the study is made by pertinent Air Staff agencies to determine its exact utility and applicability. Finally, the study is disseminated to appropriate agencies in accordance with recommendations made by the evaluators and becomes another input for policy guidance. While the "rightness"—the absolute validity—of a given study or thesis simply cannot be assured, the program as a whole has provided a valuable basis for more informed judgments in critical areas.

Another more personalized channel of productive dialogue between military and civilian strategists is afforded by the Air Force Research Associates Program. Through this program eight to ten field-grade officers serve one-year tours at prominent civilian study centers concerned with strategic policy formulation.<sup>4</sup> Working in close professional association with well-known scholars of international affairs, foreign policy, and national strategy, the research associates actively participate in a real give-and-take environment. Besides presenting Air Force policies, principles, and ways of thinking to nonmilitary elements, they are exposed to and participate in the formulation of new approaches to strategic problem-solving, thus greatly enhancing their own personal experience and insight. A number of former participants in the Research Associates Program are now serving at general officer and senior colonel levels within the Air Staff and other policy planning agencies.<sup>5</sup>

Planners have traditionally faced the problem of maintaining adequate responsiveness to the needs, problems, and questions of personnel in the field. Apparent disinterest or insensitivity on the part of higher headquarters has at times brought on pointed references to "ivory tower" types who are responsible for making (or failing to make) things work. With this in mind, it should be emphasized that the

concepts, objectives, and doctrine which exist to help us orient our activities are not dictated as law from above. On the contrary, they are guidelines, formed and sustained by dialogue. *USAF Planning Concepts*, for example, is in no way a *plan*, in no way a directive. It provides, instead, a basis for the dialogue which sustains experience as the prime mover behind our reasoned changes.

To maximize the scope and productivity of this dialogue, the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives makes a sustained and concerted effort to interact with field personnel. Briefings and discussions are held with classes of the Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, Squadron Officer School, and other service schools. Officers of the directorate participate in many of the activities of various agencies involved in shaping the Air Force contribution to national defense. For example, mission analyses conducted at the major air command level receive particular attention to ensure coordination with overall principles and capabilities. The "face-to-face" environments of the annual USAF Worldwide Plans and Operations Conference and Inter-Service Long Range Planners' Conference provide an informal atmosphere in which the philosophy and rationale supporting plans, policies, and postures can perhaps best be discussed. Although discussion at this level may seem still far removed from the individual in the field, such efforts to bring theory and practice closer together can and do have great impact upon the way each person contributes to the Air Force, as well as the way the Air Force contributes to the nation.

Perhaps the most effective way that the viewpoints and requirements of the major air commands can find expression in our overall principles is through their contributions to the continuous process of concept, objective, and doctrine formulation. Building upon existing ideas and principles as expressed in *USAF Planning Concepts* and other sources, each command annually formalizes its own objectives, which become important inputs for the subsequent revision of overall guidelines. While nearly everyone is familiar with the

popular depictions of intercommand battles for responsibility and emphasis, such contention is in fact minimized by the broad scope of the formulation process itself. Although the capabilities and contributions of the major operational components are reviewed in detail, the general thrust of the end product relates each of those components to the overall Air Force commitment to national objectives.

Through such programs and activities as these, the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives maintains a continuous effort to be both responsive and responsible to Air Force needs for planning guidelines. Although the ultimate responsibility for formulation of concept, objective, and doctrine rests with this single agency, emphasis on dialogue—as opposed to monologue—never ceases. Every effort is aimed at minimizing our uncertainties, since policy guidelines must be drawn from experience and reasoned assessment, never dictated from uncertainty.

#### *the need for relevance*

Successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.<sup>6</sup>

Whether one refers to broad concepts, more specific objectives, or well-defined doctrinal principles, the measure of effectiveness is always the adequacy and appropriateness with which they support the United States' basic national goals. To ensure adequacy and appropriateness, ideas and principles alike must prove relevant; that is, they must reflect an accurate estimate and analysis of the environment within which they are to be applied.

As nearly every American is made plainly (and at times painfully) aware, today's environment is one characterized by change. Strategic relationships established during the early years of the cold war are being rapidly and radically modified by Soviet technological advances and the emergence of Third World nations—generally underdeveloped and often nonaligned. Youth, life styles, and increasing social awareness are combining to shift popular attitudes on a variety of issues with a rapidity which often makes tradition itself suspect.

Within this context one doesn't have to be an intellectual to be aware that traditional views on the role of the Air Force, as one segment of the Defense Establishment, are being challenged. In many eyes, some of our current military policies, programs, and philosophies are seen as irrelevant in light of perceived political and strategic realities. For example, a significant segment of the American populace, influenced by popular views relating to "mutual deterrence" and "détente," sees the strategic threat to this country as a declining one. At the same time, reaction to the social and economic exigencies of the emerging nations and frustrations stemming from the conflict in Vietnam combine to give increased popular support to a re-evaluation of our commitments abroad. Finally, changing social attitudes, bolstered by these sentiments, are challenging the traditional priority of many activities relating to national security interests. Increased emphasis on domestic problems is becoming a popular demand. Critics warn of the grave dangers implied by an entrenched and politically powerful "military-industrial complex," preoccupied more with its own sustenance than with environmental realities. Far more than simply the ravings of misinformed radicals, such criticisms have today attained a degree of popular acceptance that makes them a serious and legitimate challenge to traditional views on military roles and priorities.

Changes such as these are prescribing as never before a requirement for innovative and sensitive response. The character of current inadequacies has been expressed in many ways:

The time has come to stop mourning over formulas that served so well in the past, over blueprints for the future that have been made obsolete by changing events. What was reasonable in 1949 is often unreasonable today; what was visionary in the mid-1950s is reactionary in the late 1960s.<sup>7</sup>

While the tone of such statements may be a bit too absolute, their general thrust illuminates clearly the current need for re-examination of our programs, strategies, and postures. Necessarily, the guidelines for such

reassessment must themselves reflect a high degree of relevance, for otherwise the resulting changes and responses to change will be inadequate. While ensuring such adequacy and relevance is the principal task of the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, the Air Force answer to the challenges of the future will require efforts of much greater scope. This is a challenge which we *all* face; moreover, it is a challenge we face *today*.

#### *involvement—the best response to challenge*

Individual, personal involvement is a major key to organizational success. Correctly managed, it becomes the driving force behind productive effort and responsive change. Unfortunately, however, the achievement of such motivation on a large scale can be a very difficult task. The inherent character of any sizable organization tends to inhibit a visible relationship between effort and result. For example, there are few members of any large bureaucracy who at one time or another have not felt insignificant when contemplating the nature of organizational activity as a whole. The lack of any visible means of personal contribution is today a widespread personnel management problem. Energetic, dynamic people—the ultimate resource—must be involved. To deny them this interest—indeed, this *right*—serves no purpose. The organization that fails to offer involvement is being, to that extent, counterproductive. Faced with today's and tomorrow's challenges, the Air Force can in no way afford to become counterproductive. Our human resources require management equal to, if not greater than, that required by our material resources. Every man's effort is required in the form of thought as well as action.

Toward this end, the Air Force must continually strive to become less of an "it" and more of a "we." While the material advantages of fringe benefits, travel, and exotic duty may serve to make service life initially attractive, the challenges for continued involvement require a more complex, psycho-

logically oriented response to individual need.

A high degree of personal involvement among Air Force personnel is an absolute prerequisite to meeting the challenges of today's changing environment. Maintaining a relevant contribution to national security while improving organizational character is going to require our best efforts. Again, this challenge for involvement is not an aggregate one, posed to a faceless bureaucracy. On the contrary, it is an individual challenge, to be weighed very seriously by every officer and airman who timidly passes on the "All's well" to his superiors, who avoids constructive conflict, and who opts for the security of meaningless unanimity in place of productive dissent. For the commander, these challenges imply many things. They imply the continuing effort to relate activity and energy to objectives. They also imply the delegation of authority within an atmosphere of confidence, even while recognizing that the lines of responsibility preclude "passing the buck" when things go wrong. For the planner, the challenges imply above all else the conscious effort to relate to others' problems. For the individual it means an active interest in the

"why" of things, as opposed to simply filling the squares.

Within the Air Force, our concepts, objectives, and doctrine can serve as guidelines for response to these challenges—for the commander, the planner, and the individual alike. The dialogue through which these ideas and principles are formulated and disseminated can be greatly enhanced by the participation of personally involved individuals. Personal experience, the major source of our guidelines for effort, takes on greater meaning when the individual is able to identify with the purposes and goals of the organization. In turn, these guidelines can themselves aid in that process of identification. Dialogue, then, refers to much more than intraorganizational consensus. It refers to communication between the organization and its members. If we are going to meet our challenges today, we must become involved in that dialogue. Understanding the principles and purposes of "the" Air Force is the first step toward making it more of "our" Air Force, and a better one at that.

*Hq United States Air Force*

#### Notes

1. Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull, *The Peter Principle* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1969).

2. See Air Force Manual 1-1, *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine*, 14 August 1964.

3. For a more detailed functional breakdown in associated areas, see *Department of the Air Force, Organization and Functions* (HP 21-1), 31 October 1967, pp. 122-25.

4. Participating centers to date have included the Center for International Affairs, Harvard; Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stanford Re-

search Institute; Council on Foreign Relations; Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania; Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

5. Among others, Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, Jr., Major General Glenn A. Kent, and Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh.

6. General George S. Patton, Jr., *War as I Knew It* (1947).

7. Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 69.



*The National Security Council is set up  
to do one thing—advise the President.  
I make the decisions, and there is  
no use trying to put any respon-  
sibility on the National Security  
Council—it's mine.*

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## REVITALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

MAJOR JOHN F. McMAHON, JR.

**T**HE need to develop forward-looking policies to ensure our security dictates the establishment of a national security organization that is responsive to the needs of our time and can withstand the test of circumstance and personality. President Nixon has attempted to create such an organization, by "revitalizing" the National Security Council system of the United States government. Our National Security Council system has been the object of criticism since its creation in 1947. Four Presidents structured machinery to improve its capability, yet the criticism continued. A review of this criticism leads one to believe that the only answer to effective national security policy is to establish an intricate balance of organization and people. "Revitalization" of the National Security Council system presupposes that a proper person-to-organization relationship will foster sound policy and enhance its effective execution, thereby achieving this balance. While many of the proposals (past and present) for a modification of the National Security Council system are at wide variance,

they all reflect a common concern over the adequacy of the existing machinery for developing and executing national security policy. However, virtually all proposals for modification emphasize the importance of executive leadership if the Council is to function effectively and recognize the need for highly competent advice from the Council members if the President is to exercise his leadership.

Never before in our history have the security of our nation and the peace of the world depended so much upon policy decisions made by the President of the United States. Policies developed for our security have a far-reaching impact on other nations throughout the world. These policies cannot be solely within geographical limitations or solely on political, economic, or military terms. In one sense, perhaps there is no such thing as "domestic," "foreign," "military," or even "farm" policy. There is a national security policy, and in developing it the entire Government plays a part. No longer can there be an "overlord" of our national security policy other than the President himself.

National security is not the special prerogative of any department or agency; it involves manifold domestic, foreign, and military considerations. Inescapably, the President must provide the direction. The only purpose of the National Security Council or any other machinery to deal with these problems is to assist and advise the President in arriving at decisions with respect to these matters. While it is the President who will make the decisions and determine the manner in which he will seek advice, his supporting organization can be of inestimable value in aiding him to meet the demands of executive leadership. Regardless of the organizational structure, a major problem will continue to be the interweaving of different points of view into a national course of action that will strengthen the fabric of our national security. The task is onerous.

Whereas some sixty-three years ago Secretary of State Elihu Root could disregard reports of crisis in the Middle East by cabling the American envoy, "Continue quarrels with missionaries as usual," a similar crisis today

generates terse instructions to diplomats all over the world, brings world opinion to bear in the United Nations, compels military commanders to bring their forces to the ready, causes anxious decisions in Washington, and triggers emergency sessions of the National Security Council.<sup>1</sup> In today's complex world, the President needs a good deal of assistance in carrying out the terrible responsibility for developing national security policy and directing its execution. The President must perform the functions of Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, and leader of his political party at the same time; however, he cannot plan, formulate, coordinate, and supervise the execution of policy at the same time. In addition to the normal operational delegation of responsibilities, there is always a need for proper assistance in the planning of the nation's long-range security program. No one questions the need for this assistance. However, there are sharp differences of opinion as to whether the requirement is best satisfied by interdepartmental planning procedures or by delegating responsibility for national planning to a specialized instrument of government. In any event, it is the President who makes the final decision on the major questions.

On 2 December 1968, then President-elect Nixon announced the appointment of Dr. Henry Kissinger as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This appointment set the stage for what the President-elect called a "revitalization" of the National Security Council as well as White House long-range security planning. The planning function of the national security machinery was to be "strengthened" while the operations function was to be relegated to the appropriate departments of government. The President-elect further stated that Dr. Kissinger was selected in order to bring new ideas and new men into the Administration "to do some creative thinking." Specifically, he declared that the White House planning function and the national security machinery would be directed toward more long-range thinking and planning. "Men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the ability to do creative thinking

too often get bogged down in reading the interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems they are concerned with." He stated that it was "vitaly important" to have a capability for creative thinking as well as formal "planning procedures" so that the United States does not just "react to events." In effect, "crisis diplomacy" had to be replaced with established machinery and channels in order to develop well-thought-out contingency plans to apply when a crisis occurred.<sup>2</sup>

The President-elect emphasized that "leadership in foreign affairs flows today from the President—or it does not flow at all. . . . Certainly the Secretary of State has the most backbreaking job within the Cabinet. I think it takes two men. And I intend to have a strong Secretary of State." At the same time, Mr. Nixon served notice that the Secretary of State would not be the sole overlord of policy, as conflict would be built into the new national security machinery. "I want to have conflicts. The honest differences of opinion which we know do exist between the Departments, or within a Department, I want laid before the National Security Council, and particularly before the President, so that he will know what the arguments are, so that he can make the determination as to what the policy should be." In this scheme of things, there is the intent that more effort be directed to long-range thinking in the White House and a more conscious emphasis be directed to long-range planning in the several departments, with operating functions "pushed as far as possible into the Departments."<sup>3</sup>

Instead of replacing one experiment with another, President Nixon is seeking to develop an eclectic working model from the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson models. The key elements of the Nixon national security organization are the National Security Council staff under a Special Assistant, the Council composed of designated department and agency heads, a Review Group composed of deputy and assistant department heads, an Under Secretaries Committee, and a series of regionally oriented organizations called Interdepartmental Groups. "Revitalization" in-

volves solving a problem that is partly one of mechanism and partly one of substance. Any effective remodeling of the administrative machinery will reflect the fact that political and economic considerations are entangled inextricably with military strategy.

Two factors which stood out in the President's announced "revitalization" of the National Security Council system made it imperative that a new approach in organizing for policy planning in the 1970s be instituted throughout the Government:

(1) No one Department or Agency has the expertise or capability in depth to be the sole "overlord" of U.S. national security policy.

(2) Compartmented and ad hoc security policy must be replaced by long-range planning which is predicated on "orderly conceptual thinking."

The Administration is striving for a system which will integrate long-range conceptual thinking and departmental planning functions. The system allows variant ideas and departmental views to mesh readily or be sharpened for final presentation to the National Security Council as alternatives for final debate prior to Presidential decision. Basic issues are not permitted to become so concealed in compromise that the problems are not identifiable.

There can be no denying that this nation's security position has suffered severe damage in the past. Certainly, it would be unfair to blame the real or imagined failings of American foreign policy on any element of the total governmental organization. However, it is tempting to blame a national security system for some of the decisions which have been termed mistakes in the last few years. While the National Security Council and its supporting structure represent only a small part of the whole, it is clearly the most important single element and, to a considerable degree, sets the pattern for the whole. Without a formally structured system reaching down to the expertise possessed throughout the government departments, detailed plans which give effect to the basic security decisions cannot be made.

Broad planning requires the knowledge and experience of the expert and also the



resources and the environment of the department with the main responsibility for the operations being planned. Only in the department concerned can one find logically the extended creative planning which results in clear and purposeful policy proposals. Planning that does not involve the constant participation of those responsible for carrying out the plans is a formula with built-in hazards. It takes on an academic tone, and the operators ignore the plans. Of course, as the planning process takes place, there must be cross-feeding and cross-stimulation between experts in the several departments at the level where the planning is done. If this Administration is to put together a clearly defined national security program of requirements and priorities, then planning will have to be focused in the several departments where the experts have the time for reflection and creative thinking.

Before the executors of United States policy can decide what the nation ought to do, they must learn from the political, economic, and military experts what the nation is able to do. Objectives are measured alongside capabilities; in the making of national security policy, ends are measured against means. Top-level executives cannot be expected to participate actively in this initial planning process. They do not have the time to explore single issues deeply and systematically. They cannot argue—and should not have to argue—advantages and disadvantages at length in the kind of give-and-take essential to boil the matter down to specific issues. The top-level executives need to be confronted with the specific issues which grow out of an effort to harmonize a new policy with other policies. Key members of the National Security Council Review Group concern themselves with identifying departmental conflicts, attempting to resolve these conflicts, defining them sharply, and presenting the distilled issues to the National Security Council for final discussion and ultimate decision by the President. Good plans must be coherent; they must be problem-solving oriented; and their various elements must be harmonious and self-supporting. They must have the kind

of logic that emanates from “orderly conceptual thinking” and the imagination of a creative mind. The efforts of the creative mind must remain uncompromised until after the planning process is completed. At that time, an adjustment of conflicts between coherent plans should take place.

A conscious emphasis on planning, with long-range thinking having a persuasive bearing in the planning process, will go a long way toward preparing the nation better to meet crises when they come and thus mitigate their effects. Delegating the responsibility for basic planning to the several departments takes advantage of the expertise of the men who generate new ideas daily in their attempts to solve problems with the means available to them. Creative thought generally springs from daily concern with real problems. The solution of the relationship of planning to operations is to place these functions in the several departments where expertise and creative effort can combine to produce clearly defined and purposeful national security issues. Clearly, planning is a function of the several departments, interdepartmental groups, and ad hoc White House groups appointed by the President.

There is a tendency to mold organizations to fit the personality of a single leader or a handful of leaders. The stakes are too great, however, for this nation to depend on the all-pervasive wisdom of our top leadership. Organizationally, the national security system should provide a program which will strengthen the performance of our leaders, whatever their caliber, and make an excellent leader even more effective. In the last analysis, the National Security Council system can be no more effective than the President wishes it to be, but this should not deter seeking the best system for all time.

## **The National Security Council**

The nation realizes that American security policy has outgrown the informal cabinet or ad hoc committee concept, just as the atom and manned space flight have outgrown the

laboratory. The National Security Council (NSC) is a device by which the different departments concerned with national security can meet; discuss their problems and differences on issues to reconcile unimportant disagreements; and, on major disagreements, attempt to expose weaknesses in each other's arguments—all at the level of key Cabinet members in the presence and for the benefit of the President. The objective of the Council is to relate military, foreign, and domestic policies by providing a forum to our policy-makers. It is the Council's duty "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power. . . ." <sup>4</sup> Its function is that of a forum for debate and through debate a channel of information for all concerned. In its deliberations the Council seeks to avoid interdepartmental matters which, even though related to national security, can properly be resolved at a lower echelon without reference to the President. The Council formalizes a continuing relationship between those responsible for foreign and military policies—of utmost importance in an age of unprecedented crises.

While the purposes of the National Security Council are clear, its specific functioning is a subject of concern. There seems to be real doubt as to whether the Council is meant to resolve differences of opinion or simply to bring them into the open. Members of the Council must assist in seeking the most statesmanlike solution to a problem and strive to place themselves above departmental interests so that they can judge the soundness of the issues presented in terms of the national interest vis-à-vis their own operations. The basic interdepartmental issues cannot be permitted to confuse the fundamental issues of national security. Council members, understandably, will have differences in outlook because national security issues are inherently complex. However, interdepartmental differences should be examined and resolved in the Review Group, or at a lower level if at all possible, and only significant issues should be addressed in the Council. The members of the Council cannot allow themselves to become

negotiators representing their departments, whereby they achieve a consensus in which the overall national viewpoint is lacking. In the past, NSC papers have been broad and sweeping in content, so that difficulty was encountered when one attempted to apply them to specific problems. The charge that "there is rarely, if ever, a clear national security policy to oppose clear-cut competing policies in other areas" <sup>5</sup> is serious and is being countered through "revitalization" of the intended role of the Council.

The law states that the Council's function is "to advise the President." This being so, it should be clear that the Council itself does not determine policy. It prepares advice for the President as his super-Cabinet-level committee on national security. With complete freedom to accept, reject, or amend the Council's advice and to consult with other members of the executive branch, the President exercises his prerogative to determine policy and enforce it. Furthermore, the Council has no responsibility for implementing policies which the President approves on the basis of its advice. The respective departments traditionally have carried, and continue to carry, this operating responsibility. Once a policy is determined, the departments establish the necessary programs and issue implementing orders to accomplish their share of the national security policy.

The primary contribution of the Council, then, is to attempt to reconcile some of the divergencies (issues) through debate before the President makes a final decision. To that end, the Council ensures that the President, in making policy decisions for our national security, has the benefit of all the facts, views, and opinions of the responsible officials in the executive branch and their considered judgments as to the proper course to take.

### *Review Group*

Although every effort is made in the Review Group (RG) to find the best solution from the departmental proposals in terms of our national security policy, there is no overriding requirement to interpret the "best"

solution as unanimity. If, after due consideration, departmental differences remain which cannot be reconciled short of dodging the issues or reaching a meaningless agreement, then the divergent views are stated clearly as contentious issues and together with the reasons behind them submitted to the Council for high-level debate and, hopefully, Presidential decision. In this manner, the President avails himself of the "honest differences of opinion which we know do exist between the Departments," and he is able to determine what the policy should be, based on the "arguments" presented before him.<sup>6</sup>

The purpose of the Review Group is to bring the total resources of the government to bear upon the clarification of issues, upon the sharpening of alternative policy proposals and their implications. The Group is composed of department representatives who are lesser counterparts to their bosses on the Council. These officials attempt to develop a concise and complete picture of the situation and of the policies to cope with it. They strive to agree upon a single policy to be recommended to the President, or else they submit to the Council alternative recommendations from which the President chooses one, or none.

President Nixon has stated that he wants to build "conflict" into the new national security machinery. He wants the "honest differences of opinion" laid before the Council, "and particularly before the President." He has implied that the Review Group will be utilized with a clear recognition that its members will, as they must, function primarily as instructed delegates and advocates of their departments. There is no harm, and a great deal of benefit, if both the President and the Council are faced with recommendations arising from a vested interest in the long-run national interest, as well as those arising from the specialized interests of the operating departments. The "lowest common denominator" is not sought by the President. It is obvious that he wishes to reach the "best" solution after *he* has heard the sharply defined issues discussed by his advisers.

As noted earlier, the responsibility for national security matters is not the prerogative

of a single department or agency of government. Although the supporting machinery will necessarily and properly function in accordance with the President's desires, there are two steps which are to be satisfied prior to the development of a policy paper for Presidential decision:

(1) The process of identifying emerging problems and contriving the means to deal with them.

(2) The development of proposals and shaping them into sharpened issues.

To satisfy these steps, the initial planning and staffing are accomplished by experts within the several departments. The proposals of the several departments then are examined, and an attempt is made to integrate them. Once the proposals have been sharpened into key issues and cross-stimulation and coordination have taken place, the results of the staff work are presented to the Review Group for final evaluation prior to submission to the Council.

To provide for continuity and to reduce the "overlord" tendency of any single department's establishing unprecedented control over the development of national security policy, the Review Group is chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the President's representative, he brings to the deliberations of the Group the long-range point of view. He is free to inject the views of his long-range planning staff to be tested for feasibility within the Review Group. His role is that of a conductor who attempts to develop a concert on the problem pending and is expected to forward his view, if it differs, along with other alternatives to the Council. The Special Assistant is concerned primarily with the substance of the recommendations going to the Council. A small administrative staff supports him in the final preparation of the results of the Review Group deliberations. Thus the Special Assistant represents primarily the planning link joining the White House, the Review Group, and the several operating departments.

#### *Under Secretaries Committee*

The Under Secretaries Committee (usc)

is subordinate to the National Security Council and is responsible for marshaling the total resources of the nation in order to execute the policy established by Presidential decision, as it pertains to interdepartmental activities overseas. It is responsible for assisting the operating departments and agencies in carrying out these established policies with maximum effectiveness. The Under Secretaries Committee is composed of representatives of those departments and agencies that have operating functions in the national security area. Its membership includes the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A primary concern in the "revitalization" of the national security organization is the establishment of a realistic role for the Under Secretaries Committee. First, it is necessary to establish the principal function of this committee, i.e., to assist in the integrated and effective implementation of national security policies assigned to it by the President for coordination. It should be noted that the Under Secretaries Committee reports to the Secretary of State and not to the National Security Council. Thus the Committee must strive for interdepartmental orientation to be effective. The Chairman must be willing to subordinate his departmental orientation to assure greater coordination of policy and to give the Committee status with respect to the departments and agencies. He must also be willing to subordinate personal views on implementation of policy to his task of coordinating the programs and operations of all departments and agencies so that a single national response is effected to carry out the President's decisions. The Under Secretaries Committee, then, is composed of personnel who combine the knowledge, judgment, character, and authority necessary to impose the President's will, through a chain of command of officials individually responsible for their agencies, upon the government.

#### *Interdepartmental Groups*

In addition to the Under Secretaries Com-

mittee, there is a series of working groups called Interdepartmental Groups. The latter are chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State and are composed of personnel representing the operating departments and agencies. These working groups conduct policy studies for the NSC. They prepare policy papers which set forth all significant options, evaluate the pros and cons of each option, and include a statement of the political and economic costs of each recommendation. These papers are sent to the Review Group for evaluation. The papers are studied and returned to the working groups if additional work is required or submitted to the NSC for consideration. Once the President makes a decision, the specific instructions are incorporated in National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM) and forwarded to the Under Secretaries Committee for implementation.

A concerted effort is needed to develop operational plans that cut across departmental lines. The Interdepartmental Groups develop plans which are applicable worldwide and can be implemented regionally without detracting from the overall national security objective. The Under Secretaries Committee has the potential to be a very effective device in the National Security Council system if the proper people/organization balance is achieved.

#### **Special Assistant for National Security Affairs**

Mr. Nixon has stated publicly that neither he nor Dr. Kissinger wanted to set up a "wall" in the White House between the President and his Secretaries of State and Defense: there was to be a "better staff" and a less free-wheeling attitude toward decision-making by White House assistants. He implied that national security advisers in the White House would not be involved in day-to-day operations. More specifically, the White House staff would be involved in long-range thinking and planning, while operating functions would rest with the departments and agencies.

In the "revitalized" National Security Council system, the Special Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs (SANSAs) directs a small group consisting of some of the most experienced national security affairs experts in the country as well as some of the most outstanding "thinkers" available. This group was established in the White House to look at problems with a longer range and broader view than could be taken by any of the departments of government. The latter are of necessity focused on the present and the immediate future; the task of developing policy to deal with these matters is in their purview. But the very tasks of developing policy and carrying it out limit them, in time and incentive, for looking ahead to discern new problems. The special need, as implied by the President, is for this group to project goals within the context of the future and to attempt to anticipate those problems that are peculiar precisely because they cut across the areas of responsibility of the several operating departments and agencies.

The staff of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs provides long-range planning guidance to the departments and agencies through the Review Group and the Under Secretaries Committee. In turn, the departments and agencies detail consultants to the White House, on request, in order to provide the Special Assistant and his staff with professional advice as to the capabilities possessed in the various operating agencies. The first-hand knowledge and expertise of the operating departments are used to flesh out theoretical models developed by the "think group" so that the result of long-range thinking can lend itself readily to long-range planning and ease of implementation for contingency plans responsive to the long-range policy objectives. For the sake of reality, "orderly conceptual thinking" must take place within the parameters imposed by the nation's present capabilities or projected capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger fills one other important role as Special Assistant to the President, that of chairman of the Review Group; as such he represents the planning link between the President and the operating departments and agencies. While the President has hinted that Dr. Kissinger is more of a staff assistant and

less of a policy-maker, the important role he plays as chairman of the Review Group provides the President with a first-person evaluation of the manner in which long-range thinking and long-range planning guidance are influencing the flow of options from the operating agencies.

During the past few years there seems to have been a tendency in the White House for policy to leap from crisis to crisis, to deal with the immediate and urgent and neglect the long-term and fundamental. As Mr. Nixon stated in an election campaign speech on 24 October 1968: "I attribute most of our serious reverses abroad since 1960 to the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower's successors to make effective use of this important Council [the NSC]." This phenomenon, hopefully, will be corrected through "revitalization."

LITTLE, if anything, has been said about the administrative staff or secretariat of the National Security Council, primarily because no significant changes in its functions have occurred under this "revitalization." Naturally, the Council staff has taken into account the "revitalization" of the system and adjusted to the minor changes. However, the adjustment has been one of orientation rather than structure.

Another subject not treated is the use of ad hoc study groups. The "revitalized" structure makes allowance for the formation of these ad hoc study groups or task forces which are used for consulting purposes and to focus on certain issues which it is felt need extra-governmental appraisal. These groups are in addition to the usual departmental consultants and come into being at the specific request of the President. Their findings are referred to the President and the Council and should be subject to study and comment by the operating agencies. This provision preserves Presidential prerogatives and tends to retain flexibility in the system, while providing, hopefully, fresh insights into the problems of national security. These ad hoc study groups,

however, should not be used as a panacea for crisis situations.

In addition to the foregoing, a Program Analysis Staff functions to support the Special Assistant in three areas: planning, programming, and operations. This staff is composed of personnel from State, Defense, CIA, the Bureau of the Budget, the military, and colleges and universities. They monitor the performance of the "revitalized" system, make sure the President's desires are carried out, assist in the planning and review of papers from the Interdepartmental Groups, and do preliminary work on new projects assigned by Dr. Kissinger. In effect this staff functions as Dr. Kissinger's personal staff.

OUR national security policy machinery is, at best, an imperfect organization working in an exceptionally difficult environment. Many critics have voiced their disapproval of the ways in which the last four Presidents have used the organization. Each President has attempted to mold the organization to his personality, and in some cases the system has not fared well. Regardless of the structure envisioned, the President makes of the system what he wishes.

The answer to effective national security policy is not simply "put the right people in the right job." Nor is the answer, as some claim, the creation of even more elaborate machinery. The answer seems to be to estab-

lish an intricate balance of organization and people dictated by a need to develop forward-looking policies to protect our security. The most efficient organization and the most effective conduct of our national security affairs depend upon an interdepartmental arrangement which strives to achieve the same clearly defined and well-understood objectives. The activities of the several departments and agencies must be designed not simply to deal with situations as they develop but, rather, to shape the trend of events and anticipate further contingencies. The operating departments and agencies must be depended upon for advice on national security matters because the expertise and knowledge possessed by them can never be matched by the few officials at the executive level.

It is essential, therefore, that the National Security Council system be responsive to the needs of our time. These needs presuppose a balance of organization and people necessary to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of our nation in this turbulent era. It is still too early to know, however, whether President Nixon has succeeded in achieving such a balanced approach for keeping the peace through his "revitalization" of the national security machinery.

*Hq United States Air Force*

#### Notes

1. Ernest R. May, "Development of Political/Military Consultation in the US," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 70, June 1955, p. 161.

2. Newspaper articles appeared daily on this subject. The most informative report was written by George Sherman, a *Washington Star* staff writer. "Nixon Aim: More Long-Range Thinking," *Washington Star*, 3 December 1968, p. 4.

3. *Ibid.*

4. National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

5. A lengthy evaluation of the Eisenhower NSC is contained in "The National Security Council," an unpublished manuscript by Donald S. Bussey.

6. Sherman, p. 4.

7. Radio address by Richard M. Nixon, broadcast over the CBS radio network, Thursday, 24 October 1968.



## THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

### *The Formulation of American Policy in a Revolutionary Era*

DR. ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

**T**ODAY, it is essential to put any aspect of our foreign relations in context. We live in the most extraordinary times in the history of man. This is an age at once more dramatic and decisive than that of the Roman and Mongol empires, the Renaissance, or the rise of the industrial West. It is more decisive in part because, for the first time, man is witness to an entire world in flux, not merely his own small portion. The incredibly rapid timing of events, moreover, as well as their scope, dwarfs anything mankind has known in the past. For centuries to come writers will mark this as one of the major turning points in human civilization and seek to analyze its meaning.

To us as actors on the contemporary stage, the essence of our times is extremely elusive. We are beset with paradoxes. Our

globe—indeed, our universe—is rapidly shrinking in time, in space, in every dimension of which we can conceive; yet this shrinking serves to highlight the differences of culture, values, and development among us, and the differences are growing, not diminishing. Modern society is supposedly capped by a system of law and the goal of equality under the law, yet ours is essentially a lawless age in which violence, domestic and international, is an omnipresent fact of life. Furthermore, within each so-called “advanced” society, functional specialization and the resulting interdependence have produced an unprecedented need for community, yet anomie helps to fuel the fires of dissidence.

We have now discovered that the problems of affluence are at least as serious as the problems of poverty. The scientific-technolog-

ical revolution through which we are now passing is the most far-reaching revolution mankind has yet experienced; it is bequeathing new problems not easily solved—in some cases not even acknowledged. The more obvious ones, to be sure, are all too apparent: overpopulation, pollution, and the alcohol-drug crisis, symbolic of the tensions under which modern man operates.

Yet there are equally dangerous problems, more subtle and less clearly recognized. In our own society, for example, almost all of those institutions that once shared with the state the tasks of underwriting legitimacy and building authority have been significantly weakened in recent decades. In some degree, the family, church, and school protected and supported the state, and, more important perhaps, they shared roles with it. Now, the state stands increasingly alone as a symbol of authority, and that is dangerous—for it and for the citizen. Today, demands upon government—local and regional as well as national—are infinitely greater than at any time in our history, and they encompass psychological as well as economic and social needs.

For Americans it is not sufficient merely to recognize that we live in a revolutionary age. It is vital to realize that we are leading that revolution, or perhaps at this point it would be as accurate to say that the revolution is leading us. In any case it is ironic that our militants do not recognize a revolution when they are confronted with one. For a

number of decades, this society has been in the throes of ever more rapid socioeconomic change, a change affecting the values, actions, and way of life of every American. The United States, let it be known, is far more revolutionary today than *any* Asian or African society with the possible exception of Japan. Elsewhere, even when substantial change is taking place, its impact is primarily upon the elite, with the masses living in basically traditional fashion. The Communist states, moreover, are at most only partial exceptions to this generalization. In them also, the tempo of change is slow and the type of change traditional in comparison with similar trends in this country.

Thus, at the outset, let me pose the two-fold challenges of this era for the United States. First, can America, in the midst of a major revolution and with such serious domestic problems, so order her priorities as to avoid slipping back into quasi isolation, thereby allowing disorder and chaos to grow in crucial areas of the world to the point that once again we face global conflict? Second, can we as a people summon the courage and intelligence to live with insecurity and accept complexity while at the same time preserving our democratic institutions? The answers to these questions will affect not only the American future but that of countless other people as well.

In many respects our policies and attitudes toward East Asia will measure our capacity to respond to these two challenges. It is not surprising that our people have found the burdens of Asia in recent years especially onerous. We are, in the main, a Europeocentric people. The major cultural ties of our people are with Europe. The majority of our intellectuals look in that direction as well. Thus, it is commonplace for some of our distinguished citizens to assert that Asia is not important or that we cannot hope to understand, hence cope with, the Asian scene.

Neither of these statements is true, despite the finality with which they are often uttered. East Asia is of vital importance to the United States. Developments there will affect both our peace and our prosperity. Indeed, the decisive events shaping the char-

*The Thomas D. White Lectures at Air University continued on 2 December 1969, when Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, presented "The United States and Asia—The Formulation of American Policy in a Revolutionary Era." Air University Review is pleased to give its readers the benefit of Dr. Scalapino's views.*

THE EDITOR



acter of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century are likely to take place in the Asia-Pacific region. More than one-half of the world's population lives in this area, and it contains vast resources, human and material. All of the major states of today and tomorrow, moreover, are intimately involved with each other in this part of the world. These include the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, and Indonesia—to mention only the most powerful or the most populous. It is here that the issues of global peace or war will be determined in the decades that lie ahead. Economic and cultural interaction has only begun to flourish, signaled in a small way by the remarkable exchange on all fronts that has developed between the United States and Japan and that is now developing in our relations with such diverse cultures as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Australia.

For those whose lives have revolved solely around Europe, it is extremely difficult and often very painful to appreciate the global changes that are taking place today and their import for America. How can we get our people and, more important, our elite to stop thinking essentially in nineteenth-century terms and to realize that the world no longer centers primarily around Washington, London, and Paris? The Atlantic rim is not the world of today, and it will be even less the world of tomorrow.

Refuge from this reality is sometimes taken by asserting that we cannot possibly understand events outside of the Western world. And even though this theme is frequently echoed in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, it bears scant relation to the truth. Total comprehension, to be sure, is unlikely, whether of the non-West, the West, or even ourselves. However, there are no inscrutable mysteries about Asia beyond the reach of other men. Modesty is always becoming, but in truth we Americans in collective terms understand more about Asia as a whole today than does any single Asian people or elite. One of the major problems for Japan in the coming decade, for example, will be to place those priorities upon research and contact with the rest of Asia that will enable her to better

understand the world of which she is a physical part. Certain Americans may not desire to comprehend Asia. Others may wish to shape her in our image. These are separate problems. The thesis that we cannot understand this part of the world, however, is untenable.

This is not to deny the fact that Asia is enormously complex. The differences within Asia are as great as in any part of the world, and in policy determination they must be taken fully into account. If the importance of Asia to us warrants American concern and commitment, therefore, its complexity demands an intricate, differentiated policy adequately attuned to its various sectors. Partly for this reason we have not had an Asian policy. Rather we have had a series of Asian policies, not always consistent with each other. Our first objective, now, should be to define goals for the area as a whole and the broad means that we might use in concert with others to achieve these. Specific policies tailored to each nation or region within Asia could then be developed with greater coherence.

WHAT, then, should be our basic goals? The most important lies in the political realm, and it can be set forth simply as the maintenance of a political equilibrium, one which will encourage the peaceful coexistence of states having radically different socioeconomic and political institutions. In Asia, as in Europe, this is essential if peace is to be promoted. No single state or group of states can impose its will upon Asia except through the extensive use of force. And the challenge to the security of one state by another, including conflicts between so-called "divided states," threatens the peace of the entire area.

A second essential goal should be that of actively encouraging those measures which will result in directing the unused and underdeveloped energies of the Asian people toward economic growth. Presumably we do not need to emphasize here that there is not necessarily a positive correlation between economic development and political stability. Indeed, in

the short run, ironically, economic stagnation often lends itself to political complacency; "normal" growth breeds expectations that outrun the state's capacity to fulfill them and enables the dissident to organize; and rapid development creates those problems of affluence to which we earlier referred, problems no less serious than those of poverty. Thus, all of the simple assumptions of yesteryear that economic growth would solve the world's political crises require radical rethinking.

Nevertheless, economic development is vitally important in the longer run, and for some reasons not commonly recognized. Its most immediate positive impact relates to the elites of "emerging" societies, not the masses. Only when a political elite places a high premium upon economic growth does pragmatism begin to challenge ideological rigidity, does problem-solving vie with purely manipulative techniques, do administrative concerns influence those who earlier were interested largely in organization merely for power's sake. The style and values of the elite in Asia and elsewhere—with respect to both their own people and their neighbors—are closely connected with the type of internal priorities which they establish. Ultimately, moreover, the impact of economic development carries downward, producing forces which, however mixed, contain those elements of pluralism, rationality, and creativity that are essential to harmony among peoples or nations.

Finally, it is in the American national interest to see Asian states involved not only in regional cooperation but also in certain types of interaction with the world at large. Isolation has always been a major weapon on behalf of totalitarianism—the shield that covers a regime's shortcomings, permits the blind indoctrination of a people, and enables irresponsibility toward global problems to reach new heights. The need to have nations involved so that they can be held responsible for their acts is the crucial first step toward tackling such serious problems as nuclear weapons control, defining and preventing aggression, and facing economic issues realistically.

Thus, at a minimum, our quest should be for all Asian states to accept involvement in

the international organizations now existing, however imperfect such organizations may be. For certain states the role should be considerably greater. Japan, for example, is now the third most impressive state in the world, measured in economic terms. Her own stake in the future of Asia is a major one, and her policies should increasingly reflect this fact. For the smaller states, however, there are also obligations commensurate with their capacities: the settlement of boundary disputes and related issues peacefully; cooperation in matters involving security; and the creation of meaningful economic interaction. Asia—particularly non-Communist Asia—now demands regional infrastructures, largely or wholly Asian, that can operate beyond the capacity of the separate states concerned.

Are these goals beyond reach? When the history of our times is written, the guilt complex that dominates some of our citizens today will prove to have been unwarranted. At a point when European domination of the world was ending, when a great vacuum of power existed both in West Europe and in East Asia, and when the Soviet Union, in Stalin's waning days, combined a commitment to expansion with scant regard for means, the United States alone had the power to prevent conditions from developing which would most certainly have led to massive bloodshed and ultimately to World War III. We used that power—selectively—first in Europe, then in Asia, and in so doing, we decisively influenced the trends of our times.

Recall conditions in Europe and Asia immediately after 1945 and contemplate what the impact of an abrupt American withdrawal from either area would have been. In the future, it will be recorded that never in history has a society combined such massive power with such deep humanistic traditions, never has a nation given so much to others and demanded so little from them. It is time for Americans to stop wringing their hands and recognize the extraordinary role which this nation has played in one of the great transitional eras of mankind—and how tragic an era this might have been had that role not been played. Of course, mistakes were made,

some of them serious. Thus far, however, the two major objectives for which we strove have been protected: a political-military balance has been maintained in those parts of the world crucial to our future and that of other major non-Communist societies at a time when no universal agreement on either basic principles or the methods of effecting change has been possible. Hence, nuclear war has been prevented.

The issue that now confronts us is how we formulate our policies for the 1970s, given the three broad objectives outlined earlier. The world is changing rapidly, and our policies must keep pace with the changes. If we begin with the issue of a political equilibrium in Asia, the first question to be asked is what are the sources and the nature of the threats to such an equilibrium? They are not the threats as conceived a decade or more ago. As is well known, Communism is no longer monolithic. Indeed, the Soviet Union recently made vague suggestions for an Asian collective security system, clearly to be directed against what they perceive to be the Chinese menace. At this point, indeed, the only real danger of nuclear war exists in connection with the Sino-Soviet crisis—although I am inclined to believe that that danger is less serious than it might appear.

In any event, the threats to political stability in Asia, now and for the discernible future, come largely from three sources: first, purely “civil war” situations in which internal foes struggle against a regime for a variety of reasons—racial or ethnic, religious, economic, political, or other—with the possibility always of a spillover into neighboring states or the area as a whole; second, conflict in which an outside state combines with internal dissidents by cultivating, training, and equipping them in the hope of benefitting politically from their accession to power—the technique of covert aggression; finally, the attempts of Communist portions of the three so-called “divided states” to seize the non-Communist portions by force, either through frontal attack (as in Korea) or via aggression of the type exemplified by Vietnam.

Despite the slogan “No More Vietnams,”

therefore, the most likely forms of conflict in Asia over the next decade *are* other Vietnams. These conflicts are far more likely than nuclear war, or even the type of “old-fashioned” aggression involved when one state openly invades another. What can be done to prevent them? First, it is important for us not to mislead potential opponents. Wars today are rarely caused by incidents, but they are caused by miscalculations concerning the intentions of one’s opponents. Indeed, this has been a prominent factor in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. The Communists had no reason to believe, when they launched the attack upon the Republic of Korea in June 1950, that the United States would defend



South Korea. We had clearly indicated to them that we would not do so. Nor did the North Vietnamese have any reason to believe that within a few years there would be 500,000 Americans in South Vietnam when they made their basic plans for large-scale assaults upon the South in 1959–60. Several American presidents and generals had stated emphatically that American ground forces would not be used on the mainland of Asia.

Once again, today, some official American spokesmen are making the dangerous mistake of confusing the enemy concerning our intentions. On the one hand, they are asserting that we will meet our treaty obligations, including those to such states as the Republic of Korea and Thailand. But, on the other hand, they are saying that we will never again

use ground troops on the Asian mainland. It is both understandable and proper that we insist that our Asian allies meet their own primary defense responsibilities and that our role be that of auxiliaries, with the primary function of preventing large-scale Soviet or Chinese intervention. Nevertheless, there is no reason why we should signal at this point that we will not under any circumstances use ground troops in connection with treaty obligations, especially since we may not be able to abide by such statements should the Communists—or others—take us at our word.

The President's Guam Declaration outlines the basic thrust of our future security policies for Asia, and within a limited framework it sets forth an appropriate strategy. We shall not intervene in purely civil wars, and it shall be the responsibility of our Asian allies also to meet the primary burdens of defending themselves from external assault of the aforementioned second and third types. Our role will be, first, that of providing the economic, technological, and military assistance to enable other peoples to defend themselves; second, of maintaining a broad nuclear umbrella over our allies, with our conventional forces in reserve—particularly our air and naval forces. Only the United States can deter a big nation like the Soviet Union or China from aggressive actions of a conventional type against small states. But it is of equal importance to realize also that only we can have a significant influence upon the level of risk that a state like North Korea is prepared to take in carrying out its stated policy of "liberating" South Korea.

These commitments on our part, however, must be carried out by means different from those employed to date. It is no longer feasible from a political standpoint and no longer necessary from a military standpoint to maintain fixed American bases in the populous centers of Asia. The political costs are now too high, and these include not merely anti-Americanism at the grass-roots level but much higher incentives on the part of host governments to procrastinate in meeting their security needs themselves and many more temptations to engage in blackmail tactics.

Within the next few years, almost all fixed bases on foreign soil should revert to the governments concerned. We can meet our obligations by reliance upon mobile units such as nuclear-powered submarines, our mid-Pacific complex, and troop-carrying transport planes—with our allies charged with the responsibility for maintaining such bases as might be necessary for us in case of an emergency at readiness level. In a very few instances, it may be necessary and desirable for us to maintain token forces in an area as a demonstration of our intent to meet our treaty obligations if required. Our main efforts, however, should be directed toward the complex tasks of aiding the non-Communist states of Asia, neutral as well as allied, in the development of their internal resources and their defense capacities.

In this connection, it is appropriate to raise directly certain questions pertaining to the People's Republic of China because Communist China may represent a serious problem for Asia, not merely for the non-Communist states but for the other Communist states as well. Is the China of the next decade to be seen as weak or strong? Will it be preoccupied with internal problems of such a massive nature as to preclude its serious involvement in the affairs of other states, or will internal difficulties promote external adventurism? Will China be primarily concerned with her relations within the Communist world, particularly her troubles with the Soviet Union, or will her attentions be directed at least equally to the non-Communist states in the area?

There are certain specific policies that the United States might pursue with respect to China which we will consider later, but here it is appropriate to respond to these questions because they are one crucial element in the future of Asia as a whole. Needless to say, there can be no certain answers, so many and complex are the variables. Nevertheless, we must advance working hypotheses upon which policies can rest. First, China should be seen as both weak and strong. China is and will remain weak vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, and she is likely to be ex-

tremely wary of courting direct conflict with either of these superpowers. But no state that is en route to nuclear weapons can be regarded as weak, especially by its immediate neighbors or by the other nonnuclear states in the vicinity. Strength, especially in psychological and political terms, is partly in the eye of the beholder. For the other states of Asia, China is not likely to be considered weak or unimportant in the decade ahead.

Today, of course, no possibility with respect to Chinese internal developments can be completely ruled out, so fluid is the domestic political scene. It is conceivable that a major and prolonged upheaval might follow the death of Mao, a crisis reaching civil war proportions and rendering China once again a prey to external intervention rather than an aggressive threat. Such a development, it might be quickly added, would not necessarily be of advantage to us, for among the forces most likely to intervene, the Soviet Union stands high on the list.

More likely, however, is the continuance of a Communist regime in China, quite possibly a thinly veiled military government under the rubric of the Communist Party, a regime that may warrant comparison in many respects with other military governments more than with the prototypes of a Communist Party-dominated state. In such a case, despite the fact that various internal problems will remain formidable and unsolved (unsolvable), China will probably pursue a minimal-risk, maximal-gain foreign policy in Asia, with one purpose: to weaken and, if possible, subvert those governments on her borders, Communist as well as non-Communist, that do not accept her views and align themselves with her basic posture. Neutralism is not likely to be enough, as India and Burma have indicated.

Chinese policy will thus take the form of aid and encouragement—economic, political, psychological, and military—to all potential dissidents: tribal peoples, disappointed office seekers, students, and intellectuals. Policies will be more in accord with traditional big-power policies than with Marxist-Leninist tenets. Anyone prepared to follow Peking will achieve the status of “proletarian,” and others

will become automatically “enemies of the people.”

There is always the risk that these policies will lead to a major war, and ironically, at the moment, the gravest tension exists between China and the Soviet Union. A full-scale Sino-Soviet war cannot be ruled out, but more likely, as implied earlier, is the continuance of a wide range of conflicts short of total war, including a struggle for the allegiance of Communists throughout the world, efforts at interference in each other's internal affairs, extensive maneuvering over border areas including Outer Mongolia and North Korea, and continuous small- and medium-scale armed clashes.

If this proves to be the case, China's activities regarding the rest of Asia will be restricted in considerable degree by her need to guard constantly against Soviet power. Hence, the type of minimal-risk policy outlined above would continue to be the most attractive and feasible one. One cannot overlook the possibility, however, that at some point another generation of Chinese leaders might seek a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union precisely to reduce China's burdens and provide other policy options. We should never forget that Japanese leaders debated for decades whether to seek to “normalize” relations with Russia or with the West as a means of forwarding their policies within Asia. In the late 1930s, war with the Soviet Union seemed almost inevitable, and large-scale clashes did occur. Yet, in the final analysis, Japan undertook an accommodation with Russia and directed its major assault against the West. The situations are not completely analogous, but no one concerned about the future of Asia can afford to ignore the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement at some point, one that would fall far short of the type of fraternalism expected of Communist comrades but that might enable both parties to take more active roles in other spheres.

For these reasons it is essential to regard China as a potential threat to those Asian states wishing to follow paths other than those initiated and sponsored by Peking. It should also be noted that the Soviet Union is now

re-entering many parts of Asia from which she withdrew at an earlier point. Under Stalin and Khrushchev, Russia gave ample evidence of relegating East Asia to a secondary position in Soviet strategic thinking. Now, however, the Soviet presence is being steadily advanced in Asia, at many points and in many ways. In such diverse states as Outer Mongolia, Japan, India, Indonesia, and Singapore, the Russians are increasing their role once again.

In certain respects this development should alarm China more than the United States or Japan. However, it is by no means clear that Soviet efforts to contain China will always take precedence over or conflict with actions designed to support pro-Soviet elements in various Asian states. The Soviet Union has abandoned neither its commitment to international Communism nor its desire for a position of dominant influence as a major power, wherever this can be attained. Increasingly, therefore, we and others will have to think of Asia not merely in terms of bilateral relations but of trilateral and quadri-lateral relations as well, relations involving the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan.

All of these developments point up one central need, namely, to secure a multilateral acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence among states having different socio-political systems and to acquire some means of monitoring and enforcing those principles. To maintain and strengthen a political equilibrium in Asia, it is necessary but not sufficient for the United States to render economic and military assistance in that area. Unless we in concert with others can tackle the root problems that relate to peace or war, such assistance is likely to be inadequate, possibly counterproductive. Those root problems, as we have seen, involve more than the dangers of nuclear war or the threat of overt aggression from one state to another. The truly crucial questions of the next decade will be: How does one define civil war? What are the obligations of other states under conditions agreed to be those of civil war? What actions should be considered intervention in the internal affairs of another state? How can such

actions be prevented, or, if undertaken, challenged effectively by the international community?

More than a decade ago, a number of Asian states, Communist and non-Communist, agreed on their own initiative to certain principles of peaceful coexistence at the time of the Bandung Conference. Subsequently, these principles were violated by some of the very states involved, but there was no mechanism of inquiry or enforcement. Neither Asia nor the world can afford to delay longer in reopening the questions relating to peaceful coexistence. First, we need to seek broadly accepted definitions of such concepts as civil war, intervention, permissible assistance, neutrality—its rights and obligations, and aggression in all of its forms. Then, we need a multilateral or international body sitting in permanent session to hear complaints and determine the facts, with recommendations, including those of sanctions if necessary. These steps should be undertaken with the cooperation of Communist states if possible and via the United Nations if feasible; but *in any case*, we and our Asian allies should take the initiative.

The chances of preventing war in Asia and of maintaining a political equilibrium in that vital region may well hinge upon finding the means of defining and defending the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is in this area that the most likely seeds of conflict will continue to lie in the decade immediately ahead.

**M**EANWHILE, how should we approach the complex problems of economic development? Once again, some bold new courses of action are in order. We stand now at a crossroads. Advanced nations like the United States, beset with admittedly serious internal problems, threaten to turn inward, severely curtailing all forms of technical and economic assistance abroad at the very point when the need is most acute and when second- and third-generation elites in Asia are better equipped to make serious use of such assistance than at any previous time. With a few

prominent exceptions, the leaders of contemporary Asia are genuinely concerned with progress on the economic front.

One of our greatest contributions can be to assist in the training of the next generation of Asian scientists, technicians, professional men, and administrators. Much of this training should be done in Asia, not in the United States, and a considerable proportion of it can be undertaken by the private sector, particularly the task of training managers and administrators. With respect to broader assistance, a considerable premium should be placed upon multilateral programs. In every case, the economic feasibility of the project should be thoroughly investigated. Unquestionably, past aid has involved extensive waste, sometimes deterring rather than advancing development. It is entirely legitimate to take a tough-minded attitude toward economic-technical assistance, including a use of *quid pro quo* policies: "You do this, and we will do that—otherwise, you will have to make other arrangements."

In the past decade, we have witnessed an amazing technological revolution with possibilities which can make some of the gloomy forecasts of recent times totally antiquated. For example, developments with respect to food production and birth control are vastly more promising than could have been anticipated even ten years ago. However, these new opportunities must be grasped quickly, and none is more urgent than that of population control. This is a matter of political as much as of economic need. Even if the vast number of people now expected to inhabit Asia by the year 2000 can be fed and sheltered in some fashion, what will be the political and psychological consequences of massive congestion? In the complete absence of privacy and with the constant pressure of individuals, one against another, how can the quality of human life or the concept of human dignity be enhanced? Unless the torrent of new births can be slowed, authoritarianism is almost certain to rise and democracy to be imperiled throughout the world.

With new potentials for adding sizeable quantities of food to the world supply—and

hence the temptation to avoid tackling this problem forcefully—the next decade will prove to be one of critical importance. The United States should provide every possible resource in advancing the cause of birth control. No single issue in the socioeconomic arena is more important to our future and to that of every inhabitant of the Asian-Pacific region.

We should also take the lead in proposing a Pacific Community, with its primary responsibilities in the economic realm. This community should be composed of the economically advanced states at first, such nations as the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand. The role of the Pacific Community in promoting free economic intercourse and blocking the further inroads of economic nationalism in itself could be vitally significant. Beyond this the need exists to work out cooperative methods of aid for the "emerging" states and to underscore for all of the peoples of the area the importance of multilateral economic programs.

In the whole field of social and economic planning, the element of timing is crucial. The resources are now available: elites willing to commit themselves to the tasks; technological breakthroughs on several vital fronts; and, in some regions at least, a sufficient reservoir of high-level manpower to commence significant work. We also have the need; no prospect is more frightening than that of unchecked increases in population, increases that will surely lead to spiraling violence, domestic and international. Are we prepared to assign the necessary priorities to the task?

Regionalism in Asia has political and military potentials as well as economic ones. Few Asian states are able to stand alone. None will be the better for having made the attempt, since the level of sacrifice demanded of one's own people under such circumstances breeds coercion and conformity. And such fledgling associations as Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are important not least because they are all-Asia organizations, thereby representing an opportunity for the people of the immediate region to work together without external involvements. One of the prob-

lems of modern Asia has been the fragmented, quasi-isolated character of its societies. Each knows little about the other, and suspicion or hostility fills the void of ignorance.

Regionalism, let it be underlined, is no panacea. Indeed, at present, it is fashionable to belittle regionalism just as it was once in vogue to assume that it would solve most problems. There are no single or simple solutions. At best, regionalism will serve certain purposes, answer certain needs.

Beyond regionalism, however, there is the broader problem of bringing all Asian states into at least minimal contact with each other and with the world. Once again, we have returned to the problem of peaceful coexistence and the thorny issue of working toward some type of international order in Asia. In my opinion, it is now appropriate to take a



major step in an effort to establish a new approach to international relations in the Asia-Pacific area for the 1970s. Such a step would involve the acceptance of two principles:<sup>1</sup>

1. Governments in control of a fixed territory, possessing a physical capitol, having established institutions of authority, and possessing *de facto* control over the people within this area shall be accepted as states.

2. All states shall accept in principle the right of other states to pursue political and socioeconomic theories and institutions of

their own choosing. They shall reserve the right on behalf of themselves and their citizens to support or criticize those institutions and theories verbally and to render or withhold assistance of an economic, political, or military nature to the government concerned. However, they shall not undertake actions of two types: (a) physical assistance in any form to indigenous groups dedicated to the overthrow of the government; (b) physical intervention on behalf of a government when it is engaged in fighting a civil war, to be defined as a war involving only people whose permanent residence is within that government's territory as defined in Point 1.

We have already suggested methods whereby Point 2 might be explored and implemented. Let us concentrate now upon Point 1. This point looks toward a new concept of recognition that is at once more flexible and more realistic. If it were accepted, recognition would come into effect automatically for certain minimal purposes at least and be totally divorced from questions both of affinity (likes and dislikes) and permanency (the assumption that a *de facto* state will exist for all time or in precisely the same physical form).

A government passing the tests set forth broadly under Point 1 would secure recognition at least for the following purposes: (1) membership in such international and regional bodies as relate to its needs, concerns, and interests; (2) participation in international conferences on a similar basis. No one can force a state to belong to the United Nations, for example, but the above proposition would clearly envisage an automatic invitation to all *de facto* states, including the so-called "divided states." It would also support invitations for such states to the range of conferences and organizations, ad hoc or permanent, that have been established to tackle various issues.

Beyond this, relations of a bilateral character could be determined by the states involved. Thus, recognition in the above terms would not necessarily require that a full range of state-to-state relations be established in every instance, desirable though this might generally be. In some cases, there might be



no relations between two bitterly opposed states, except in the international arena. In other situations, only limited bilateral relations might be possible. Nor would recognition in the forms set forth here imply an acceptance of the permanency of any given *de facto* state.

Under these conditions, a new approach to the problem of the "divided states" would be possible. Clearly, this problem is and will remain a serious obstacle to any workable system of peaceful coexistence in the Asian-Pacific area. Traditionally, most nations have regarded China-Taiwan, South-North Korea, and South-North Vietnam as "legitimately" single states, having only one "legal" government. This approach accords with the position of the six governments most immediately involved, and indeed it is often demanded by them. It also gives the Communists certain special advantages. Championing unification by force if necessary, they promote the tactics of "People's Wars" as civil wars, irrespective of the degree of covert external assistance involved. Thus they can claim that external aid to any government under such attack is unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of another state.

In any case, however, our present policies regarding recognition do not accord with reality, are not conducive to the settlement of international problems, and greatly increase the risk of wars, large and small. We should now promote a fundamentally new doctrine concerning so-called "divided states." First, the thesis that these states can be treated as divided but single entities with military operations between them considered "civil wars" is untenable. Would the Soviet Union consider it a "civil war" if West Germany attacked East Germany, or South Korea assaulted North Korea, whatever the means? In truth, none of these "divided states" has ever been unified under any one of the existing governments. Moreover, in each case, the two states involved in a "divided area" are moving rapidly away from each other rather than toward each other. The divisions between China and Taiwan, South and North Korea, and South and North Vietnam are growing wider, not nar-

rower, whether the measurement be social, economic, or political.

The important point, however, is that the international community does not need to determine whether unification is possible or impossible. It need only determine *how* it can take place. More specifically, it is essential to agree that it shall not take place by allowing one state to force another state into submission by force of arms.

If we are to achieve peace in Asia, the so-called "divided states" must come under the same basic rules as apply to other states. Thus, each existing state constitutes a separate entity to the extent that it meets the conditions outlined in Point 1 above and deserves recognition in the terms already set forth. Second, military action, overt or covert, by one such state against another shall constitute aggression, not civil war, and be treated as such. Unification efforts by peaceful means, on the other hand, shall be regarded as proper and legitimate.

LET us now turn from general principles to specific policies, seeking to interrelate these, beginning with Japan, our most important Asian ally. Within the next few years, the economic role of Japan in Asia will be greater than that of the United States or any other country. Should China continue to produce nuclear weapons, moreover, Japan will be posed with an increasingly grave security problem, and as her government has already recognized, any threat to South Korea or Taiwan would represent a penetration of Japan's own outer defenses. Thus, Japan's security and prosperity are directly affected by developments in East Asia.

It would be well, however, for all Americans, including those in our government, to disabuse themselves of the pleasant notion that Japan will assume the American role in Asia. This will not happen for reasons connected with both domestic politics and certain distinct limits upon Japanese capacities in Asia—psychological and political as well as military. Japan will play an increasing role

throughout the region, and one having political as well as economic aspects. In addition, Japan will gradually assume some responsibility for the defense of northeast Asia. By the mid-1970s, moreover, if a general agreement upon the control of nuclear weapons that includes China has not been reached, Japan may well reconsider her ban on such weapons. Even now, there is considerable doubt in Japanese defense circles as to the wisdom—political as well as military—of increasing conventional armament and eschewing nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, American-Japanese relations should remain close, despite certain problems. American bases in Japan and Okinawa will continue to provide ammunition for the “left,” especially in a period when Japanese nationalism is mounting rapidly. They should be abandoned under the conditions set forth earlier and before they become the negative issue which Okinawa clearly became prior to the Nixon-Sato agreement. Only when those bases are evacuated, moreover, will the Japanese people be caused to face more realistically their own security responsibilities.

By the end of the 1970s, hopefully, the United States and Japan will jointly share responsibility for the security of northeast Asia, with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan prepared to accept the main role in defending themselves against “Vietnam-type” conflicts. Hopefully, also, Japanese and American relations with the Soviet Union in this area will be sufficiently normal to provide additional insurance against any new Soviet-backed Korean War.

In the economic arena, the initiatives should come first from Japan. Economic liberalization is long overdue, and the United States has every reason to insist that a nation which has benefitted so greatly from aid and trade now take steps to ensure greater equity of opportunity and fewer nationalist restrictions. But as suggested earlier, the concepts of free trade and broader economic intercourse need a dynamic new context, one which a Pacific Community could provide.

Japan should also have a permanent seat on the Security Council and play an active

role in any international body that might define and defend the concept of peaceful co-existence. This, indeed, could open up a political role for Japan not necessarily demanding military obligations.

In sum, Japan cannot replace America in Asia, but she can and must supplement our efforts and those of others. Our interests and hers basically coincide, and despite the elements of competition and friction that inevitably emerge between two powerful, progressive nations, that will continue to be the case.

Let us turn next to Korea. The Republic of Korea in many respects is graphic evidence of what can be done when commitment is combined with patience. After years of crisis, Korea's economic growth is currently running between 8 and 10 percent per annum, and hope in the future has never been so high. Political growth is slower, partly because this is still a nation under Communist siege and partly because democracy can only be painfully built in a society with strongly authoritarian traditions. Korea, indeed, illustrates some of the complexities of modern Asia and the dilemma for Americans. On the one hand, to demand Western-style democracy as a prerequisite for support to “emerging” states is both unrealistic and, in itself, a form of imperialism. On the other hand, to support with treasure and lives an “illiberal” government runs strongly against our grain.

There is no simple answer to this dilemma, but two simultaneous “educational” programs are warranted, one toward our own citizens and one toward our Asian allies. That toward our own citizens, and especially toward certain portions of our intellectual and journalist communities, would underline two principal points. First, American withdrawal from Asia would reduce the chances for democracy everywhere. Left to its own devices, every small non-Communist state would become more authoritarian in an effort to survive. Many critics overlook the fact that our presence in Asia has enabled greater experimentation with political openness than would otherwise have been possible—even in those states where nondemocratic elements persist.

Second, while states like South Korea have a number of shortcomings measured against our political perspectives, there remains a sizeable difference between the degree of political freedom allowed in Seoul and that permitted in Pyongyang, and an even greater difference in the potentials for political evolution contained in each state. Much the same point could be made concerning Saigon and Hanoi, Taipei and Peking. It is curious that some of our people, if they cannot have Abraham Lincoln, are prepared to settle for Ho Chi Minh, unable to recognize that there can be men and institutions between these two polar symbols.

At the same time, it is both appropriate and essential to remind our Asian allies that American public opinion will sharply challenge extensive American commitments to governments that place a heavy reliance upon repression. In the final analysis, the character of American relations with each ally is dependent upon the image of its government and that government's relations with its people. And that point should be reiterated as often as is required.

We may hope that such problems will not constitute major issues between us and the Republic of Korea in the future. To us as to the South Koreans, the integrity of the Republic is vital, having been consecrated by our mutual lives and treasure. At all times, the Communists of the North must be made fully aware of our intention to help the South Koreans preserve their independence and integrity.

We come now to Taiwan and China, areas vital to our Asian policy as a whole. Within the next decade, a new generation of leaders will come to power in both of these societies. What policies should we pursue? The policy followed since 1950, namely, that there is a single China, with its capitol in Taipei, has already undergone many modifications. We refuse to support offensive operations against the mainland. Our efforts are to aid in the development of a self-sufficient, increasingly indigenous Taiwan. And we have shown a willingness to normalize our relations with mainland China, a willingness not yet reciprocated.

There are various alternatives that could be followed. We might acknowledge that there is only one China, with jurisdiction over both the mainland and Taiwan, but leave open the question of who governs or will govern China. By implication, at least, this would represent an abandonment of the thesis that the people on Taiwan have any rights concerning their future. It would accord with the position of both the Nationalists and the Communists, and it might be the *sine qua non* for any improved relations with the People's Republic of China.

It is not in accord with the facts, however. Mainland China and Taiwan, as noted earlier, are not one at present, and they are not growing toward each other. The *peaceful* unification of China and Taiwan seems a very remote possibility, now or in the foreseeable future. Only a major upheaval within China could change the odds significantly. Meanwhile, we are pledged to oppose any attempt at unification by force, and as long as that pledge is maintained, no attempt is likely to be made.

A new nation is being constructed on Taiwan, and slowly a psychological adjustment to that fact is being made. Among the younger generation, indeed, that adjustment may be more complete than has commonly been recognized. If we work within the basic principles outlined earlier, we can pursue the logic of these facts. First, we should recognize the existence of two *de facto* states, without having to decide that the present situation, either with respect to the names of those states or their respective jurisdictions, will last for all time. However, we would accept the People's Republic as having control over its people unless or until that control was clearly in doubt in terms of the criteria set forth earlier, and we would therefore accept the minimal consequences of such recognition, namely, membership in the United Nations and participation in other international activities. At a second level, we would continue to explore the initiation of bilateral relations of an economic and cultural type prior to any establishment of full political relations.

At the same time, we would continue our

commitments to and our ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, making it clear that, for our part, we intended to see that state recognized in the international community, participant in various international organizations, and fully defended against external attack.

It is often pointed out that such a policy would be vigorously opposed by Peking and Taipei. That is unquestionably true at present. U.N. seats might remain vacant, organizational overtures ignored, and, insofar as Peking is concerned, bilateral efforts continuously rebuffed. But that should not disturb us, particularly since China is undergoing a major transition at this point and the future is most unclear. If our basic principles were sound, we could afford to wait. In the final analysis, there can be no escape from the fact that two *de facto* states do exist, and for the foreseeable future they will exist, each undergoing evolutionary changes but unlikely to grow more closely together. An acceptance of that fact, with all of its implications, could do much to advance the prospects for stability in Asia.

There remains the question of American policies for Southeast Asia. Once again, these have been suggested in broad outline. Our major commitment in this region, painful and divisive though it has been in terms of the American scene, provides a hope for the security and development of several hundred millions of people. If one compares the Southeast Asia of today with that of 1960-62, the influence of our actions can be appreciated. And those actions are all the more significant when measured against trends within the Communist world during that period.

Some Americans would divide Asia into two parts: the islands to which they would make a commitment, and the continent which they would regard as expendable. Such a position has a certain attraction from a purely military point of view. However, it is based upon a profound ignorance of cultural, political, and economic realities, and nowhere is this clearer than with respect to Southeast Asia. Can one envisage the type of blockage now poisoning relations between China and

Japan or North and South Korea operating with respect to Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia? What would be the result of these areas, plus Thailand and the old Indochinese states, being separated from normal intercourse with Japan and other island states—for all parties concerned?

If a meaningful political equilibrium is to exist, it cannot be based upon this unrealistic type of division. Only a structure of relations envisaging far more complex arrangements can suffice, one including certain neutral states and others with their security internationally guaranteed. Thus, peace in Vietnam cannot be separated in the final analysis from the basic question of peace for the area as a whole. If our policies toward Southeast Asia are to be consistent with the themes advanced previously, we should seek to uphold the following principles:

1. The right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future, both with respect to a government for the South and with regard to the issue of unification with the North, should underwrite any Vietnam settlement.
2. Peaceful coexistence among states having different social and political systems will receive its supreme test in this region. Hence, institutions and procedures to this end involving multilateral commitments are urgently required.
3. Those states which choose neutralism as well as those selecting alignment should have international guarantees of respect for their territorial integrity and their full sovereign rights.
4. We seek no permanent bases or military presence in this area. Once multilateral agreements and enforcement mechanisms are in effect and adequate standby facilities are being maintained by those countries with which we have continuing treaty obligations, our military forces should be withdrawn.

Vietnam is now a test that goes far beyond that unhappy land. If the United States were to capitulate to the Communists there, either directly or in some concealed fashion, the repercussions would be swift and far-reaching. Our credibility as an ally every-

where would be seriously eroded. The militants within the Asian Communist movement would have won their greatest victory, and they would certainly push forward on various fronts. Against the background of an American defeat and intense disillusionment, isolationist sentiment would reach new heights in this country. All of these factors would in turn affect the character of American-Soviet relations in the critical years that lie ahead.

In the final analysis, events in Vietnam will depend upon two interrelated developments: political trends in South Vietnam and political trends in the United States. The Vietnamese Communists have understood this better than some Americans. Now as never before, the American people are called upon to exercise maturity, patience, and fortitude in a situation where the stakes are very high and the issues are not susceptible to quick or easy answers.

IN certain respects, the issue of Vietnam is a mirror to our times. As noted at the outset, one of the greatest challenges which this age poses for the United States is to learn how to live with complexity and prolonged insecurity, still preserving our democratic institutions. Given our political culture, this will not be easy. We became a great nation by practicing the principle of applying our energies to any given problem in maximum degree so that it could be handled in a minimum amount of time. We have always handled big tasks in a massive fashion. Now we must learn how to develop and live with complicated policies, prepared to operate at neither 0 nor 100, but at 46, moving up to 52 or down to 39—and then prepared to hold at these points, if necessary. Further, our leaders must find methods of explaining these requirements to our people.

It is understandable that a number of our citizens, unable to bear complexity and pro-

longed uncertainty, would seek an easy way out. For some, relief comes through moral crusades, the pretense that the solutions are in reality simple, pure, and at hand but are being blocked by evil men—and generally those evil men, of course, are Americans. For others, an old path has renewed appeal. Once more, the call for a return to isolation is heard, voiced by those who are seemingly oblivious to the costs which isolation would exact at home as well as abroad.

I am convinced, however, that the majority of our citizens are capable of coping with these extraordinary times, given proper leadership. Our people can accept complexity and demonstrate endurance if our government will set forth the facts as candidly as possible. And if the government were to take the lead in this respect, it might persuade the media to follow. Certainly one glaring contradiction in American society at present that impinges directly upon foreign policy formulation is the fact that our media vie with each other in defining "news" as the most sensational event of the moment when more than ever before our leaders and our people need to take cool, long-range, rational views of the major problems which confront us.

Like all great transitional periods, our revolutionary age is an exciting and painful period in which to live. And we, as the most powerful nation on earth, have a special responsibility for the future. A considerable portion of our energies must go into tackling the problems of affluence that have emerged here at home, but an equal portion of our energies must be devoted to helping build a world in which we can live. There are no ivory towers left—for people or for nations. In the decades that lie immediately ahead, Asia will represent the most critical test of our capacities in this regard.

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#### Note

1. This section is adapted from my essay, "The United States and Asia" in Paul Seabury and Aaron Wildavsky, *U.S.*

*Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Proposals for the 1970s* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969), pp. 123-50.

# THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGING WARFARE

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT N. GINSBURGH



AS professional military officers, we are by occupational necessity students of warfare. One fundamental lesson in this study is that wars change: the next war will be different from the present one, just as the present war differs from the previous. Those of us still on active duty, if and when the next conflict comes, will be accused of having prepared for the wrong war: the previous one rather than the current one. While we ought to be philosophical about the certainty of being accused, we must ensure that the accusation is false.

To do this, we must know what determines the nature of war and why that nature changes.

Even the first wars were subject to many influences. A tribe possessing stone axes and clubs fought a war that differed greatly from that war waged by a group with no technology. Purpose also had an effect. A war fought to maintain a territorial imperative varied from one fought to capture slaves and goods. In the same way, a change in each tribe's concept changed the war they fought: ethnocentric isolation which required trespassers to be driven across a boundary was one thing; tribal growth requiring the death of all adult males in a defeated group was quite another. Finally, a tribe's capability also determined the kind of war it fought: a war waged by two nomadic hunting tribes with large male populations skillful in weaponry was quite different from that fought when one group had an agricultural economy. Even from the beginning, wars were as complex as the men and societies that conducted them.

Throughout man's history, these same four elements—technology, purpose, concept, and capability—have been determining and changing the nature of all successive warfare. Each warrants a more detailed examination.

The impact of *technology* upon warfare is obvious. From the bow and arrow to the ICBM, each weapon improvement, whatever

its level of sophistication, has brought changes in the fighting of war: in its size, in the type of battles, in the number of participants, and in the number of casualties. Unquestionably, the use of armor, fortification, gunpowder, the steam engine, the airplane, wireless communications, and, finally, nuclear power drastically altered the face of war. (It is significant to observe how much of the scientific alteration of war has occurred within this century.)

There are certain characteristics of the technological determinant that require definite action by a nation if it is to survive. The accelerating rate of technological development places a premium on not only recognizing the importance of a change but on quickly adapting to it. Historically, there has been a significant time lag between technological developments and their exploitation in warfare. This gap has been decreased in more recent times, but it needs to be narrowed more, and by us rather than by our potential enemies. In addition, there is a danger in concentrating on weapons improvements to the exclusion of technological developments in other areas. The nature of war has been changed by developments in transportation and communications-electronics just as much as by more powerful bombs and more accurate guns.

The second major determinant is *purpose*. Purpose applies to a national objective as well as the objective of a specific war. While a nation's purpose is often as intangible as its technology is tangible, different purposes have clearly resulted in different kinds of wars. Our own history illustrates this fact. Our major purpose, of course, has always been national security, but within this framework we have had more specific purposes.

In the Revolutionary War, our purpose was independence; the British purpose was to maintain control. To achieve these purposes, the colonists fought a war of harassment; the British sought to control key centers and to

catch and defeat the American Army in the field. One generation later in the War of 1812, we again fought the British in almost the same way. But while the British sought to control key centers along the seaboard, our purposes were somewhat unclear. Some people wanted to add new territory; for others, preserving our newly gained independence was enough. As a result, while we did attempt annexation of Canada, we fought primarily a defensive war, a war of harassment.

In the Mexican War our purposes changed and so did the nature of the war we fought. Territorial expansion and the desire to punish Mexico for attacking American troops resulted in two almost unrelated campaigns: General Zachary Taylor's campaign along the border, where we eventually did annex territory, and General Winfield Scott's amphibious landing and subsequent punitive march on Mexico City. In the Civil War, the different purposes of the North and South also made a difference in how each side fought. In general, the South fought as the colonists had during the Revolution while the North's actions were similar to those of the British.

During the remainder of the nineteenth century, further shifts in purposes changed the nature of wars we were involved in. Our Indian Wars, motivated by the desire for territorial expansion, control, and protection, were conducted quite differently from our war with Spain. In the latter, our purpose was to stop the hostilities in Cuba and to gain freedom for that country. Our conduct of the war served the purpose, and we annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines in the process.

In this century we entered World War I to help the Allies make the world safe for democracy. Failing to do this in postwar diplomatic and political negotiations, we tried again in World War II on the basis of demanding unconditional surrender. In each of these cases, the United States fought a different kind of war partly because our purposes were different.

Differences in *concept*, the third major determinant, have also made a difference in the wars fought by the United States. In addition, our own history reveals the interrelation

of all the determinants and demonstrates the need for concept to relate to technology and purpose.

In the Revolutionary War we employed the concepts of the minuteman and the citizen soldier to demonstrate to the British that it simply was not worth their effort to continue trying to control the colonies effectively.

After the war of Revolution, our strategic concept was based on the avoidance of long-term, entangling alliances. We felt that if we avoided involvement in European affairs, maybe Europe would leave us alone. Hence our program for national security was based on the concept of a very small standing army which would be expanded, if needed, by volunteer citizen soldiers. Our concepts for the actual waging of war depended on our purpose, which varied at times from harassment on land and sea, to blockade, to invasion, to defeat on the battlefield of opposing forces, and occupation of territory.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century we began to shift to a strategic concept of ad hoc interventionism, a concept which lasted pretty much through the end of World War II. During this period we placed primary reliance on the Navy as our first line of defense, as urged by the father of naval power, Mahan. Behind this first line of defense and based on a favorable geographical situation, our concept was to mobilize both our manpower and our industry as needed either for defense or for projection of our forces overseas when we chose to intervene on an ad hoc basis.

*Capability* is the fourth, and probably most immediately obvious, determinant of warfare. A war in which only one adversary has nuclear weapons, a global navy, a large standing army, intercontinental missiles and aircraft would be quite different from a war in which both adversaries possessed similar capabilities. Obviously, a nation's capability depends not only on technology and other power but on the will and ability of that nation to exercise its capability in accordance with concepts. Moreover, a nation's security depends on its potential and actual capability being consistent with its technology, purpose, and concept.



Maintaining this consistency is a major responsibility of the professional military man. It is a difficult task at best because of the constant transformation of each determinant. Just since 1945, changes in these four determinants have substantially altered the nature of modern warfare.

At the end of the Second World War our *purpose* was simply to turn our attention to peace as quickly as possible and in the process to avoid a postwar depression. Our *concept* was that peace would be enforced by the Big Five, partly acting in concert through the United Nations. It was based on the *technology* evolving from World War II, including atomic weapons. In terms of *capability* our concept assumed that the member states of the United Nations would contribute forces necessary to enforce the decisions of the U.N. Security Council.

Within a matter of months this *concept* proved illusory. First of all, a series of Soviet actions made it obvious that their *purposes* were different from ours. The establishment of a ring of Communist satellites in Eastern Europe and in North Korea, Soviet intransigence in the administration of occupied Germany, and Communist threats to the security of Iran, Greece, Turkey, and Republic of China revealed the true Soviet purpose.

By 1947, as a result of the conflict between U.S. and Soviet purposes, we had evolved a new purpose, the containment of Communism. Later, with the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, we adopted another purpose, the avoidance of nuclear war. These basic purposes have remained unchanged for the last 22 years. However, there have been changes in concept, technology, and capability during this period which have significantly affected the nature of war.

Initially, we relied on a twofold concept to avoid nuclear war and to contain Communism. Primary reliance was placed on economic and military aid to our friends—first to Greece and Turkey, subsequently to Western Europe, and then progressively to other parts of the globe. We conceived that economically healthy nations were less subject to political overthrow by Communist parties.

Our concept also included the deterrence of the U.S.S.R. by primary reliance on our air-atomic power. The doctrine of retaliation was born then, in the late forties, rather than when Secretary John Foster Dulles made his famous “massive retaliation” speech in the fifties. Of course, our retaliatory ability then was not really massive in present terms, because atomic bombs were still relatively scarce. But it was sufficient to give us confidence in our deterrent capability so long as we enjoyed an atomic monopoly.

Despite our lip service to primary reliance on our air-atomic power, we did not really begin to create the appropriate capability until 1949. Thus the situation in the late forties was an exception to the statement that military concepts often lag technology. At that time our concepts and technology for strategic deterrence were together. It was our in-being capability that lagged. In part, however, this lag in capability resulted from conflicting concepts on the roles of land and surface forces and on the role of industrial mobilization in a general war situation.

Almost from the beginning it became obvious that our concept for containment required something more than just economic stability and strategic deterrence. The Soviets still retained massive forces under arms, forces which represented a significant threat to Western Europe. The only question was whether it would take the Soviets three weeks to get to the English Channel or eight weeks. Thus, even those who were confident in the ability of U.S. air-atomic power to defeat the Soviets by strategic bombing recognized the likelihood that a successful strategic campaign could not in itself prevent the Soviets from quickly overrunning Western Europe. To cope with this possibility, we added a third element to our concept: territorial defense through regional alliances.

The formula for regional alliances, dating back to the Rio Treaty of 1947, became the concept for the North Atlantic Pact. But it took the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the military aid program to make the pact more than just a statement of intentions. This basic concept for collective

regional defense has since expanded throughout the world and involves overlapping, multi-lateral, and bilateral defense arrangements with more than forty separate nations.

These three elements—economic and military aid, strategic nuclear deterrence, and collective regional defense—remain the basic elements of our concept today. Changes in our view of the nature of war in the last 20 years have resulted from dramatic changes in the other two determinants—technology and military capability.

Since 1949, five major technological developments have significantly affected the nature of war:

- The Soviet development of an atomic bomb by 1949.
- U.S. and then Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons.
- The development of ballistic missiles of intercontinental range and especially missiles with solid propellants.
  - Air mobility.
  - And finally, tremendous advances in communications-electronics technology which both support and control our various weapon systems.

These developments represent an extremely rapid rate of technological change unparalleled in any similar period in history. As a result, they have posed an unparalleled challenge to military establishments to keep pace.

Although these changes were not generally anticipated very far ahead of time, our concepts for exploiting them have generally kept pace. In fact, our concepts have at times been ahead rather than behind the force capabilities derived from technology. For example, our concepts were adjusted to a situation of strategic parity at least several years before the U.S.S.R. actually achieved such a military capability.

The intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has compelled both nations to convert these technological developments into military capability in the shortest possible time. This rapid military exploitation of technology is unparalleled his-

torically. Significantly, neither the United States nor Soviet Russia has yet been able to obtain a marked technological edge over the other.

In broad terms, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have become military super-powers. Although it has become fashionable lately to speak of the diffusion of power, the fact remains that while the United States and the Soviet Union are competitive with each other, they have far outdistanced all other nations in terms of military power.

As a result, emphasis has been placed on forces in-being. This requirement for significant forces in-being represents the most drastic change in the traditional U.S. military posture. Americans are not entirely comfortable with the new situation. In part, at least, the current questioning of U.S. military posture results from the reassertion of the traditional American reliance on relatively small standing armies.

In general, the collective influence of the five technological developments has been substantial. Specifically, each development made its distinctive change in the nature of war.

The Soviet development of the atomic bomb had three significant effects on warfare. First, it stimulated and speeded up the development of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. With our monopoly in atomic weapons gone, we saw the development of the concept of nuclear superiority and the re-emergence of the concept of counterforce. Second, Soviet possession of the atomic bomb led to a new U.S. emphasis on air defense. Third, the Soviet A-bomb was probably one of the reasons for applying the limited warfare concept in the Korean War. Of course, technical, moral, and psychological factors and the fear of a possible Soviet response in Europe also caused us to limit our military effort in Korea.

(It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if, before June 1950, the United States had applied to Korea the concept of regional defense for a containment of Communism which we applied in Europe. Such a concept might well have deterred the North Koreans. In reality, our public state-

ments probably contributed to the Communists' thinking that they could take over South Korea without interference by the United States.)

The impact of thermonuclear weapons and the development of ICBM's can be considered together in analyzing their impact on warfare. They have increased the emphasis on forces in-being, on instant readiness, and on political control of forces at the top levels of government. They have also caused a hardening of forces and motivated the research for an antiballistic missile. On the other hand, as ballistic missile forces have increased, progressively less emphasis has been placed on manned strategic aircraft and on air defense against them. Existence of these weapons has caused the Soviet Union to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States. Finally, they have caused the United States to exercise great restraint in waging war.

The technological developments mentioned thus far have not been used in actual warfare although their potential has profoundly influenced military planning. The development of military airlift, however, has allowed the United States greater freedom of movement within the constraints imposed by the previously mentioned developments. The most obvious example of this is the Berlin airlift of 1948-49, which saved the city without forcing a direct conflict between Russia and the United States—one in which we would have been at a distinct disadvantage. Since Berlin, airlift has proven itself in the Lebanon crisis and again during the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States rapidly mobilized its forces for action in Cuba. More recently, the use of airlift in Vietnam, in combination with the air interdiction campaign and Army tactical air mobility, has at the very minimum prevented the enemy from achieving a military victory. This is at least one illustration that technology can be significant in guerrilla wars.

In the matter of the tremendous strides taken recently in the field of communications and electronics, only two points need to be made concerning their effect upon the nature

of war. First, their development has made possible many of these other postwar accomplishments; and second, this sophistication has made it possible for the top levels of government to exercise close control over military forces.

It is best to summarize the impact of technology upon the nature of warfare since 1945 in the framework of the interaction between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Four points emerge from such an analysis. The first is that U.S. strategic power has thus far foreclosed most direct Soviet action which might have led to hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Second, with this avenue blocked, the Soviets have resorted to limited war waged by their proxies. Third, after the failure of the limited war in Korea to expand the Communist world, the Soviets reverted to the older tactic of revolution, which they chose to call "wars of national liberation." Again, these wars were waged by proxy while being supplied and supported by the U.S.S.R. Finally, partly because of the danger of escalation, the United States chose to respond to each of these Communist overt actions essentially on their own ground. While the Communists have, in each case, exercised some degree of military restraint, our self-imposed restraints have significantly limited our technological superiority except in the field of air mobility.

WHAT then can be said about the nature of warfare in the future?

Conventional wisdom would have us expect that the future holds more wars of national liberation and insurgency. This is a logical projection, and it may turn out to be a correct one, but not necessarily. Planners most often go wrong when they attempt to project current situations into the future. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now possible to see clearly the inadequacies of the forward projections of 1959 and 1949. This does not mean that the planners of ten or twenty years ago did not do their jobs well. In many cases, it was the excellence of their projections that generated action programs which in turn

changed the nature of the original predictions.

Rather than attempt hard and fast predictions on the future nature of warfare, which could, as we have seen, be outmoded by technology, it will be more profitable to analyze some of the ways in which the four determinants of warfare might affect the future. In each case, there is such a wide range of possibilities that it is safe to say only that the future is indeterminate—that the nature of future warfare will depend upon decisions which have not yet been made by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other nations. Furthermore, decisions made by each of these nations will, in turn, generate new sets of decisions by the others.

In the realm of purpose, very little of the absolute is possible to predict. Soviet purposes at the moment are unclear. There are those who would have the United States believe that the Communists have abandoned their goal of territorial expansion and world domination. This is a situation much to be hoped for but one impossible to base upon any facts.

The purpose of the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, seems much clearer. That teeming nation wants to expand both her power and her influence in Asia and perhaps beyond. The steadfastness of these purposes against those of the Soviet Union is questionable. Conventional wisdom would tend to predict a continuation of the Sino-Soviet split. However, the death of Mao and other elders in the Chinese hierarchy may lead to a quest for a healing of the ideological split.

The United States is in the midst of clarifying and redefining its purpose at this time. It is a logical assumption that nuclear deterrence will continue as one major U.S. purpose. How far we will go in the current policy of containment will in a large measure depend upon how much we are willing to pay in its pursuit. The decisions of these three nations and their respective allies will establish the parameters of war in the future.

There is a wide range of alternative future concepts which can and would affect future warfare if put into practice. Issues such as strategic arms control, if agreed upon by the major powers, could basically alter the

type and ferocity of future wars. The parameters here could embrace anything from all-out nuclear conflict to the severely limited use of conventional arms. Any nation obtaining nuclear capability after the initial agreement could very well upset any past strategic parity. A second conceptual issue is the extent to which we will continue to rely upon regional collective defense throughout the world. Again, this doctrine can be applied with varying degrees of implementation ranging from full-scale assistance, such as in Vietnam, to the simple supplying of arms to a nation's forces. Certainly, the following questions must be considered: How will we implement this concept in terms of (1) deployed U.S. forces versus a strategic reserve, (2) in terms of U.S. surface forces versus air forces, (3) in terms of nuclear forces versus nonnuclear forces, and (4) in terms of concepts for employment of nuclear weapons in the defense of our allies? If the United States retrenches, will the Soviets step into the resultant vacuum, or will the Chinese Communists decide to take upon themselves this function? Should either of these latter two countries act in this manner, then how would the United States respond to protect her interests and commitments?

A third major conceptual issue is United States policy toward internal subversion, wars of national liberation, and counterinsurgency. This concept will be decided only when Russia and China have sufficiently revealed their hands to allow the United States to decide how she will react to Communist insurgencies in areas far from its shores.

In the field of technology, antiballistic missiles, space research, lasers, sensors, improved guidance systems for missiles, air mobility, and very-low-yield nuclear weapons have created vast possibilities. How these developments affect warfare will depend largely upon our concepts for exploitation in pursuit of national purpose. It is possible, however, for technology not only to affect warfare planning but to be affected by such things as feasibility and the ever-present problem—cost.

These latter two considerations materially influence the fourth determinant, capability.

Current indications are that United States financial considerations will loom especially large in the months ahead in influencing capability. It could go to the extreme of creating a gap between capability and concept, and it most certainly will cause the United States to adjust its purposes and concepts to the capabilities we are willing to pay for.

ALL THIS may well raise more questions than it answers. It should certainly afford a glimpse of the problems of second-guessing future wars. There are, however, four things which are of paramount importance in the consideration of the future. First, all military profes-

sionals must recognize the indeterminacy of the future of warfare and gear their thinking away from the stereotyped and into the flexible. Second, the professional must ask himself the right questions, based upon careful study of the situations, which will enable this country to react in timely fashion as the future is revealed. Third, the planners of the future must be prepared to cope with a wide range of alternatives, with subtle shades of grey instead of the conventional black or white. Finally, a truism should be ever present in the planner's mind: those eventualities for which one is best prepared are the least likely to happen.

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## REVIVAL FOR NATO IS NEEDED NOW

DR. STANLEY L. HARRISON

**O**NE political institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, links formal United States commitment to the defense of Western Europe. For twenty years this tie has sustained varying degrees of emphasis by both the United States and its European partners. Nevertheless, the alliance continues. Yet political vitality is lacking; military muscle is flagging. In short, NATO needs revival. This element of American foreign policy needs revision. In the past, political development of the alliance has atrophied in the face of pressing military necessity. Specifically, the Korean War wrought changes in the military sphere and produced heavy investment of United States ground and air forces on the European continent. During the period of the cold war, defense needs and security requirements became a daily preoccupation of NATO's military planners. Despite this emphasis, European complements of local defense forces never reached alliance programmed levels of military capability.

Reliance on nuclear weapons beyond long-range aircraft capability engendered strategy debates centering on employment and control of nuclear arms. Increasingly, emphasis in alliance affairs shifted to concern for immediate military problems. Solutions for these issues prompted debate that continues unresolved. After twenty years NATO is beset by differences over its purpose and role, its organization and function. Disagreement and debate, however disruptive, have not proved the alliance unnecessary. New interpretations of NATO as well as revisions of policies and structure are in order and deserve serious consideration.

Aspects of NATO's relationship to alliance purposes are revealing. Traditionally, alliances were structured for a threefold purpose: to provide for an accretion of power; to make clear the alignment of forces; and to convert tacit mutuality into formal obligation. In essence, prior to the advent of nuclear weapons, alliances were held together by the belief that the immediate risk of conflict was less than the ultimate hazard of countering a powerful enemy unaided. Old theories retard NATO's development.

In the beginning, NATO was interpreted as nothing more than a defensive alliance. President and Congress saw NATO simply as a political commitment. The United States entered into the North Atlantic Treaty with support from a Senate satisfied that the Treaty left Congressional war-making prerogatives intact and assured that there were no plans to commit substantial numbers of American troops to Europe. This was not the case. Subsequent treaties have employed a more reserved formula in the commitment to defense, in order to retain the war-making power. Thus, in its early phase, NATO constituted a diplomatic rather than a military gesture. The Korean outbreak led to NATO's transformation. This event transformed the European military commitment of the United States to wide-scale troop deployment in the field. American forces in Europe were increased to almost six divisions. In the U.S. Senate there was increased pressure for the European nations to contribute more ground

force units. Europeans paid little heed to the desires of U.S. legislators.

Nevertheless, the alliance became a genuine military organization, structured to stop a genuine threat to Europe. This was possible only by significant increases of United States air and ground forces. While the United Nations force in Korea represented collective action to achieve collective security, it was through U.S. efforts alone that NATO was able to assume an increasingly military coloration. Hence, the alliance role is defined as one of collective defense. Korea was significant to the foreign policy evolution of the United States and was the major catalyst in the new direction of NATO. By the early 1950s NATO broadened in scope militarily but left off immediate application of purely political affairs.

A basic assessment of NATO's performance uncovers inconsistency of purpose and performance. In the first decade, NATO was sustained by three factors: the U.S. nuclear monopoly; the economic weakness of the nations of Western Europe; and the intransigence of the U.S.S.R. Initially, these several purposes served to sustain NATO, despite the changing times and circumstances. Primary objectives of the European alliance partners were identical: preservation of their national security and military protection of their independence. Notwithstanding this element of *Realpolitik*, NATO failed to develop a convincing philosophy of military purpose. Mutual defense, couched in generalities, constituted the *raison d'être* for the alliance. Basically, the philosophy underlying NATO failed to take cognizance of the fact that in the present environment alliances differ significantly from earlier concepts. First, political goals have superseded military goals; second, the relative power and number of participants have altered significantly; and finally, ideology is not a major factor. Militarily, NATO would not have come about without the United States, but the dominant role of the largest partner engendered internal stress as the allies regained vitality. Ideological impetus is less pervasive for NATO than for, say, the Warsaw Pact group. Common bonds of "democratic"

government and similar goals have worked to this end for NATO members.

Critics of American policy have argued with reason that NATO policy is fragmented and bereft of genuine political action. Further, the policy of benign intervention is perpetuated by dubious alliances hastily erected to give legal framework to world involvement. These are valid charges; it must be remembered that NATO sought to strengthen Europe and contain Soviet Union military expansion. The United States primarily sought to block Soviet domination of all Europe. Given the impetus and importance of these goals, United States involvement in Europe over the last twenty years was caused by peculiar circumstances. Involvement in European recovery and defense through the Marshall Plan and NATO grew out of immediate necessity. If weaknesses exist, it must be remembered that NATO was only one of a series of defensive regional alliances created as an overall containment policy to counter active military aggression. Weaknesses inherent as a result of this hasty arrangement persist.

Despite theoretical emphasis on the alliance's political thrust, NATO remains a pre-eminently defensive military alignment. Nonetheless, for the United States NATO remains an indispensable instrument for extending deterrence and engendering political confidence in Europe. One of NATO's enduring goals remains the hope that Europeans will mount the major portion of the military strength to contain any future U.S.S.R. menace. Another function of the alliance is to provide a unifying nexus for Western security. For this task, Europe remains the indispensable collaborator with the United States. Aspirations to project the potential of NATO beyond application in Europe are too optimistic.

If mutual heritage linked the Old World and the New, few Americans—or Europeans for that matter—were pulled toward common cause with Europe. Failure of the ideals originally sought in the United Nations brought about the concept of an "Atlantic Community." Proposed political, economic, and military integration in Europe was but a vision. Integration was largely a myth, and NATO has

never completely captured the loyalties of the European public; it was the burden required to obtain the U.S. nuclear guarantee of security. Within the United States, on the other hand, the alliance and European integration have been intimately linked. Yet even with the emphasis on the economic-political-military ties of the alliance, it is doubtful that the United States would desire closer unity if this would entail relinquishment of national sovereignty or Congressional prerogatives.

Not surprisingly, then, despite the early ambitions to form military and political union, NATO has never embraced genuine political or economic unification or, for that matter, extensive military unification. Nevertheless, NATO's political and nonmilitary aspects endeavor in theory to embrace a wide scope of activity, though often the reach exceeds the grasp. Official records are remarkably circumspect in attempts to describe NATO as a functioning political forum.

Candid comments found in personal memoirs of former NATO participants are apt to be more illuminating, if less optimistic in portrayal of the political sphere of NATO relations. In the international political community, military and defense questions fail to exhibit close affinity for integration except in the matter of allocating resources. Experience of NATO in community defense efforts indicates that the upgrading of common interests takes place only with obstacles and delays, but for the most part the other activities of the alliance make it clear that integration is more pronounced on paper than in actual practice. It lacks common central institutions. Nevertheless, NATO is to some degree unique as an alliance, for it goes far beyond any other's peacetime achievement.

However impressive, these aspects have not reached federation or confederation level, and NATO's claims to be more than a military alliance do not stand up. As a limited center of coalition diplomacy and a multilateral framework of interallied diplomacy, NATO is only somewhat more than a military alliance. At some cost, the alliance served the fundamental purpose of achieving security by papering over disharmony.



IN the present environment, political goals must be at least equal to military goals for NATO. With the restoration of Western Europe and the obvious success of threat containment, NATO's military importance has receded into the background. With success seemingly assured for both external and internal threats, several revisions within NATO can be entertained. Issues on which the alliance members differ have been well publicized within recent years, but despite the differences the basic stability of NATO remains sound. The fact that the structure is capable of absorbing buffetings without massive consequence suggests that constructive revision can be accommodated without harming Western security.

Reform or adjustments must usefully be made in order to reinvest NATO with needed vitality for its future tasks. Two broad areas stand in need of examination in order to suggest goals for the future American commitment: military reform and political alteration.

At the root of NATO's present military problems is a complex of strategic issues centering on the question of deployment, use, and control of nuclear weapons. To solve this problem, a decision by the United States to genuinely share elements of control, deployment, strategy, and the decision to use nuclear weapons is required. This is the future means with which to come to a sharing of responsibilities within the alliance. In the 1970s the United States and the European allies would be well served by closer ties and further development of military integration within the alliance.<sup>1</sup> Nuclear weapons can provide the needed catalyst.

If the United States cannot bring itself to promote a European nuclear force, it should exercise more prudence in seeking to retard internal European initiatives and nuclear arrangements. One positive role for the U.S. is to exert its influence in shaping meaningful Atlantic nuclear relationships. Atlantic political cohesion will progress no further until a positive U.S. nuclear policy for NATO emerges. A number of alternatives can be used to build on the existing strategic nuclear forces, including the earmarked United States forces, in

such a manner as to open the way for an Allied Nuclear Force.

Proposals for nuclear sharing within the alliance have been made by a number of European commentators. French General Pierre Gallois, a former member of the Planning Group at SHAPE, proposed that the United States make nuclear weapons available (individually or in groups) under dual control, with the proviso that the "key" to the warheads be turned over in critical situations specified in advance.<sup>2</sup> According to Gallois, the only meaningful way to assure the credibility of nuclear retaliation is for NATO to have power to retaliate. To allow selected NATO nations to rely on a unilateral force of nuclear weapons encourages proliferation and strains mutual defense obligations. One means to check proliferation of nuclear weapons is for the United States to share nuclear weapons, under proper safeguards, for combined dual and unilateral control. His plan relieves the alliance of dependence on United States control of nuclear weapons without requiring the several members to develop their own nuclear capability and without requiring the cumbersome procedures of a collective decision of all the allies. In brief, the Gallois plan is one means to solve problems of nuclear proliferation and alliance dependence by combining the military and political advantages of American and independent control. Critics suggest that Gallois may have combined the disadvantages of both systems. Europeans favor this approach. A similar plan, embracing cooperation of NATO and the Western European Union, with political control within a combined NATO-WEU Council, was proposed within the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in December 1964.

Alastair Buchan, former Director of the prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies, proposed a NATO nuclear force.<sup>3</sup> Creation of a NATO nuclear force seems more feasible and desirable than a European deterrent group. This proposal was envisioned as a means of giving America's NATO allies a share in the control of nuclear weapons consonant with the altered distribution of power within the alliance. At the same time it avoids the dangers

of a purely European deterrent by building on existing military cooperation of the United States and Europe, in order to enhance the cohesion of the alliance and shore it up against further erosion that would isolate Europe militarily or politically. Through an integrated nuclear force, nuclear sharing could become an instrument of allied consolidation rather than disintegration. The United States could either give or sell the nuclear weapons and perhaps preserve formal custody of them while transferring command and control to NATO. The British and French would also be expected to place their nuclear forces under NATO command, except perhaps for token elements. This proposal will be credible if those American strategic weapons based in Europe are not withdrawn. If the NATO system of deterrence in Europe becomes one sustained primarily by Polaris submarines, this opportunity will be lost.

The proper NATO role in the nuclear context is difficult to resolve. Questions that U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), posed a decade ago remain unanswered: How do we meet a growing, but still somewhat confused and conflicting, desire among the European allies for a broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons? How can the alliance as a whole be assured that such weapons will be available to them in all reasonable circumstances for the defense of Europe? General Norstad in 1966 proposed that NATO be given the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons, their physical control resting with the country of origin. The political controlling arm would have up to 200 of the existing nuclear weapons in Europe under Norstad's scheme. None of these proposals has been acted on, and the nuclear issue, with a latent potential for interalliance divisiveness, remains unresolved.

What is required within the alliance is a politically acceptable system of sharing and control of nuclear weapons under central command that would give sufficient promise of a controlled response to deter aggression. This is a problem not only of organization but also of strategic and political consensus. Motiva-

tion and organization of the system for a NATO nuclear force can be determined only after protracted discussion and bargaining among the allies. If it comes about at all, it must be the U.S. leaders who take the initiative. This intensely political question holds a great deal of military significance to the continued vitality of NATO.

Political alteration in the alliance is equally important to military modification. In this area as well, NATO will require some alteration if it is to continue. But it should be equally evident that no military force arrangement will solve problems of the alliance; the fundamental challenge lies in the political field. Indeed, in the present environment, emphasis on the political phase of NATO is needed more, not less, as both symbol and substance of unity.

Need for political alteration or re-emphasis within NATO is clearly tied to the military requirements. But the modification in the military structure is intimately related to concomitant political changes as well. For example, the adjustments in NATO's central structure illustrate this linkage. A steadily widening military challenge facing the alliance from the Soviet Union and the uncertain balance of strategic power set a high premium on unified political responses.

Attempts to devise common nuclear strategy are likely to prove futile in the absence of common political policy. Thus, creation of a political function at the highest level for concerting the policy of the alliance is needed. Henry Kissinger has proposed creation of a political body to be constituted as an Executive Committee of the present NATO Council.<sup>4</sup> Membership would include five permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy—and one rotating member to represent the smaller NATO nations. These nations would select their representatives by vote within the NATO Council, the permanent members being excluded from participation, in order to protect the rights of smaller countries. The Executive Committee would formulate common Atlantic purposes and define limits of autonomous action when

interests diverge and would provide opportunity to carry out closer association. Such an arrangement could afford the alliance members within Europe opportunity to form a closer association. The Western European Union could properly assume responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force and provide joint European contribution to NATO plans.

Proposals for military change are closely linked to political alterations within the alliance. One aspect that needs examination is the effectiveness and authority of the machinery of political consultation and control. Obviously the NATO Council devotes a great deal of time to questions of European security, but consultation and joint planning are not the same thing. Serious deficiencies arise: First, the NATO Council exercises only minor influence over military planning and little control over the military environment in which it may be asked to reach political judgments. Second, the NATO Secretariat cannot undertake effective long-range planning or play the dominant part it should in the evaluation of political, economic, technological, and strategic trends, which themselves shape military goals. Well meant proposals of national governments have more than once foundered on the hostility or misunderstanding of other NATO governments. Revamping of NATO's political machinery is needed in order to avoid the continued division existing between U.S. military thinking and that of its allies. Theoretically, members of NATO should have access to the debate from which American policy emerges and thereby be able to deal with greater candor about new developments. The Secretariat could more effectively serve the Council if a division of functions was related to the different contributions which countries make to the collective military and economic resources of the alliance. A new staff creation is required. Within this group, allied rather than national planning would be conducted in a cooperative effort. By this means candid and informed assessment of the requirements of both present and future would be forthcoming by international teams.

These revisions of an organizational na-

ture may perhaps be criticized as too conservative in that they fail to reflect the erosive process of the disintegrative forces at work. Indeed, radical changes in the structure of European relationships may become inevitable. In this environment, which to be sure goes beyond mere revision of NATO, the total dissolution of NATO may emerge as the first alternative. In the second possibility, however, NATO might be continued with modifications that include: denuclearization of the two Germanys; abolition of the unified military command, along with an agreement on the conventional forces for each European state; or creation of a superstructure over the two existing alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact group, to embrace a European security organization that would include representation from within Europe as well as the two superpowers. The eventual goal would perhaps lead toward merger of the two alliances.

Less extreme political reform within the existing alliance structure could lead to a general-staff type planning group of five or six of the principal members of the alliance. This move would serve as a beginning toward the more sophisticated arrangement, a close central staff. Reform of the political process within the alliance must deal with the nuclear question. One alteration in the procedure, already initiated on a modest basis, is evident in the creation of the NATO committees dealing with nuclear issues.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed that some means be established within NATO "in which consultation might be improved and participation . . . extended in the planning of nuclear force, including strategic forces."<sup>5</sup> The NATO Council approved formation of a committee, and two permanent bodies for nuclear planning were established. One is a policy body, called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, which is open to all NATO countries; not all of them have sought membership. The second group, subordinate to the first, is the Nuclear Planning Group. These committees were formed so that NATO members would understand the strength of the nuclear deterrent and participate in its planning and potential use. Offi-

cially, the view of the U.S. is optimistic, although Europeans are not so sanguine.

France is opposed to this concept and argues correctly that it violates the spirit of the alliance. It is too early to be able to predict the success that may be expected from this kind of consultation. Several European members refer to the activities as "eyewash." At least it can be said that one forum for political discussion is opened through creation of these committees. If the group does not constitute a milestone in political cooperation of NATO, it is nonetheless a beginning useful step toward unity. In the past, United States policy, if thoroughgoing in particulars, can be correctly charged with being less than precise in defining a schedule for future development of the alliance. Limited efforts being made by the United States to respond to the requirements of European unity within the NATO alliance may be found wanting.

**T**HE time has come for major changes and a genuine revitalization within NATO. Even those who would dismiss the charge that the alliance is undergoing a crisis must recognize that events have called for a reconsideration of policy and that some adjustment is necessary.

Need for change is apparent. Required adjustments or useful alterations of emphasis do not spell abandonment of NATO. Critics who see NATO as only a limited military alliance that has outlived its purpose are wide of the mark. It is highly unlikely that the United States can accomplish more beyond NATO. Nor have nuclear weapons made alliances obsolete. There is need for revisions, to be sure, particularly in the realm of military strategy, and for recognizing that the political function must at least have equal emphasis. Nuclear-era military alliances compel the respective members to establish an intimate political relationship. Vital interests must be mutual to an unprecedented degree—if these relationships are to succeed. Future developments within NATO require careful plotting, but the need for the alliance remains firm.

Within NATO itself tentative re-examina-

tion of the alliance began in December 1966. The North Atlantic Council resolved to "undertake a broad analysis of international developments" under a proposal initiated by Belgium's Pierre Harmel. Significantly, this effort points to increasing desire by the European members of NATO for increased political stature and greater participation. Among the major points advanced in the reform proposals were recommendations to (1) improve NATO's role in reducing tensions between East and West, (2) enlarge the policy-making role of the NATO Council, and (3) increase alliance responsibility as a political entity itself for coordinating specific areas of interest to the alliance community. Study is ongoing, but the effort is a modest one.

The significant point, of course, is that NATO itself is turning to examination, analytic and thorough, of problems that stand in need of solution. None are going to be swift or easy. As President Richard M. Nixon observed during his April 1969 address to the NATO Council:

The answers to these great questions will not be decided in a week. They deal with the vast sweep of history, they need the most thorough deliberations. But the questions are with us; we cannot evade them; and the fact that we have begun this process of soul searching is a good augury.<sup>6</sup>

Later, in a landmark address at the U.S. Air Force Academy, June 1969, the President attacked the "new isolationists" and promised that "we must revitalize our alliances, not abandon them." Moreover, Mr. Nixon affirmed that "this nation shall continue to be a source of freedom's strength. . . ." President Nixon has forcefully indicated his acceptance of the challenge to renew NATO.

The future outlook for NATO is mixed. The challenge is evident. Perhaps the success of NATO prompts high expectations. In the past NATO has demonstrated the necessary properties of change to meet the exigencies of the environment. This adaptability has allowed the alliance to meet specific challenges presented in a number of situations, primarily military.

Europe cannot act as a great power, and there is no solely European entity that can act alone for defense of the Continent. Until that assessment changes, the policies and actions of NATO will be crucial to the direction given for the future of the European environment. It is evident that NATO has the necessary ingredients to remain a dynamic organization responsive to the needs of its members. There is nothing to suggest that the formal commitment by the United States for the defense of Europe has eroded. The response for defense of Europe following the bitter lessons of World War II is clear evidence of that guaranty. Problems of defense and strategy must be resolved on a basis satisfactory to the

European members of the alliance. More particularly, political issues must be resolved in concert with those most intimately concerned with this problem or there is little likelihood of reaching any meaningful agreements pertaining to continuation of the alliance.

Required now is more than a protracted series of steps and half-steps toward a hoped-for solution. Bold, assertive effort is needed. Requirement for revision must be recognized by the decision-makers of all the NATO partners, particularly in the United States. An optimistic outlook for the future of the alliance appears warranted only if there is a firm decision to undertake the chore of genuine revision.

*Fulton, Maryland*

#### Notes

1. Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 19.
2. Pierre Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX, 1 (October 1960), 67-80.
3. Alastair Buchan, "The Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XL, 2 (January 1962), 165-82.
4. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 194.

5. "NATO Defense Ministers Communiqué," reprinted in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, III, 3 (Fall 1965), 405

6. The President's remarks to members of the Council, Brussels, 24 February 1969, *Presidential Documents*, Vol. 5, No. 9, 3 March 1969, pp. 312-13.

7. Partial text of the President's address at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 4 June 1969, *Washington Post*, 5 June 1969, p. A12.

## Air Force Review

### COMBAT TRAP— VON CLAUSEWITZ REVISITED

COLONEL DAVID R. JONES

**T**HE epical work, *Vom Kriege*, which established for all time the military genius of Karl von Clausewitz, has guided military students in the classrooms and commanders in the field alike. A striking reaffirmation of the validity of the principles of war expounded by Clausewitz occurred recently in South Vietnam in connection with an R&D project, Combat Trap, to create instantaneous helicopter landing zones.

The advent of the helicopter after World War II inspired ground troop commanders with visions of mobility and maneuverability that would revolutionize the ground battle. In the Korean conflict this was partially realized in the medical evacuation role played by the helicopter. It was not, however, until after the Vietnam struggle had gotten well under way that the helicopter came into its own as a gun platform as well as a transport, in great part due to rapid advances in available power plants. But there is a limiting feature, that of suitable landing zones, in helicopter operations which has continued to restrict the degree of mobility required by the battlefield commanders, especially in the conduct of operations against guerrilla forces in Southeast Asia (SEA). In that war the troop commander

must seek out the enemy concealed and protected by dense jungle. Too often, because of this cover, the time and place of battle was chosen by the enemy. If a battle was not to his liking, he faded away into the jungle, where our forces were unable to follow.

The helicopter to date has played a major role in South Vietnam for evacuating wounded, transporting infantry into battle, and delivering supplies and equipment—and to a limited extent as a gun platform. The majority of these activities are restricted to prepared landing sites, or those natural sites which meet the criteria for safe operation of helicopters, such as terrain, height of obstacles, and a reasonable approach path. Too often, in that heavily forested country, the few available naturally clear areas either were in the wrong place strategically or were heavily booby-trapped by the enemy forces. The helicopter could not provide the troop commander the means of moving his combat troops into advantageous positions from which they could attack the enemy, once they had found him, or cut off his retreat following sneak attacks. A means of creating helicopter landing zones (HLZ) was needed, in areas of the commander's choosing, to give him the



elements of selection, surprise, and maneuverability.

The jungles in which these HLZ were desired are as dense as any in the world. Heavily foliated, the ironwood, teak, mahogany, and other tree varieties may rise to a height of over a hundred feet, with vines and undergrowth making movement on the ground very difficult. The field commander, having made the decision to create one or more HLZ, was faced with the prospect of sending in a sizable force to clear the virgin jungle. First, a security force would rappel in from hovering helicopters, a very vulnerable and time-consuming operation. Once the area was secure, the engineers would rappel in with chain saws, brush hooks, explosive charges, etc., and start the clearing operation. When a sufficiently large area was cleared, a small bulldozer might be lowered, and gradually the clearing would take shape. Typically, an HLZ might be 100 meters square and might take as much as eight days to clear. Casualties from accidents were frequent, and the troops on the ground would be subject to attack by the enemy, who would have ample time to maneuver his forces to meet the new threat. What was needed was a means of clearing, in as short a time as possible, an area in the jungle large enough for one or more helicopters to land. The objective was to put friendly troops where the enemy was not expecting them and to do it as safely and quickly as possible.

Accordingly, a Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) was established by the Seventh Air Force to develop a technique to provide these instant helicopter landing zones. It was not immediately apparent how to satisfy the requirement or who was best equipped to investigate the problem. Several in-country experiments had been conducted, using 1000-pound and 3000-pound general-purpose bombs, detonated statically in the deep jungles of Kontum province. These were not successful, for even though some clearing resulted, stumps and whole tree skeletons were left standing and prevented safe helicopter touchdown. Something more was needed.


Meanwhile, in a series of tests, the De-

partment of Defense had cooperated with the Canadian Defense Ministry in studying the effects of high-explosive (HE) weapons on large forest stands. These tests were conducted by detonating as much as 100 tons of stacked TNT in the deep coniferous forests of Canada. These and other experiments indicated that large HE detonations would clear trees and brush from an area, leaving a zone suitable for helicopter landings. As applied to the HLZ problem, it was clear that the HE had to be detonated at some height above the ground to avoid cratering, for two reasons: First, the ground should not be disturbed so much as to make it difficult or impossible for a helicopter to land safely. Second, even shallow bomb penetration would result in the blast being directed at an upward angle, greatly reducing the total surface area affected by the blast. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, had been involved in the experiments, doing the theoretical prediction of blast overpressure as a function of distance, as well as participating in the blast instrumentation. Because of this experience with blast phenomena, the Weapons Laboratory was asked, in the spring of 1968, to look at the problem of creating instant helicopter landing zones.

A task force was established, incorporating personnel from the Air Force Armament Laboratory at Eglin AFB, Florida, the Army Waterways Experimental Station at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and the Ballistic Research Laboratory at Aberdeen, Maryland, under a task force commander from the Air Force Weapons Laboratory. In the search for a suitable high-explosive package to perform the mission, the M-121 10,000-pound bomb was found in an ordnance depot in sufficient supply to carry out the tests. This bomb had been developed in 1954 to be dropped by the B-36 but had never been employed. It was decided to test out the HLZ concept in the United States before proceeding to Southeast Asia. The M-121 was taken to Fort Benning, Georgia, where a stand of mixed hardwood and conifers had been designated as a test area. The bomb was emplaced by an Army CH-54 helicopter at a height corresponding

## Instant Landing Zones

To meet an operational requirement in SEA, Task Force Combat Trap devised a quick way to clear a helicopter landing zone in jungle. The 10,000-lb M-121 bomb, tests at Fort Benning, Georgia, cleared enough space for a helicopter to land (left). . . . The M-121 was fitted with drogue parachute, special tail fuze and fuze extender, and brush deflector (the latter two visible, right). . . . The Army CH-54 was specially fitted for operational test drops in I Corps, South Vietnam.





to that planned for an airdrop burst and was statically detonated on 10 June 1968. When the smoke had cleared, the area was surveyed, and an Army Huey helicopter was flown in to land in the cleared area. The zone created had usable space approximately 100 feet in diameter. There was no crater, but the earth had been punched down directly under the bomb to produce a shallow bowl, about eight inches at the deepest point. The "usable area" was defined as the area in which a helicopter could operate without damage to its rotors; i.e., any remaining stumps were less than six feet tall. The first phase of Combat Trap was clearly successful, as related to Georgia forests. What would happen in the much taller, denser, and harder woods of Southeast Asia, however, had yet to be determined.


Heartened by this success but still concerned about the differences to be found in a tropical jungle, the Combat Trap project began preparations for aerial delivery of the M-121 for operational tests in South Vietnam. The M-121 was fitted with a drogue parachute for stability, and a special tail fuze was developed to serve as backup to the nose fuze. To provide for a burst height of about three feet, a standard nose fuze and M-1 fuze extender (a tube packed with explosives, which was attached to a detonator inside the bomb) were used. The contact nose fuze was protected with a brush deflector, a locally designed iron basket to enable the bomb to penetrate the tops of the trees without detonation. The sequence of events is as follows: As the bomb separates from its carrier, pins are pulled from both nose and tail fuzes, and the drogue chute is deployed. The fuzes are armed at a preset time to provide safe separation, and the chute quickly stabilizes the trajectory of the bomb. Penetrating the top of the canopy, the brush deflector pushes aside the smaller branches and is crushed by the impact with the earth. The fuze detonates the explosive in the extender tube, which in turn ignites the booster in the bomb, which sets off the main charge. All this occurs rapidly enough to ensure that the detonation will occur with the nose of the bomb only slightly less than three feet above ground level.

Ballistic data on the parachute-stabilized M-121 was obtained from inert drops at the Flight Test Center, El Centro Naval Air Station, California. Fuze operation was checked with the aid of telemetry. The Army CH-54 Skycrane had been fitted with a drift meter rigged up as a bombsight, sway braces to stabilize bomb carriage, and a pitch attitude indicator. Practice drops were made, dropping the inert bomb on the Sandia Corporation test ranges at Albuquerque, New Mexico. In the meantime standard cargo-extraction techniques were modified for deploying the bomb from the C-130. Two different delivery techniques were thus developed and tested. About five months after receipt of the order to develop the technique, the Combat Trap Task Force deployed to South Vietnam for the operational tests.

Both Army and Marine forces had been designated to provide the targets and operational support for the tests in I Corps area. Operating primarily out of Da Nang, the Task Force, assisted by local Army and Air Force units, began the initial operations with the CH-54 as delivery aircraft. Drop altitude was 6000 feet above the target. The targets had been chosen for their immediate operational value and would have presented a severe accuracy problem to any delivery technique. Located without exception on ridges or tops of elevations, they offered an extremely small target area. Four bombs were dropped in this phase, but only three HLZ were created, since one of the detonations occurred on a slope too steep to permit helicopter operations. On the basis of these results, the technique was declared a success by the ground forces, who immediately began laying plans for operational employment. Parenthetically, the 10,000-pound bomb seemed to work much better in the Southeast Asia jungle than in the Georgia pine woods. The typical Combat Trap HLZ consisted of an area about 120 feet in diameter completely devoid of vegetation, including stumps. Beyond that, the height of the remaining stumps gradually increased, so that at some 70 feet from ground zero their height was approximately six feet, the limiting height for helicopter operations. Damaged


## A Cheaper Bomb

*As substitute for the limited number of M-121s, a "homemade" bomb utilized a 1000-gallon propane tank full of slurry explosives (stabilizer parachute and tail fuze visible, right). . . . A pair of the CD-1s stand ready for test drop from a C-130. . . . Drop No. 2 confirms success at instant jungle clearing.*



and defoliated trees extended to approximately 180 feet from ground zero.

The second phase of Combat Trap involved use of the C-130 as delivery aircraft. Whereas the CH-54 had made visual bomb drops, the C-130 delivery was directed by the MSQ radar on its bomb run and drop. Again, a total of four M-121 bombs were dropped from an altitude of 6000 to 9000 feet AGL. Two of the resulting HLZ were unusable (because of the slope of the ground in one zone and large boulders in another), but the other two were immediately useful and became fire bases to interdict infiltration routes. The MSQ radar demonstrated a high degree of accuracy in working with the C-130. Drops were made with miss distances from 30 to 150 yards.



WITH the concept and technique proven, the Combat Trap Task Force returned home. Only a few weeks had elapsed, however, when an urgent call was received for operational employment of the technique in I Corps. In less than a week ten sets of supporting hardware were gathered, and a Weapons Introduction Team was deployed to support the operation. Despite weather problems (all drops were made through dense clouds by C-130s), HLZ were created in sufficient numbers to support the planned operation, and the usefulness of the concept was again demonstrated. The Combat Trap technique has since become established as an operational system that may be called on by the ground force commander in carrying out his mission.



The rate at which Combat Trap was using the 10,000-pound M-121s as a clearing device for helicopter landing zones was rapidly depleting the limited supply of bombs. In the search for a suitable substitute, methods for developing a cheap, big bomb were explored. Slurry explosives, chiefly ammonium nitrate and water, have been used for many years by the oil and mining industries, and tests were conducted on various mixtures. A 1000-gallon propane tank was used for the container, and appropriate flanges and openings arranged for. When filled with the slurry mixture, which solidified into a rubbery mass after pouring, the device weighed 15,000 pounds. This was a cooperative development by the Weapons Laboratory and nearby Sandia Laboratories, whose tremendous technical and engineering capabilities enabled completion of the modification engineering and testing in a matter of months. The tests,


both static and airdrop, were completely successful, and deployment of two of the so-called CD-1 devices to SEA was authorized for operational tests in April 1969. At last report, the armed forces in Southeast Asia are apparently satisfied that the CD-1 will fulfill all the requirements originally stated, and Combat Trap is essentially completed.

The net result of this effort has been to enlarge the role of the helicopter in jungle warfare against a highly mobile, irregular enemy. By enabling the commander to maneuver his forces and turn the tables on an enemy who depends on concealment, mobility, and surprise to survive, the task of fighting the ground war in Vietnam may be a little less difficult. It is the opinion of all who have seen the combat situation in Vietnam that the ground forces need all the support they can get.

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# POLITICS AND PRISONERS OF WAR

COLONEL ROBERT M. KRONE



**T**HE evolution of the treatment of prisoners of war is a macabre story that encompasses the extremes of cruelty, neglect, deprivation, and maltreatment of human beings. Even when the stated intentions of captors were to provide humane treatment—during the last hundred years particularly—

instances of barbarous treatment of prisoners of war have been numerous. It is particularly evident that a historical and fairly linear trend toward more humane treatment has been arrested during the wars of the twentieth century.

Other developments are apparent when one reviews the history of treatment of prisoners. The Korean and Vietnam wars and the seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship *Pueblo* by North Korea have introduced a considerably increased political dimension into this treatment. Scholars in the field of military strategy and tactics have excluded analysis of the treatment of

prisoners of war (POW), evidently considering the prisoner to be an unfortunate by-product of war rather than as a political pawn to be exploited in the propaganda, public opinion, or bargaining facets of modern limited war. The fact that the use of prisoners for these ends is more a reflection of political goals than military tactics is of critical importance for our understanding of inhumane and apparently illogical treatment of U.S. prisoners in North Korea and North Vietnam during the last two decades.

Using the broad definition of "political," one can say that war, in all its aspects, is a political act to achieve a nation's objectives and impose its will on an enemy or prevent him from doing the same. Although war is certainly the extension of politics—if not politics itself—that definition is too broad to be useful for this investigation. The concern here is with the type of treatment of prisoners which has a discernible feedback into the decision-making centers of the opposition and which is designed primarily to provoke a response in the political, rather than the military, sphere. After tracing the history of the treatment of prisoners of war, I shall consider some of the implications of the recent trends of such treatment.

#### *early history (before A.D. 500)*

Accounts of personal suffering and mass annihilation of prisoners of war and of periodic efforts to ameliorate conditions of prisoners through international treaties are abundant. Tales of the treatment of the enemy taken in warfare appear almost as early as written history itself. Egyptian and Assyrian bas-reliefs show prisoners at the feet of the conqueror, about to be killed. According to Chinese history, the Shangs (*ca.* 1523 to 1121 B.C.) decapitated their captured enemies as sacrifices, and later during the Eastern Chou Dynasty (*ca.* 400 B.C.) the practice of consecrating drums by smearing them with the blood of sacrificed captives of war is cited.<sup>1</sup> Also during the fourth century B.C. in battles waged by the aggressive state of Ch'in, "heads were cut off by the tens of thousands."<sup>2</sup>

In the Old Testament, Samuel quotes the word of the Lord to Saul:

Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.<sup>3</sup>

On the subject of doing battle with the enemy, Moses interprets the word of the Lord to the Israelites:

... you shall save alive nothing that breathes; but you shall utterly destroy them; namely, the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites. . . .<sup>4</sup>

Moses gives us the motivation for this action by adding:

That they may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices which they have done in the service of their gods, and so to sin against the Lord your God.<sup>5</sup>

When the American Southern Eskimos (aborigines) took male prisoners of war, they either killed them immediately or reserved them "to torture for the edification and improvement of their children."<sup>6</sup> The North American Indians demonstrated a wide variety of cruelties against their prisoners:

The Nez Percé Indians . . . day after day, at a stated hour captives are brought out and made to hold scalps of their dead friends aloft on poles while the scalp-dance is performed about them, the female participators meanwhile exerting all their devilish ingenuity in tormenting their victims. . . . The Upper Dakotas . . . tied him to a stake and mutilated him before killing him. . . . The Apaches . . . scalp or burn at the stake. . . . The tribes of North Mexico . . . many cook and eat the flesh of their captives.<sup>7</sup>

The Romans occasionally used their prisoners for festive purposes in the coliseum; however, in general the Romans treated prisoners less harshly than the Greeks did.<sup>8</sup> Plato stated the Greek view:

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.<sup>9</sup>

However, Plato did make a distinction between prisoners taken in foreign wars and other Greeks taken in city-state conflict. In the former case death or enslavement was appropriate treatment, whereas other Greeks should be spared to avoid a collective weakening of the Greek city-states.

In general, the ancients regarded foreigners as real or potential foes who had no rights and whose extermination was logical and necessary. However, even in ancient times the killing of captives began to give way to enslavement, ransoming, or exchange. The Treaty of Nicias (421 B.C.), which ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, provided for prisoner exchange, and Livy refers to conventions for exchange during the Punic Wars.<sup>10</sup> In most cases prisoners became the property of their individual captors rather than of the state and thus became a source of personal interest and gain. One of the few evidences of considerate treatment of prisoners was the East Indian Code of Manu (*ca.* 500 B.C.), which recommended humane care for Indian prisoners.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Middle Ages (A.D. 500–1500)*

In spite of a series of legal, religious, and humanitarian efforts toward amelioration of the life of the prisoner of war, little progress was actually achieved until well into the Christian era. During the first portion of the Middle Ages, death or slavery continued to be the rule, but the payment of ransom for freedom was sometimes acceptable.

The growth of Christian doctrines of equality and brotherhood in Europe had some positive humanitarian effects, but, paradoxically, the same doctrine encouraged greater severity against the infidels. The history of the Crusades reveals little quarter being shown by the victors following the capture of a fortified city. Historian Lynn Montross describes the slaughter following the fall of Jerusalem to the Crusaders in 1099: “. . . the men of the West literally waded in gore . . . likened to ‘treading out the winepress.’”<sup>12</sup> The murder and pillage after the fall of Constantinople are other ugly Crusade events.

One of the earliest attempts at ending enslavement of prisoners as an institution was the appeal of the Lateran Council of 1179. This seems to have had little effect as slavery was firmly entrenched in the economic and social life of the Middle Ages. The Mongol conqueror Tamerlane is said to have instructed his commanders to avoid needless cruelty after the battle was over, ordering that prisoners be spared, since “a living dog is of more use than a dead lion.”<sup>13</sup>

Chivalry in the Middle Ages also had little effect on the treatment of prisoners. The obligation of chivalry extended only to the nobility. A prisoner of rank might be ransomed or exchanged, but slavery was the general practice until the influence of the Christian church brought about its abolition.

#### *modern era (since 1500)*

During the last 500 years an increasing awareness of the injustice of maltreatment of prisoners of war has led to periodic international efforts to establish universally acceptable humane standards of treatment. The end of institutionalized enslavement of prisoners occurred with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ending the Thirty Years' War. It stipulated that prisoners of war were to be released without ransom. It was a hundred years later, however, before what would be considered modern rules relating to prisoners appeared. The liberal views of Montesquieu and Rousseau influenced the treatment of prisoners during the eighteenth century. Montesquieu maintained that “war gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further harm by securing their persons.”<sup>14</sup> And Rousseau challenged Hugo Grotius's verdict of 1625 that “enemies captured in war become slaves.”<sup>15</sup> Rousseau saw no such right of slavery in war. He maintained that war is a relation between states, not between individual men, and that the right to kill remains in force only as long as a soldier is armed. The loss of liberty is the only measure that can be taken toward a prisoner of war; once the war ceases, his liberty should be restored.<sup>16</sup>

The views of Montesquieu and Rousseau

were not universally accepted in their day. The philosopher David Hume took the more popular and parochial view of the Greeks and the ancient Chinese: when fighting barbarians, who observe no rules of war, a civilized nation must "render every action or encounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors."<sup>17</sup> The British, who prided themselves on their humane treatment of European prisoners of war, applied a different standard to American prisoners during the Revolutionary War. It was estimated that 20,000 Americans died aboard British ships during that war as result of "inhuman, cruel, savage, and barbarous usage."<sup>18</sup> Such harsh treatment may well have been calculated as much as accidental, since the British continually exhorted the prisoners to desert and fight for Britain.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the practice of ransoming prisoners reached a zenith and then declined. Previous to that time a soldier's pay did not come with regularity. A prisoner was then a valuable asset representing potential income, dependent upon the current supply and demand. During the seventeenth century a scale evolved which fixed the ransom value of a prisoner with superior rank at the equivalent of a year's income and that of one of inferior rank at three months' pay. At the end of the eighteenth century England and France agreed on a tariff to govern the exchange and ransom values of prisoners of war, a common soldier being worth one pound sterling and a French marshal or English admiral, 60 pounds.<sup>19</sup>

During the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon's treatment of prisoners varied with the amount of resistance offered by the foe. His treatment of the Spanish was exceptionally harsh. During the Peninsular War (1808-14) the French met with heroic resistance during the siege of Saragossa. The Spanish defenders were offered liberal terms for surrendering, and then "every stipulation made with them was shamelessly violated. Twelve thousand pale and emaciated Spaniards, exhausted and staggering from fatigue . . . surrendered. Not six thousand reached the Pyrenees on the way to

France."<sup>20</sup> Those that survived the long march to France were "summarily packed off in droves and distributed along the Western coast of France, where they were made to labour like ordinary convicts."<sup>21</sup>

The treatment of prisoners in the American Civil War became a major issue between North and South during and after the war. President Lincoln asked General Francis Lieber to draw up instructions for use by the Union Armies as a guide for handling prisoners of war. Lieber's "American Instructions" became the first comprehensive codification of international law relating to prisoners of war issued by any government.<sup>22</sup> However, the code had little impact on treatment received by captives where the major factor was the inability of either side—especially the South—to provide adequate facilities, food, and shelter for prisoners. A flood of Northern publicity on the miserable conditions in Southern prisons such as Andersonville fanned an already emotional issue into a postwar controversy that raged for years.<sup>23</sup> There is no doubt that prison conditions were deplorable, but a more objective analysis has revealed that Northern prisons were little better than Southern and the percentage of deaths was only slightly higher in the South.<sup>24</sup>

During the Civil War the fortunes of war played a larger role in the treatment of prisoners than any evil intentions of the captors. The term "fortunes of war" has been defined as:


The relatively unpredictable outcome of the applications of strategies and resources in conflict that determines how many prisoners are taken by a particular power at a particular time and place. Indeed, . . . the severities of climate, the lack of logistical preparation and resources, and the disorganization of supplies have probably played a greater role than the malevolence of the capturing troops or government.<sup>25</sup>

This explanation of "fortunes of war" seems to have a great deal of relevance to the plight of prisoners in World War I and to military prisoners in World War II. The total number of prisoners taken by both sides during World War I was estimated at over



## Today's POWs

*Propaganda photographs, such as these of American prisoners of war in North Vietnamese detention, plus nationwide concern about those Americans whose status is unknown (whether missing in action, prisoner of war, or known to be dead) have aroused almost universal response, which may yet drive a wedge into the well-nigh implacable North Vietnamese.*







6,000,000,<sup>26</sup> many of whom starved to death. As most of the European countries involved in the war had been participants in the 1899 Hague Conference and the 1906 Geneva Convention, it can be assumed that the intent of governments to provide humane treatment was present, but the capability was not.<sup>27</sup>

The "fortunes of war" explanation is necessary but not sufficient to explain the deviation between the general acceptance of international humanitarian principles and the actual treatment of prisoners by captor nations. As late as 1877 the ancient custom of making trophies of the heads of enemy soldiers was still in effect in Japan; it was also employed by the Chinese in the war of 1894.<sup>28</sup> Only a decade later during the Russo-Japanese War, the treatment of prisoners by both sides was hailed as quite humanitarian and in complete accord with the Hague Convention of 1899.<sup>29</sup>

The nature and ends of warfare play a

big role in the treatment of prisoners. The two total wars of the twentieth century have reached new heights of intensity and nation-state involvement. An objective of unconditional surrender generates an absolutism in which the opponents are mutually depicted as representing everything alien and detestable. Total objectives are symptoms of the extremes in nationalism, imperialism, or ideological commitment which have spawned the conflicts. "Fortunes of war" does not explain the conduct of the Japanese guards supervising the Death March after the fall of Bataan.<sup>30</sup> Nor does the phrase explain a smaller-scale march of over 300 miles to Pyongyang through North Korea in which 200 of 320 American prisoners died and the remainder lost from 60 to 80 pounds each.<sup>31</sup> Such treatment is motivated by the nature of the warfare, by historic, cultural, and political characteristics of the captor nation, and by the interpretation of the battlefield com-

mander as to what is necessary treatment to protect his own forces and mission.<sup>32</sup>

In the wars of the twentieth century, it has become more difficult to separate political action from military action. For example, in World War II the Allies—particularly the United States—took great pains to give their prisoners humane treatment and advertise that fact to the enemy. Interrogation of German POW's who surrendered voluntarily indicated that an overwhelming majority of them expected good treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention in spite of German efforts to make them believe otherwise.<sup>33</sup>

This was a tactic aimed at the enemy's military forces which, obviously, would have political impacts from the standpoint of ending the war in Europe sooner (if, indeed, it did) and of transmitting a humanitarian image of the Allied side to the enemy. Considering the absolute nature of World War II and the ideological fervor and irrationality of the Nazi leadership, it was a logically conceived and implemented tactic. However, it was a tactic designed primarily to provoke a response in the enemy's military sphere, not the political.

Wars since World War II have been militarily limited in scope and objectives but waged politically across a wide national and international spectrum. The treatment of prisoners in the Korean and Vietnam wars has been part of this spectrum.

Two words came into new or renewed usage during the Korean War—"brainwashing" and "turncoat." "Brainwashing" was the term widely used to describe the elaborate system of thought reform used by the Chinese and North Korean Communist captors of United Nations military personnel. From a psychological point of view, it has been called a "recurring cycle of fear, relief, and new fear." Prisoners were kept in fear of death, torture, or starvation while all their norms of group associations and beliefs were systematically distorted by controlling information they received. The conditions of stress and deprivation wore away the physical stamina and mental orientation until the captors' descriptions of "truth" were accepted.<sup>34</sup> Four reasons

have been advanced for brainwashing: (1) to obtain military information; (2) to obtain false confessions; (3) to reindoctrinate the captive so that he will act in the approved political fashion; and (4) to make the prisoner inform on his fellow captives.<sup>35</sup> Regardless of the specific reason, the fundamental motivation is for political, not military, gain. Few captives in either the Korean or Vietnam war would possess tactical military intelligence of more than a few weeks' significance to the enemy.<sup>36</sup> Major General William F. Dean, captured by the Communists in August 1950, was an exception, but he was not subjected to the severe treatment of other prisoners.<sup>37</sup> Most of the 427 known prisoners now held by Hanoi are Air Force or Navy airmen who were prohibited by Department of Defense regulations from flying over North Vietnam for twelve months after exposure to sensitive classified information.

Apparently the treatment of prisoners in Hanoi—like that of previous captives in North Korea—is designed more toward attitude conversion and thought reform than toward intelligence gathering. The political benefits reaped by the Communists from the twenty-one American turncoats who refused repatriation in 1953 were of much greater significance to them than any intelligence data they might have gained. The reported collaboration of American prisoners with their captors and these turncoats touched off a controversy in the United States which raged for years. The writings of Eugene Kinkead convinced many Americans that this conduct was inexcusable and the result of social and moral decay in this country.<sup>38</sup>

It is difficult at this point to make generalizations concerning the treatment of prisoners by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. To this date most of the testimony of the few repatriated prisoners is classified.<sup>39</sup> The Department of State has issued one short "white paper" in which it described mistreatment and atrocities by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong against U.S. prisoners as contrasted to the humane treatment of prisoners by the South Vietnam and U.S. forces.<sup>40</sup> On 14 October 1967 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

#### H. Nitze issued the following statement:

The Hanoi government has thus far refused to abide by provisions of the Geneva Convention covering prisoners of war. Representatives of the International Red Cross continue to be denied access to prisoners of war held in North Vietnam. Mail privileges to and from families are restricted or totally denied. No list of prisoners has been provided to the International Red Cross as required by the Convention. Attempts by the State and Defense Departments and the International Red Cross to secure compliance with requirements of the Geneva Convention have been persistently rebuffed.<sup>41</sup>

The pattern is familiar and should not be surprising. The techniques are more exotic than during the Korean War, but the objectives are identical: psychological disorientation and isolation from traditional groups (family, country, fellow prisoners) to effect behavior opposed to United States policies. Although the techniques now in use are obviously more sophisticated, so are the prisoners in custody. Whereas most Korean War prisoners were low-ranking young Army men, Hanoi must deal with college-educated men, many of them field-grade officers. With this type of man the mental manipulation problem for the Communists is more difficult and occasionally backfires.

Humane treatment of prisoners as a general goal is a recent phenomenon. The concept began with eighteenth century philosophers, and the practice has gained momentum since then as religious and humanitarian movements pressed for international law sanctions after each major war since the middle of the nineteenth century. After the turn of the century and before World War I, the upward trend toward humane treatment had been so rapid that English lawyer J. M. Spaight felt justified in the following euphoric conclusion:

To-day the prisoner of war is a spoilt darling; he is treated with a solicitude for his wants and feelings which borders on sentimentalism. He is better treated than the modern criminal, who is infinitely better off, under the modern prison system, than a soldier on a campaign. Under present-day conditions,

captivity—such captivity as that of the Boers in Ceylon and Bermuda and of the Russians in Japan—is no sad sojourn by the waters of Babylon; it is usually a halcyon time, a pleasant experience to be nursed fondly in the memory, a kind of inexpensive rest-cure after the wearisome turmoil of fighting. The wonder is that any soldiers fight at all: that they do so, instead of giving themselves up as prisoners, is a high tribute to the spirit and the discipline of modern armies.<sup>42</sup>

Such conditions for prisoners of war—if they ever did exist outside the Victorian view of the world held by Spaight—were to be short-lived. The wars of the twentieth century have been far different from those of the nineteenth, and in many ways the treatment of prisoners has undergone a reversal to ancient forms of barbarism.

World War I and World War II were a return to what sociologist Hans Speier refers to as "absolute war," unrestricted and unregulated.<sup>43</sup> There were fewer rules and more chaos, total commitments to expansionist ideologies and total resistance determined to fight for unconditional surrender. Then a new and critically important event in the history of warfare occurred, ending World War II in the Pacific. In the nuclear age thus initiated, absolute war has not occurred. The quantum jump of potential destruction seems to have been a major influence in returning warfare to a lesser level of intensity.

Limited war is the term applied to the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as other smaller conflicts around the globe since World War II. The fact that limited war is characterized by considerable restraint on military action while the realm of warfare is expanded into the economic, social, and political arenas would hardly be challenged today. The significance of that fact with regard to prisoners of war, however, has yet to be fully realized or exploited.

To support that statement, it will be necessary to review the subject of motivation for prisoner of war treatment as summarized in Figure 1. This table represents the general opinion of historians and psychologists who have studied the prisoner of war problem.

		Motivations →							
		1. Protection, survival, and fear	2. Religious	3. Tradition and revenge	4. Military considerations	5. Economic gain	6. Pride and glory	7. Political advantage	8. Humanitarian considerations
Treatment of prisoners of war	A. Death and/or torture	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	B. Enslavement	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	C. Ransom	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	D. Hostage	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	E. Exchange/parole	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	F. Psychological coercion	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	G. Humane	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Figure 1. Motivation for prisoner of war treatment

A few comments will explain the eight motivational headings under which seven forms of treatment have been plotted.

Ancient peoples thought it necessary to exterminate supporters of an adversary in order to destroy his power. Tacitus credits Germanicus with crying to his legions (*ca.* A.D. 11): "Slay, and slay on. Do not take prisoners: we shall only have peace by complete destruction of the nation."<sup>44</sup> Individual and collective fear that the vanquished enemy will rise again and attack is well recognized in psychiatric theory. Religion (column 2) has been a motivational factor for both harsh and humane treatment. Human sacrifices, cannibalism, and holy crusades against the heathen and infidel had at least partial motivational roots in religious beliefs. But the liberal humanism of Christianity, Confucianism, and Buddhism also helped to break the "eye for an eye" and revenge traditions (column 3).

Military motivational considerations include necessity due to battle conditions and security of the force, intelligence requirements, inducements to defect or desert, availability of logistical support, warnings to belligerent neighbors, and intangibles such as emotional reactions. In discussing the Crusades, Montross stated:

The psychologist is perhaps best able to explain, but the historian can at least assert that these excesses usually come as the climax to the capture of a fortified post or city. For long the assailants have endured more punishment than they were able to inflict; then once the walls are breached, pent-up emotions find an outlet in murder, rape and plunder which discipline is powerless to prevent.<sup>45</sup>

The motivation for economic gain has probably played as large a role as any in the treatment of prisoners. It was the self-interest of the captors which turned the trends from death to enslavement and then to ransom. Prisoners of war built the Great Wall of China, elaborate canals, and irrigation systems. The Roman transportation network of roads and fortresses was built with slave labor. The ransom of Richard the Lion-Hearted brought 100,000 pounds into the coffers of the Duke of Austria during the Third Crusade. Historical examples are in abundance.

Pride and glory, per se, were associated more with the ancient extermination practices or the Romans' festive use of prisoners. But certainly there is an element of this motivation also in the political advantage category. Revolutionary ideology, pride, and glory have a great deal in common.


It is at this point that the trends and motivations cross for the primary interest of this paper. The fact that a return to a type of warfare less than absolute did not reinstate Spaight's turn-of-the-century "halcyon times" for prisoners in spite of a new international treaty (Geneva, 1949) and the fact that the political dimension in warfare has become increasingly important in wars for limited objectives lead to a fundamental observation: the overwhelming motivation for treatment of prisoners of war under these conditions is political.

If this conclusion seems naively obvious, why were we so surprised and unprepared for brainwashing and forced confessions of guilt by airmen in North Korean prisons?<sup>46</sup> And why was the country shocked when the application of these sophisticated physical and psychological programs produced a few "collaborators" and turncoats? And if we were surprised, why were we not better prepared for the Vietnam version of North Korean brainwashing or for the *Pueblo* crew treat-

ment? The pattern is identical: no access by the International Red Cross, extremely restricted mail privileges, no list of prisoners provided; controlled press interviews with prisoners who "are ready."<sup>47</sup>

Figure 2 shows the patterns of influence on the political world which are the product of the treatment of prisoners by North Vietnam. News media communications are much more efficient and pictorial now than they were fifteen years ago, and decision-makers in open societies are becoming more aware of public opinion. The external international public—in all its various groups of interests and pressures—and the domestic population are targets for the propaganda resulting from the treatment of American prisoners. At times this effort appears to have been counterproductive, as when the world was shocked at the sight of a dazed and confused U.S. Navy officer at a press conference in Hanoi. At a command from his captors, he bowed stiffly but said nothing while a recording, credited to him, confessed to war crimes. However, it

Figure 2. Influence channels for POW confessions (a simplified view)



is reasonable to assume that the public reaction within North Vietnam may have been different.

Just how effective Ho Chi Minh's program has been is impossible to guess at this time. But what of the communication flows in the opposite direction? If we were not surprised by the opposition's tactics and were prepared to handle them, what programs of our own did we implement? As far as effectiveness of South Vietnamese POW programs is concerned, Herman Kahn, after analyzing the first four years of Vietnam combat, made the following statement:

More Effective Chieu Hoi, Prisoner-of-war, and Reconciliation Programs: While the importance of improving these programs has frequently been emphasized by the United States, and to a lesser extent by Saigon, the implementation of anything effective has been painfully slow. Returnees are still often mistrusted; very little money is available to provide assurance to a returnee that his family will be moved out of the range of VC vengeance; and many returnees are still badly treated, inadequately protected from VC retaliation, and not given useful and satisfying training or employment. Ironically, the resources that would be needed to treat a returnee reasonably well by Vietnamese standards are infinitesimal when compared to those available for killing the same man on the battlefield.<sup>48</sup>

THE plea here is not that the United States establish a thought-control program for its prisoners of war but that it make the subject a research and training effort of greater proportions than it has in the past. The classic writers and authorities on war have generally ignored the treatment of prisoners of war in discussions on tactics and strategy. Modern defense policy and national strategy writings also rarely touch on the sub-

ject. International law contains a great deal on the development of the legal status of prisoners; psychologists and medical researchers have been much interested in effects on the human body of physical and mental stresses in prison camps; and there is an abundance of literature on the personal experiences of prisoners of war.

What is not found is a body of literature considering the political implications of the programs carried out by the Communists with U.S. prisoners of war in North Korea, China, and North Vietnam. In the modern world, where instant communications cover the globe and world opinion and national domestic opinion seem to have as great an impact on the decision-making process as military capability, the influence flows should be understood. Ho Chi Minh and Kim Il Sung have used U.S. prisoners to try to establish the legitimacy of their positions and widen the credibility gap in the United States. As yet we have no consistent or effective response to these tactics.

There should be other, more tangible benefits from a research program designed from a political viewpoint. Will the country be eager to condemn repatriates from Hanoi on the basis of innuendo and sketchy information, as it was after Korea?<sup>49</sup> How much would those prisoners now in Hanoi have been helped by a carefully prepared training program based simply on the Korean experience? What can we learn from the Communists' techniques that would be useful in our own political manipulation of prisoners? How applicable is the Code of Conduct for American servicemen, in view of these new tactics?

It was not our initiative to make prisoners of war political pawns in the international chess game of limited war, but we should be able to relate history to the present situation with an eye for assisting American prisoners, understanding opponents' tactics, and applying lessons learned to the future.

*University of California at Los Angeles*

#### Notes

1. Herrlee Glessner Creel, *The Birth of China* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1937), p. 207, which cites *The Ch'un*

*Ts'ew*, trans. James Legge (1871).

2. Marcel Cranet, *Chinese Civilization*, trans. Kathleen E.

Innes and Mabel R. Brailsford (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), p. 32.

3. I Samuel 15:3.

4. Deuteronomy 20:16-17.

5. *Ibid.*, 18.

6. H. H. Bancroft, *The Native Races of the Pacific States of North America* (1875), as cited in Maurice R. Davie, *The Evolution of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 297.

7. Davie, p. 299.

8. Tacitus described the Romans as a people no less remarkable for their courage in the field than for their humanity to the vanquished. See Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, trans. A. C. Campbell (Washington, D.C.: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), p. 361. William E. S. Flory discusses the entertainment usage of prisoners by the Romans in *Prisoners of War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 12.

9. *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), paper ed., p. 170.

10. E. G. Trimble, "Prisoners of War," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1934), Vol. 12, p. 419.

11. Amos S. Hershey, *The Essentials of International Public Law* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 29.

12. Lynn Montross, *War Through the Ages* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 138.

13. J. Fitzgerald Lee, "Prisoners of War," *The Army Quarterly*, Vol. 3 (1921-22), p. 351.

14. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955), Vol. 1, p. 283.

15. Grotius, p. 345.

16. Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), pp. 7-11.

17. Flory, citing Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1777), p. 16.

18. Herbert C. Fooks, *Prisoners of War* (Federalburg, Maryland: J. W. Stowell, 1924), p. 174, citing D. Dandridge, *American Prisoners of the Revolution* (1911).

19. J. M. Spaight, *War Rights on Land* (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 264.

20. Edward Fraser, *Napoleon the Gaoler* (London: Methuen, 1914), pp. 13-14. This march bears similarities to the one at Bataan during World War II.

21. *Ibid.*

22. For a reproduction of the code see Fooks, Appendix II. A modified form of ransom is recognized by "American Instructions" (Article 108): "The surplus number of prisoners remaining after an exchange has taken place is sometimes released for the payment of a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of provision, clothing, or other necessities." The idea of ransom is far from dead today: the Bay of Pigs prisoners were ransomed from Castro's Cuba in 1962.

23. See John McElroy, *Andersonville* (Toledo: D. R. Locke, 1879), and A. C. Roach, *The Prisoner of War* (Indianapolis: A. D. Streight, 1865).

24. William Best Hesselstine, *Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930), p. 254.

25. Albert D. Biderman, "Internment and Custody," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968), Vol. 8, p. 141.

26. Daniel S. McHargue, "Prisoners of War under International Law," (unpublished master's thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1941), p. 4.

27. For example, the American position was that the Geneva Convention was not binding in the war because not all the belligerents had signed it. However, the U.S. State Department considered the results of the convention to be international law, and General Pershing instructed his provost marshal general to "follow the principles of the Hague and Geneva Conventions in the treatment of prisoners." See Flory, p. 22.

28. Flory, p. 11.

29. McHargue, p. 43.

30. Sidney Stewart, *Give Us This Day* (London: Staples Press, 1956), p. 76. In this personal account of the march, he

cites the instance in which, during nine days of forced march when "more than fourteen thousand men died," four Japanese guards walked through the ranks of prisoners with freshly decapitated American heads stuck on the ends of their bayonets. Another account estimates that more than 17,000 Filipino and U.S. troops died during the march (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1967, Vol. 11, p. 648).

31. William Lindsay White, *The Captives of Korea* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 45-53.

32. At least two authors (William Lindsay White in the Korean War and John McElroy in the Civil War) cite inferior intellect and psychological instability of military guards and prison administrators as factors in inhumane treatment. This seems a logical assumption, as few military commanders would use combat-capable personnel on prison duty.

33. U.S. House of Representatives Reports, No. 513-738, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Misc Reports III), 12 June 1945, No. 728, p. 3. Safe-conduct passes, written in English, German, and French and promising good treatment, were widely distributed behind the German lines. This promise was remembered by 59 to 76 percent of prisoners captured from December 1944 through February 1945 (percentages varying with time periods), and considerable numbers came carrying the passes. (p. 13)

34. The entire issue of *The Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1957) was devoted to the subject of brainwashing. For discussion of the fear-relief cycle, see Edgar H. Schein's "Reaction Patterns to Severe, Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese," pp. 21-29.

35. James G. Miller, "Brainwashing: Present and Future," *Ibid.*, p. 48. In the same *Journal of Social Issues* Julius Segal describes research with samples of the 3323 repatriated Army prisoners. The research concluded that 15% were participators with their captors; 5% resisted the brainwashing in the face of personal danger, torture, and deprivation; and 80% remained passive or neutral to the program. See "Correlates of Collaboration and Resistance Behavior Among U.S. Army POWs in Korea," pp. 31-40.

36. Some of the 82 crewmen of the Navy intelligence ship *Pueblo* were obvious exceptions, and the *Pueblo* was a unique case in many ways.

37. *General Dean's Story*, as told to William I. Worden (New York: Viking, 1954).

38. Eugene Kinkead, "A Reporter at Large: The Study of Something New in History," *The New Yorker*, 26 October 1957, pp. 102-53; also, "Have We Let Our Sons Down?" *McCall's*, January 1959, pp. 23-81; and *In Every War But One* (New York: Morton, 1959). These writings, based on scanty research, were condemned by professionals. A. D. Biderman designed his book, *March to Calumny* (New York: Macmillan, 1963 as a complete refutation of Kinkead's "sensationalistic and tendentious portrayals." (p. 3) [Postscript: Of the 21 defectors, only two remain in China. Fifteen have returned to the United States, three are in Europe, and one died in 1954. *Time*, 15 July 1966, pp. 20-21. One British Marine and 327 South Koreans also refused repatriation, while 88,000 Communist troops refused to return to North Korea. See White, p. 330.]

39. The first repatriated prisoner to break this silence is a Navy lieutenant released in August 1969. See Lieutenant Robert F. Frishman, USNR, "I Was a Prisoner in Hanoi," *Reader's Digest*, December 1969, pp. 111-15, which substantiates the charge of inhumane treatment by the North Vietnamese against U.S. prisoners of war.

40. "Prisoners of War," *Vietnam Information Notes*, Department of State, No. 9, August 1967.

41. *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, November 1967, p. 30. [Postscript: In the last seven months Secretary of Defense Laird has made several public statements condemning North Vietnamese treatment of U.S. prisoners of war.]

42. Spaight, p. 265.

43. Hans Speier, "The Social Types of War," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 46 (January 1941), pp. 445-54.

44. Fooks, p. 8.

45. Montross, p. 138.

46. Of 131 total Air Force prisoners in North Korea and Communist China, 78 were subjected to varying types of torture, deprivation, and thought-control programs. Thirty-eight

confessed to dropping germs over North Korea. White, p. 261. (Germ warfare was not used in Korea.)

47. When three sergeants were released by the Viet Cong in November 1967, a Viet Cong defector in Saigon admitted that he had tutored the captive sergeants on the United States' responsibility for the war and stated that they were to have been released as early as December 1966 but were not because they "weren't ready yet." *Time*, 17 November 1967, p. 39. Three more prisoners were released by the Viet Cong on 1 January 1969. Whether the VC motivation was based on these prisoners being "ready" or on a desire for the United States to negotiate officially and directly with them cannot be determined. Either motivation had political overtones.

48. Herman Kahn, "Toward a Program for Victory," *Can We Win in Vietnam?* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 320-21. As with most programs in Vietnam, there is considerable debate over the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program and the meaning of the statistics associated with it. Mike McGrady, in *A Dove in Vietnam* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), states the figure of 67,000 Viet Cong who had joined the Government of Vietnam by 1967 but says that only 64 percent of those were military, of whom only 5 percent were Main Force soldiers. (p. 129) William R. Corson, in *The Betrayal* (New York: Ace Books, Inc., 1968), claims that "less than one-half of 1 per cent of all Vietcong defectors turn out to be Party members." (p. 138) He is referring to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the group of from 50,000 to 60,000 hard-core organizers and planners behind the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong.


49. Apparently not, if the reaction to the *Pueblo* is an indication. In a Louis Harris public opinion survey, 68 percent rejected the charge that Commander Bucher did disservice to the country in signing the confession, while only 9 percent agreed with that statement. *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 1969, Part I, p. 26. However, the answer to this question depends to a great extent on how the military reacts to prisoner conduct.

**This article is based on a paper written for a seminar in National Defense Problems conducted by Dr. Bernard Brodie at University of California at Los Angeles. I am indebted to Dr. Brodie and Colonel Harry M. Darmstandler, USAF Research Fellow with the Security Studies Project at UCLA (1968-69), for their critical review of the original paper.**

**R.M.K.**



## Military Affairs Abroad



### SALVADOR-HONDURAS WAR, 1969

*The "Soccer War"*

JAY MALLIN

AN idyllic view of Latin America shows twenty or so somewhat similar countries living in peaceful proximity to each other. Revolutions, yes; wars, no—or so goes the popular concept. Wars are for Europe and Asia, not for neighborly Latin America.

The fact is, however, that Latin America has been the site of a number of bitter conflicts, several of which have resulted in large numbers of casualties. The Chaco War, the War of the Pacific, the Paraguayan War, the Peruvian-Ecuadoran War—all of these were international conflicts that disturbed the hemisphere.

The year of 1969 saw the outbreak of a new conflict, this time in a somewhat unexpected place. The little countries of Central America had been seeking to bind themselves closer through their common market, and the trend toward international agreement was often cited as a model of what future cooperation

in the rest of the hemisphere could be like. And then, suddenly, there was war. Two small nations, El Salvador and Honduras, were at each other's throats in a very real conflict.

The conflict between El Salvador and Honduras has come to be known as the "Soccer War," but hostility long predated the soccer games which helped spark the war. Honduras, with a population of 2,333,000 people, occupies 42,300 square miles. Salvador, with over 3,000,000 inhabitants, occupies only about 8000 square miles. Its population density of 400 persons per square mile is second only to Haiti's in this hemisphere. Inevitably, Salvadorans have spilled over into Honduran territory—an estimated 300,000 of them. Most of these are *campesinos* who have industriously tended plots of land in previously undeveloped areas. They did well, and so did those who found jobs in Honduran factories.

Resentment against them, however, developed among Hondurans, particularly in rural areas. Adding to the ill-feeling between the two countries was the fact that certain sections of the border have never been clearly defined.


Various attempts had been made to control the problem of immigration by agreements between the two countries. The latest of these, a two-year accord, expired in February of 1969 and was not renewed. A further aggravating factor was passage of an agrarian reform law by Honduras, which began taking land away from some of the Salvadorans.

Such was the background when teams of the two nations met for a soccer match in Tegucigalpa on 8 June 1969. Salvador lost by a score of 1-0. However, the point was made in overtime, and Salvadorans felt they had been cheated. This became practically a point

of national honor. When the Honduran team came to San Salvador for a return match, feeling was running so high that a Salvadoran security unit hid the team at a secret place outside the city before the match. There was rioting in downtown Salvador, and three persons were killed—all of them Salvadorans. Before the game, played on 15 June, Salvadoran police searched all spectators, confiscating liquor and weapons. There was booing, perhaps some pushing, but nothing serious developed. Salvador won 3-0.

As the Hondurans headed back to their own country, a number of their cars traveling through smaller Salvadoran towns were hit by rocks. Windshields were smashed. Salvadoran President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez deplored the acts of violence and blamed "communist and subversive elements."

Honduras, however, was not content to



let the incidents go by without retaliation. Exaggerated reports were circulated, and rumors claimed that the Salvadorans were holding Honduran prisoners. For three days, Salvadoran stores and shops selling Salvadoran goods were attacked in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, the attacks spreading into interior areas. A flow of refugees began moving into Salvador, sometimes as many as 1400 per day. They told tales of *la mancha brava* (roughly, the angry stain), disorganized groups of hoodlums who terrorized them. The *mancha* types would say "Catracho [a small animal], get out" and then return to burn their houses if the Salvadorans did not flee. There were incidents of rape and of murder. Many of the Salvadorans took heed, hurriedly sold their properties at low prices and fled to their homeland in cars, buses, and afoot. A reliable estimate was that over 17,000 refugees crossed the border. (Not all the blame could be placed on the central Honduran government. It apparently is able to exercise only loose control over local commanders.)

As the exodus of refugees continued, the situation between the two countries steadily became worse. Border skirmishes flared. Demonstrations were held. The Salvadoran Council of Ministers charged that "the crime of genocide" was being committed by Honduras. The President of El Salvador charged the Hondurans with "outrages," and the President of Honduras protested "the abuses committed against so many innocent Hondurans." Salvador broke relations with Honduras; Honduras broke relations with Salvador.

A few days before the break, Salvador won a playoff match 3-2, the winning point being made on overtime. The match was prudently played in Mexico City.

On 3 July, a small Honduran plane made an incursion into Salvadoran territory near the town of El Poy. On 14 July, during the morning hours, a second incursion occurred in the same area, this time by three fighter aircraft. They may have made strafing runs.

At 1700 that day, Salvadoran Corsairs, F-51 reconditioned Mustangs, and C-47s with bomb-adapted wings struck Tegucigalpa's airport, Toncontin, which is utilized by both

civilian and military aircraft. Salvadoran planes also struck at El Poy, Amapala, Choluteca, and Santa Rosa de Copán. The Honduran Air Force had the edge over Salvador's Air Force, and the raids were intended to reverse that situation.

The Salvadorans did not succeed. Early the next morning, Honduran warplanes (T-28s, F-51s, Corsairs) hit Ilopango, the San Salvador airport, which is also used by both military and commercial aircraft. A taxiway was damaged as well as an old hangar, and one bomb fell on a car in a parking lot in the civilian sector.

Honduran planes also struck at the refinery and industrial complex at the town of Acajutla, Salvador's main port. The refinery remained intact; only storage tanks were hit. Dud bombs hit the piers, doing no damage.

The third target area for Honduran aircraft was El Cutuco, in La Unión, the major port for the importation of petroleum. Five of 17 storage tanks were destroyed. The port area itself was not damaged.

There were unconfirmed reports of dog-fights. One Honduran Corsair did land at Aguilares, in El Salvador, either because of damage or because it ran out of gas. In addition, one Salvadoran F-51 and one Honduran Corsair landed in Guatemala.

Hours after the Salvadoran planes struck Honduras, Salvadoran troops crossed the border and invaded the neighboring country. There were two primary attack areas. The Salvadorans moved up from the border town of El Poy and captured Nueva Ocotepeque. On the easternmost frontier, the Salvadorans captured Goascorán and advanced about half a dozen miles.

In lesser incursions, the Salvadorans took the towns of San Juan Guarita, Valladolid, and La Virtud (along the north central border), as well as Caridad and Aramecina (on the eastern border). They also sent in two pincers towards Cabañas (northeast Salvadoran border) but were unable to take the town. Salvadoran troops also crossed the border east of Nueva Ocotepeque, moved north and captured La Labor.

Outwardly, there was not much differ-



*We'll be back—Viva El Salvador! Salvadoran troops await orders to evacuate the Honduran town of La Aramecina following four days of warfare, the aftermath to an inflammatory soccer rivalry.*



*With the signing of an act, the town of El Amitillo is assigned to Honduras in the presence of the principals and Organization of American States observers.*



*Observers survey damage left in the wake of the Salvadoran Army's border incursions into Honduras.*



*The customhouse of El Amitillo had been ransacked by Salvadorans, who destroyed all the records and left debris strewn in the street.*

ence between the Salvadoran and Honduran armies. Both numbered approximately 5000 men; both were equipped with World War II-vintage American weapons. Neither side had heavy equipment in the way of tanks or artillery.

In the air, Honduras had definite superiority, a 2.5-to-1 edge. This enabled the Hondurans to retain control of the skies throughout the conflict, once it had started.

On the ground, Salvador's troops seemed to have an edge in organization and fighting ability. Rough terrain in Honduras may have been an added factor in delaying the establishment of effective positions by the Honduran forces. The Honduran Presidential Guard, about battalion size, is considered to be that country's best military unit. Near the end of the conflict, Salvadoran newspapers reported that this unit had staged a counterattack and been repulsed. Whether these reports were true or not, the Salvadoran army generally maintained the offensive.

A Salvadoran newspaper carried the banner headline, "Salvadoran Army Advance Unstoppable." There was proud talk in Salvador that this tiny country had become "the Israel of Latin America." It appeared that the cocky Salvadoran army might drive forward from the captured towns of Amatillo and Goascorán and attempt to take the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa.

There were, however, important factors and influences that pointed toward an end of the war. The Salvadoran army was victorious on the ground, but the Hondurans controlled the air. Salvadoran planes were concealed under trees, the location of Salvadoran command posts was kept tightly secret, and Salvadoran troops on the move scanned the skies, ready to leap to shelter when and if Honduran aircraft should appear. The capital city of San Salvador was totally blacked out every night.

Both sides were running short of ammunition. Perhaps the Salvadoran commanders had not fully understood the logistics problem, or else they had planned on only a brief campaign. In addition, the Honduran attacks on Salvador's petroleum supplies had been

strategically sound. The country began suffering a shortage of gasoline, which would eventually force the army to come to a halt. Three days after the raid on the petroleum supplies at Cutuco, one of the burning tanks exploded, setting fire to five more tanks.

**B**OOTH El Salvador and Honduras requested United States assistance. Both were turned down.

The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States brought heavy diplomatic pressure to bear on both governments in an effort to effect a cease-fire. The United States was represented in El Salvador by Ambassador William Bowdler, who had had previous experience in helping to bring peace to the Dominican Republic after the 1965 civil war. For the OAS, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaragua's Ambassador in Washington and dean of that city's diplomatic corps, headed a peace commission that moved back and forth between Tegucigalpa and San Salvador, seeking to end the conflict.

The peacemakers evolved a four-point program: cease-fire, troop withdrawal, protection for citizens of both countries, and OAS supervision of both troop withdrawal and citizen protection. Honduras was amenable to these points; Salvador only partially so. The Salvadoran government was split between its own version of hawks and doves. The hawks wanted Honduras to pay reparations for the mistreatment of the Salvadorans who had had to flee that country, and they talked of holding a 30-kilometer strip of Honduran territory until Honduras paid. The doves, including some military men, knew the war effort was exhausting Salvador and that the army was running into logistical problems.

The OAS set a 72-hour limit for the withdrawal of Salvadoran troops—since no Honduran troops were on Salvadoran soil—after a cease-fire had gone into effect. Salvador protested that it could not pull out its forces within that time. The OAS extended the time limit to 96 hours.

Salvadoran President Sanchez Hernan-

dez went on a national radio and television hookup and stated that his country would accept a cease-fire but would not withdraw its troops until "satisfactory and effective guarantees are given to our compatriots." The Apollo moon landing had occurred a few days previously, and Sanchez Hernandez declared, "How is it that a man can walk with safety on the moon and cannot do so, because of his nationality, on the prairies of Honduras?"

The warring countries agreed upon a cease-fire, and this went into effect at 2200 on 18 July. The conflict had lasted just five hours over four days. OAS military observers arrived and moved out to the border areas in order to enforce the cease-fire, and OAS human rights officials began looking after the safety of Salvadorans in Honduras.

Salvador, however, continued to resist withdrawing its troops. Salvador's Foreign Minister told Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa, "It hurts us in El Salvador that now you [of the OAS] want to watch the clock, when during the time when Salvadorans were persecuted and insulted, the OAS did not want to see the calendar, much less the clock."

The time limit set for the withdrawal of troops passed, and still Salvador did not pull back. The OAS increased its pressure, there was talk of applying sanctions, and finally the

order went out to the Salvadoran troops to withdraw to their own territory.

**T**HE war between El Salvador and Honduras was a short war. It was no less a war for that. Men died, property was destroyed, refugees abandoned their homes.

The war showed—if this needed new proving—that conflicts are not necessarily waged by large countries. Tiny countries get mad, too. The danger in this particular conflict was that the war, if it had continued, might have spread beyond the two countries. Nicaragua, favoring Honduras, possibly would have entered the conflict, and other countries might well have followed. Enmities run deep in Central America.

The OAS structure is based on a concept of friendship; it prides itself on Good Neighborliness. Yet the fact remains that there are significant disputes and rivalries between some of the member countries. Arms races in these countries may seem largely unnecessary to Washington, but several countries are sincerely concerned about their neighbors.

The lesson of El Salvador-Honduras 1969 was plain: it can happen again—on a much larger scale.


*Coral Gables, Florida*



## In My Opinion

### THE OER-HEAVEN HELP US

COLONEL JOHN T. McCABE



**R**ECENTLY a meeting took place in the reception area outside Southgate-One. An older gentleman in flowing white robe greeted a somewhat perplexed Air Force officer.

"Hello, Major Jones. Sorry to keep you waiting. We've known of your pending arrival for some time, but the computer listing with the details for your processing was a little slow getting to the reception area. You can call me Thaddeus; I'm C-Team Interviewer, working Southgate-One this shift. I report directly to Saint Peter, who has been delegated broad authority on admittances."

"I'm please to meet you, sir," Major Jones responded politely. "It was all so sudden, I haven't got used to the idea of being in Heaven. I'm anxious to learn more about the routine up here."

"Well," said Thaddeus, "let me start by saying you're not in Heaven yet. Not that there isn't every probability that you'll get in. You've passed the initial screening done by our computer, but there's more to it than that. The input data for our computer system comes from our angel-agents on Earth, and in many respects the data just aren't good enough. That's

really the main reason for these interviews. I suppose you're familiar with computers and their shortcomings, Major?"

"Oh, yes sir, almost everyone in the Air Force today knows about computers, and about having proper data inputs. We have a saying—"

"Garbage in, garbage out," Thaddeus interrupted. "I've heard it before, Major. Not that it's very amusing up here. In fact, the data problem is a rather sensitive subject right now. It's being said that the decision on when we go to the next-generation equipment hinges largely on getting improvements in the accuracy of our Earthly inputs. But with your population explosion, we've just got to do something to speed up the system."

"Gosh, sir, you ought to have some of our personnel specialists up here to help you with this problem," said the major. "They've done wonders automating our Air Force records. Just the other day I got a punch-card telling me it was time for a tetanus booster. What a waste that was!"

"Oh, don't worry, Major. We make a special effort to get your personnel types. Not that we're allowed to discriminate, but we can waiver minor irregularities and recommend probational assignments. However, we just don't seem to be getting our share of the top talent. It's almost as if there were a conspiracy."

Continuing on, the fatherly gentleman said, "But let's get on with the interview, Major Jones. We can discuss computers some more during the coffee break if you'd like."

"Yes sir," replied the major in his best military manner. "What would you like to know?"

After leafing through a file of papers, Thaddeus looked up, "Well, I think we have all the factual information that's needed—family data, education, military training, awards and decorations, and so forth, even your physical condition—Chart 3B of 5BX, but with a little trouble on the push-ups."

"It was too soon after lunch," Jones offered quietly.

"Well, it doesn't really matter; mostly we're joggers up here now, but it's probably just a fad. I can remember when everyone was

throwing the discus. My, how time flies!"

Then Thaddeus went on, "Now let's see, your Earth-angel sent along a file of OER's. That's 'Officer Effectiveness Report,' isn't it? To tell the truth, Major, I'm a little disappointed."

This startled Jones. "But, sir, my ratings have been excellent."

"It's not that. Or rather, it's just that. You see, every OER I've ever looked at rated its subject top-drawer. I've also been told that most of your officers who don't get past our initial screening also get excellent ratings. It's a shame," continued Thaddeus. "We really need information on Earthly job performance and honest opinions of superiors. Of course, we can still get this information, using techniques like your tv instant replay. But it isn't very cost-effective."

Major Jones groaned, "Don't tell me, sir—not up here, too!"

"Ah, yes, 'Waste not, want not.' You must have seen the latest campaign posters?"

"I'll watch for them," the major muttered, half to himself.

Thaddeus let the remark go unnoticed. "Back to these OER's. Let's see if we can salvage anything from them. I might tell you, in the past we've tried giving numeric values to the boxes checked and running them through the computers; but the results have so far defied analysis. Too much inflation, and too many inconsistencies among raters."

"I think our promotion boards have the same problem," offered Jones.

"I can believe it. I just don't see how—in Heaven's name—we can use such data. And the word picture doesn't really help either. I'm sure it's designed to support the ratings."

"It's supposed to be the other way around," said the major, "but I have to agree with you, sir."

Thaddeus lifted one of the blue sheets of paper. "This one says you were 'responsible for the timely development and implementation of an automated records filing, retrieval, and inventory system.' Does that mean you're a programmer?"

"Oh, no," replied Jones quickly. "I'm more of a systems analyst. You know what that is?"



"Of course," the older man answered. "We've got lots of systems analysts here, but not many of them can program. We're very short on good programmers, and with talk of going to the next-generation equipment, things will no doubt get worse before they get better. Programmers are a 'special action' item on our interview check list. If you're interested, I can arrange an aptitude test and a training interview?"

"Thanks," was the unenthusiastic reply from Major Jones. "I'll think about it. But at my age—Earthly age, I should say—well, it's tough just remembering things like multiplication tables."

Thaddeus then read through several more of the major's OER's and referred to a report from Jones's Earth-angel.

"How is it, Major, that these discrepancies—like overstocking supplies and running out of TDY funds—aren't mentioned in your OER's?"

"Boy, if they were, I'd be dead—ha—I mean career dead!" And somewhat nervously, Jones continued, "Besides, my rater was responsible for reviewing and approving my recommendations, so he made the same mistakes. Anyway, we managed to correct these problems. They happen all the time."

Thaddeus wasn't convinced. "From what I've seen, your Air Force could use another rating system. I'm sure the OER is good for some things, but I don't think it's much help in separating the wheat from the chaff. Or, how do you say it?"

"The men from the boys?"

"Yes," continued Thaddeus. "We sure could use an honest Earthly rating system as a part of our evaluation process. If only such a system could be devised and tied to the computer, why, the savings in Heavenly time and Earthly frayed emotions would be terrific!"

"It will never happen," Jones guaranteed.

"I guess you're right. But it's something to think about while we're waiting for the analysis of your replays," suggested Thaddeus. "You might also want to look over those FORTRAN manuals—the programmer option I spoke of?"

Jones tried to ignore the last remark.

"Isn't it time for that coffee break?"

Thaddeus agreed, "Indeed it is, Major." Then as the two men rose to leave, he caught Jones somewhat off guard by adding, "And with regard to another item in your history, while we're having coffee maybe you can tell me something about that affair in Naples."

MAJOR JONES and Thaddeus concluded their coffee break and the remainder of the interview routinely. Major Jones's admittance into Heaven seemed assured but required some additional verification of data. So there was to be a slight delay.

A few days after the initial interview, Major Jones requested and was granted another audience with Thaddeus, who greeted him warmly.

"Good to see you again, Major. Sorry I don't have anything more on your entrance status. These things always take time. What's on your mind?"

Jones appeared relaxed and confident. "Well, Thaddeus, with all the free time you've given me, I've been thinking about what you said concerning the need for a better 'down-to-Earth' rating system. I've now got some ideas that might interest you. Do you have time to discuss them?"

"Certainly," replied the older man. "It's a subject dear to my heart, as you no doubt have guessed. What are these ideas?"

"Well, first of all, I think the handwriting on the wall says computers are here to stay, and any new rating system should be compatible with present and future data-automation techniques," said Jones. "This suggests a numeric rating system."

"I'll agree to that, Major. Go on."

"Of course, the idea of a numeric rating system isn't new. Schoolteachers have used some such system for years. What I'd like to suggest as maybe being new is a way of achieving a degree of comparability among all the ratings of a group. I think this has been lacking and is a major criticism of our rating systems to date.

"You know," Jones continued, "we could go from our present block-checking system to

an equivalent numeric system by simply having the rating officials give their evaluations of percentile standings, among contemporaries, of the individuals being rated. The trouble with such a numeric system is the same as with the present one—there are no hard and fast standards that would allow comparisons of ratings made by different individuals or groups. The tendency would still be for raters to inflate their ratings in an attempt to get at least a fair share of the rewards for their own people.”

“You mean,” said Thaddeus, “a so-called percentile evaluation rating system would probably show a lot more people above the 50 percentile score than below? I can believe that.”

“Yes,” the major continued, “and after each rating cycle, those raters whose distributions of ratings were lower than the ratings of the group as a whole would probably attempt to adjust their next ratings upward to achieve parity with the group. Hence the perpetual inflation.”

“Then what do you suggest as an alternative?”

“Well, Thaddeus, I like the idea of a *true* percentile rating system when it's applied to a large group. In such cases the relative standing of each individual in the group corresponds automatically to a percentile level indicating, in general, the percent of the group with lower ratings.”

Jones continued, “In large groups, small differences in evaluated standing generally correspond to small differences in percentile values. However, as groups get smaller, the percentile differences between individuals in adjacent standings get larger, thus possibly forcing the rater to spread his percentile ratings more than his honest evaluation warrants.”

“See if I'm following you, Major,” Thaddeus interrupted. “You say if I'm rating only two people on a true percentile scale, I must rate one above the other and give the better man a numeric percentile rating of 100 and the other a zero? That is quite a spread!”

The major was quick to reply, “No, Thaddeus. First of all, you could rate the two peo-

ple equal. But suppose you did choose to rate one above the other; then their percentile ratings, by my system, would be 25 and 75. I figure it this way: there are two people being rated, so the percentile scale, zero to 100, should be divided in half with the lower rated person representing the range from zero to 50 and the upper rated person representing the range from 50 to 100; then each person is given the mid-point value of his portion of the scale. If the two people were rated equal, they would each represent the whole percentile range, zero to 100, and each be given the mid-point value of 50.”

“I think I see it now. Those are my only options if I have two people to rate under a true percentile system—either 25 and 75 or two 50s?”

“That's right, Thaddeus,” replied Major Jones, sensing he had really captured the old gentleman's interest. “Of course, the computer could calculate the numeric scores if you just specified the relative standings, including any ‘equal standing’ individuals.”

“But like you said, Major, for small groups the options are either a wide spread or no spread of percentile scores, or some limited number of combinations, I suppose. How can you get around that?”

“Well, first, you should notice one good thing about the true percentile system. The average of all the ratings, regardless of the size of the group, and for all groups, is always 50. So,” reasoned the major, “let's design a numeric rating system that forces the rater of a group of people to come up with ratings that have a fixed average. That average could be 50, or it could be some other number, like, say, 80. We're not very used to thinking of scores according to percentiles, but most of us are familiar with educational grading systems where 80 is a pretty fair average.”

“Then,” asked Thaddeus, “you're suggesting that when I or others rate any group of people, their numeric scores must be made to average 80? How about limits on the amounts of spread in the ratings?”

Major Jones had given this a lot of thought. “I think we should try to keep the spread of grades as uniform as possible with-

out being unduly restrictive on the rater. I think this can be done by placing some kind of a limit on the overall amount that a group of scores may differ from their assigned average. One way could be to require that the difference from average be not more than some set value, say five.

"Or better still," Jones went on, "using a statistical term, we could limit the root-mean-square difference to something like five. This would allow a little more rater flexibility but still restrict large departures from the assigned average. Do you know what I mean by 'root-mean-square' difference?"

Thaddeus answered, "Yes, I've been exposed to RMS by some of our computer people. They say it's the square root of the average of the squared values. But I'm not sure how it would apply to your rating system."

Jones was ready. "I've worked out a few examples that might help explain this. Let's say the ratings have to average 80, and they have an RMS difference of five or less. If I have only one person to rate, I obviously have to give him 80. If I have two people to rate, I can rate them both 80, or any combination equally above and below 80 so long as I don't go beyond 75-85. At 75-85 the average is still 80, and the RMS difference from 80 is the maximum allowed, five.

"When I have three people to rate," Jones went on, "it's more interesting. I could go as low as 73 or as high as 87, but not both. The greatest range I could have would be 12, a low of 74 and high of 86, with the third score being 80.

"You can see, Thaddeus, as the number of people of a group being rated by one individual increases, so does the maximum permissible departure from the mean, as well as the maximum permissible range. However, these latter increases taper off quite rapidly. For example, if I were rating ten people under the same rules, I couldn't give a score below 66 or above 94, and not both. Also, my maximum range would be 22, from 68 to 90, 69 to 91, or 70 to 92."

Thaddeus had some doubts. "That's all very interesting, Major. But how could it apply to your Air Force OER situation, where you

usually rate people singly, not in groups? And if you did group them, it wouldn't seem fair to have the lower-grade people compete in the same groups with the higher ranks? Yet, if you didn't do this, your groups would often be too small to get a meaningful distribution of grades."

Major Jones wasn't disturbed. "Those are good points, Thaddeus. As I envision it, this system would require Air Force-wide rating of each grade, each at a designated time, maybe every six months. Lieutenants might be rated in February and August, captains in March and September, majors in April and October, and so on. As for the groups being small and thus limiting the distribution of scores, my feeling is that the grading system should include the first-line supervisory rating and probably two levels of what we now call indorsement ratings. While the group size might be a problem at the lowest level, the second- and third-level raters probably would have an adequate-sized base to work with. From my own experience, I think an officer's performance is generally recognized to his third-higher level of supervision. If not, I don't think it would hurt to encourage that kind of interest.

"Of course," Jones continued, "there are bound to be instances where an officer's performance is not known at one or more of the three supervision levels, and then he should receive the average numeric rating. In our example, that was 80."

"I suppose," interjected Thaddeus, "an automatic average score would be given when the rating official was not in the individual's supervision line at least some minimum length of time, like 90 days?"

"Yes, or for any number of other reasons, like some TDY or training assignments. And don't forget the average score that is mandatory when there is only one individual in the group being rated."

Thaddeus offered a suggestion. "You know, Major, where the average score is assigned in a noncompetitive way, it would be nice to attach some kind of footnote or subscript to provide the reason. I'm sure this information would be of some value in analyzing an individual's history of ratings."

The major was impressed. "Absolutely, Thaddeus. I can imagine several different analyses of an individual's rating history being generated by the computer. For example, the system could provide averages of the ratings of the three levels, or it could assign different weights to each level to produce a weighted average. Noncompetitive scores could be eliminated in another analysis.

"One other option that appeals to me," the major continued, "is to do as is done in judging some of our Earthly sports events: compute average scores after discarding the highest and lowest ratings received over some time period. This could be done while providing something like two-year running means of each individual's ratings."

Thaddeus gave this some thought. "Let's see; if each person were rated every six months and at every three supervisory levels you mentioned, that would mean six ratings each year. It would also mean a lot of bookkeeping."

"More than that, Thaddeus. Six overall ratings each year is right. But I think the system can be designed to handle all the rating factors that make up the present block-checking portion of the OER.

"Each factor," the major went on, "like leadership, job capability, writing ability, and so on, would be rated according to the same restrictions of group average and spread of scores. In the long run, hopefully this could provide a means of identifying individuals best qualified in particular talents or combinations of talents.

"As far as the bookkeeping goes," he continued, "don't forget the computer. Not only can it keep track of the ratings and provide any of a wide assortment of analyses, but with proper inputs it can also be made to provide the periodic lists of who rates whom at the various levels of supervision, even identifying certain mandatory noncompetitive ratings, like for insufficient time in the line of supervision."

Major Jones pressed ahead, "Also, don't forget that the computer can keep track of the ratings of each individual rater. Some useful and interesting analyses could be made from this information, I'm sure. For instance, each

rater would probably like to know how his spread of ratings compares with those of others. It would also be nice to know if, in general, there is a tendency for a person's ratings to increase significantly as he is repeatedly rated by the same supervisor—the familiarity syndrome. If this turned out to be the case, then ratings could probably be adjusted to correct for this, at least in a general way."

"A lot of what you have said seems to make sense," Thaddeus said. "But I can see one big objection. How is this rating system going to affect those officers who get recognized for doing outstanding work and are assigned *en masse* to elite groups like your top staffs or professional schools? Isn't the competition going to be keener in these groups? Isn't it unfair to bring in a group of officers who had an average score of around 85 and have the system force their next ratings into a distribution that averages only 80?"

Major Jones wasn't shaken by this attack. "You phrased the problem so well, Thaddeus, the answer is almost obvious. If, as you suggest, the officers being brought into particular groups have ratings which actually show significant differences from the Air Force-wide average, then their scores should be adjusted to account for this selectivity of assignment. And at the same time, maybe we should also look at the corresponding ratings of the individuals in these same elite groups as they move on to other assignments, to determine whether or not the adjustments were reasonable. In other words, if the average rating of all majors coming into the Air Staff is 85 and their ratings while assigned there are adjusted to keep that average, then we should expect comparable officers leaving the Air Staff to continue to earn ratings which, on the average, justify the increases given for the Air Staff duty. These adjustments should be made by the computers, based on the history-of-rating data that continuously flow into the system. Then, as far as any rater is concerned, his ratings must satisfy the same limitations of average and spread as those of any other rater in the Air Force."

"Sounds like it might almost work, Major Jones."

"Oh, I'm sure the system won't work too well, if at all, in some situations." The major was almost apologetic. "I imagine that the ratings of officers about to leave the service would have to be watched carefully to see if raters were unjustifiably downgrading them in order to raise the ratings of others in the group who are staying on. Likewise, officers on control rosters shouldn't be rated with their grade groups for similar reasons. There are bound to be other problems, too. One way to find and deal with them is through some kind of a series of 'shakedown' exercises. My feeling is that the benefits derived from the competitive aspects of the system—brutal as they may appear—should outweigh the disadvantages, especially when compared with the present OER system."

Thaddeus might have been tiring. "Well, then, let's see if we can summarize these ideas so I can brief the staff and maybe get some action started. Give me the high points, and I'll jot them down."

Jones was agreeable. "OK. First of all, the system is computer-oriented. The computer will, at the required times, prepare name lists of those individuals a rater is to rate at each of the three levels of supervision. Each list will also identify, as far as possible, those individuals requiring noncompetitive (average) scores. Next, the rater will fill in the ratings, subject to the restrictions of coming up with the required group average and not exceeding the RMS difference limit in each rating factor. The computer will check these items, of course.

"The point to emphasize here," the major continued, "is that by forcing each rater to conform to these standards we eliminate inflation, and, over the long run, the ratings made by any one individual are more likely to be comparable with those made by any other individual than under the present system. At the same time, we eliminate much of the possible unfairness that can sometimes arise when one officer rates others of his own grade who indeed may be his competitors for promotion or preferential assignment."

"That's a good point, Major. The staff will like that pitch for fairness."

"Next, Thaddeus, you might mention the

idea of adjusting the ratings when there are significant group differences. I'm not at all sure how significant these differences will be, but the system can identify and take care of such problems as they come up."

"OK," said Thaddeus. "We've now got what we think are reasonably fair and unbiased rating data into the system. What sort of products should we generate from the data?"

"We mentioned a few," Jones replied, "like weighted and unweighted averages, one-year or two-year running averages with or without the exclusion of highest and lowest ratings, and, of course, the listing of individuals by scores for various screening and selection actions. You can also be sure that the personnel people will have many more ideas about how a person's rating could be combined with such factual data as his age, flying status, education level, awards, service time, and so on, to come up with composite information for comparison purposes."

"Would this put the promotion boards out of business?" Thaddeus asked.

"I'm sure it wouldn't," the major replied. "But it could certainly lighten their load. Also remember that the system has other applications, like in screening people for writing or speaking ability, with or without college degrees, rated or nonrated, with or without Southeast Asian tours, and lots of other options. The thing is, this system permits what should be reasonably reliable rating information to be a part of an otherwise objective screening process. The human element hasn't been eliminated, but the computer can and should do the dog work."

Thaddeus smiled. "You're talking like a systems analyst, Major Jones. You've sold me. Now all we need are some recommendations on how the system should be implemented."

Jones thought a moment. "Needless to say, this type of rating system won't be implemented overnight. It will have to undergo a limited test and be modified to fix any problems that turn up. Then, I think it should be run concurrently with the present OER system for a couple of years. During this time a data base would be building, from which group

adjustments could be determined. Also, detailed comparisons between the systems would be made with a view to further modifying the new system and integrating those portions of the old system still felt necessary."

Jones paused a moment. "One thing bothers me, Thaddeus. If your staff goes along with the idea, how do we get the word back to Earth?"

It was the older man's turn to be confident. "That's not a great problem, Major. Of course, it will depend on the priority we get. When the situation warrants, our communications system can respond very effectively. Remember Moses and the Ten Commandments?"

Major Jones was impressed. "I see what you mean. What a way to sell a new OER system! But I don't suppose we'll rate that kind of priority?"

"No, I think we'll have to settle for something less, like planting the idea in the mind of one of your troops on Earth and letting him advertise it."

"How about the Chief of Staff?" Jones suggested.

"I doubt it, Major. I think our channels

to him are already loaded with more important traffic."

"Well, then," Jones said, "it should be through someone who has no personal quarrel with the present system, an officer who already has it made. How about one of the Air War College students? Those guys have it made, and they're always sounding off about something or other in papers they have to write."

Thaddeus smiled. "I detect a note of bitterness or jealousy, but I like your suggestion. I'll recommend it. And I'll see what can be done to hurry along your entrance approval because I may need you to back me up on the briefings."

"That would be swell of you, sir," said the major as the two men rose. "Incidentally, did I understand you to say, the other day, that you get advance word on pending arrivals up here?"

"Yes, Major, normally six months in advance. However, we can go beyond that if there's a reason. What did you have in mind?"

"Oh, nothing much, I was just wondering about a girl I once knew in Naples."

*Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Vietnam*



## CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

## *An Employment Concept*

MAJOR WILLIAM A. GORTON

**A** CONVERSATION between two forward air controllers (FAC's) recently returned from combat tours with Army units in South Vietnam might sound something like this:

First FAC: Joe, which bird did you find best for close air support?

Second FAC: No question in my mind on that one, Sam—the good old A-1. Man, could those guys put 'em in there with that bird! Just where I wanted 'em—every time!

First FAC: Yeah, they were good all right, but in my area their response time was pretty long. Besides, those F-4s really carried the goodies. When I needed the heavy stuff, and lots of it, I sure liked to see those F-4s coming!

Second FAC: The A-1s did take some time getting to me, but I normally

preplanned a couple "on station," and that way I had 'em right over the battlefield just waiting for Charlie to show.

The conversation is just getting started, and they will soon be talking about the relative merits of B-57s, F-100s, A-37s, AC-47s, all types of air munitions, and equipment not yet on the drawing boards. Should an Army troop join the conversation, it could go well into the night.

It should not be surprising that there are differences of opinion regarding which aircraft or combinations of aircraft are best for providing close air support to ground troops. The arguments generally center on whether it is best to employ a specialized aircraft designed solely for close



F-4C

air support or a multipurpose aircraft with greater utility over the full spectrum of tactical fighter missions.

However, a case can be made for a close air support concept that employs a tactical fighter force comprising a limited number of specialized close air support aircraft and a greater number of multipurpose tactical fighters. This concept of close air support employment will be discussed in the context of the air and ground war in South Vietnam. That environment has been selected for two reasons. First, it is generally conceded that a "permissive air environment" has existed in South Vietnam; that is, an environment in which we have had air supremacy and the enemy anti-aircraft threat is of a low order—primarily small arms and automatic weapons.<sup>1</sup> Because of the characteristics of a specialized close air support aircraft, a "permissive air environment" is desirable in order to utilize the aircraft fully in the role for which it was designed. The second reason for selecting the

South Vietnam environment is that my own combat experience, as an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) with an independent Army brigade, is limited to that area.

Before considering how tactical fighters might be employed to enhance our ability to provide timely and effective close air support, let us review some typical target situations and the requirements generated by those targets.

#### *targets and target requirements*

The character of the ground war in South Vietnam is diverse. A friendly ground force engaged in an operation may make contact with a well-equipped North Vietnamese Army (NVA) unit, and the ensuing battle may last for days. On the other hand, that same ground force on the same operation may be confronted by a small guerrilla unit, and the engagement may last only minutes. Because of this diversity, the close air support forces





A-7D

supporting the ground operation must be able to provide not only rapid response but sustained response as well. Yet often when a ground element begins to receive enemy fire, considerable time elapses before the size and type of enemy force can be determined. What was thought at first to be a small Viet Cong force may turn out to be an NVA or VC main force unit that is dug in and ready to fight. In both instances there may be a call for rapid close air support to silence the initial enemy firing position; in the latter, however, there will also be a need for follow-on and sustained close air support.

Because small guerrilla units are well trained in the tactics of dispersal when confronted by a superior force, such a target is normally short lived and must be struck immediately. Another consideration is that *only* the target should be struck. Often a hamlet guerrilla unit will fire from a position in or near a populated area. It is then important that our firepower be "surgically" applied,

thereby limiting destruction of nearby life and property to an absolute minimum.

Today, in Vietnam, the war is still primarily characterized by small-unit operations, brief encounters of South Vietnamese or allied units with the VC. Although these engagements make few headlines, the necessity of destroying the guerrillas' ability to terrorize and control the populace is still a paramount consideration. How can tactical air power be effectively and efficiently employed to aid friendly ground units in dealing with both the local VC and the NVA?

#### *force employment*

In order to meet the diverse close air support requirements generated in South Vietnam, our force employment concept must be flexible. We must be able to concentrate our tactical fighter forces rapidly in support of a major ground engagement while, at the same time, providing rapid response against



O-2A

fleeting targets. But these two requirements, rapid response and concentration of force, create a dilemma.

The best way to provide rapid response is to place tactical fighters "on station" over the ground operation, thereby reducing response time to the few minutes required to attack a fleeting target. However, to position our force in that manner would require many sorties to cover a single ground operation. For example, let us assume that we employ multipurpose F-4 aircraft, in flights of three, each flight "on station" for one hour, for a twelve-hour period.<sup>2</sup> This would require 36 F-4 sorties to be flown in support of a single ground operation. Should no enemy contact be made, it would mean that 36 bomb loads would be dropped on secondary targets. Thus the number of sorties flown would be considerable when viewed from a theater-wide perspective. The cost of bombs, fuel, and manpower required to sustain such air operations would be high. The total number of tactical fighter aircraft needed to do the job would be larger than we now have or can expect to have in the future. It becomes obvious, when considering all the ground operations which may be taking place at one time, that the "on station" tactic is an inefficient way to employ multipurpose fighters on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, we lose flexibility, since a large portion of the fighter fleet would be airborne

or tasked to support a specific ground unit, which could well cause delays in our ability to concentrate our force rapidly against a lucrative target.

Conversely, the best way to provide for rapid concentration of force in response to a major ground engagement is to keep our fighters in a ground alert status, fully loaded and ready to take off as soon as it is confirmed that a major engagement is under way. But this tactic is not acceptable for two reasons. First, rapid response to fleeting targets would be precluded. And second, the determination of what is or is not a major ground engagement is rarely clear at the outset of a ground action. This problem might bring about disastrous delays in providing air support.

It appears therefore that, if we are to meet the requirements of rapid response and concentration of force effectively and efficiently, the proper tactical fighter force employment concept must be a compromise between "on station" and ground alert that will provide the needed flexibility.

#### *the "cork-puller concept"*

The concept of a close air support force described here as "cork-puller" consists primarily of the F-4 and A-7 aircraft, plus a new aircraft created for the purpose of illustrating the concept. We will call this new specialized



OV-10A

close air support aircraft the A-10. In addition, O-2 and OV-10 FAC aircraft will be employed as they are presently used in South Vietnam. The employment of the USAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS) will also remain the same. Some aircraft presently in use in South Vietnam, such as the F-100 and B-57, are not considered because it is assumed that they will not be part of the tactical inventory during the time period when the concept could be employed. The performance characteristics of the F-4, OV-10, and O-2, being well known already, will not be discussed; however, the A-7 and A-10 require some explanation.

The A-7 will soon enter the tactical fighter inventory. It is a subsonic, ground attack aircraft that can deliver a wide variety of munitions in adverse weather, both day and night. One of its outstanding characteristics is the ability to stay "on station" for extended periods of time. A drawback is that it must be operated from a main operating base (MOB) because of its need for lengthy, prepared runways for takeoff and landing and considerable maintenance support facilities.

The A-10, as a new addition to the tactical fighter forces, would have the following characteristics:

*Simplicity.* The aircraft will be easily maintained at austere forward operating bases (FOB's) and capable of high utilization rates. It will normally require only fuel, oil, and

munitions between flights. It will be capable of operating on a sustained basis from an FOB with a 2000-foot semiprepared runway and minimum maintenance facilities.

*Maneuverability and speed.* The A-10 will have a low wing loading which will enable it to deliver air munitions under low ceilings and rapidly maneuver for target re-attack. High-speed flight will not be a characteristic of the A-10, having been traded off in favor of low-speed munitions delivery.

*Armor protection.* The A-10 will be heavily armored. It will have critical component armor protection against smallarms and automatic weapons through 14.5-mm. Its power plant will be heat-shielded to provide a low infrared signature.

*Munitions.* The A-10 will use munitions tailored for the close air support role. These munitions will consist primarily of small, 100- to 250-pound bombs, napalm bombs, and cluster bomb unit (CBU) canisters. In addition, the A-10 will have four low-rate-of-fire, high-velocity 30-mm cannons. The pilot will be able to elect to fire all guns at once or separate pairs of guns.

*Endurance.* The A-10 will remain "on station" at 5000-foot altitude or below for a minimum of 5 hours, with reserve fuel for landing.

*Avionics.* The A-10 has no avionics per

se. Only basic flight instruments and navigational aids, such as TACAN, are installed.

*Fire control.* The A-10 will have a simple ground attack sight. Possibly a fixed reticle sight will be all that is required.

*Radios.* In addition to the normal UHF radio, the A-10 will also have an FM radio for direct contact with ground troops and a VHF radio for FAC communications.

In short, the A-10 is a simple, rugged, and relatively inexpensive aircraft wholly specialized to provide "on station" close air support. As will soon be seen, it is the "cork-puller" in the "cork-puller concept."

As major components, the concept calls for A-10 aircraft staged from FOB's and flying preplanned "on station" missions, backed up by A-7 and F-4 aircraft at MOB's on ground alert status, ready to handle any immediate and certain preplanned requests for close air support.<sup>3</sup>

The A-10 will be employed in flights of two aircraft on four-hour "on station" missions. Each aircraft will be armed with a large number of small bombs, possibly as many as 36 in number, plus a full load of 30-mm ammunition. A flight will be tasked to support a particular ground operation and will be controlled by an airborne FAC. The decision as to whether A-10s will be requested to support a particular ground operation will be made by the appropriate ground unit commander with the advice of his ALO. Normally, an A-10 mission will be requested only when current intelligence indicates that enemy contact is likely or when the importance of the operation is such that rapid response is mandatory. Theater A-10 forces will be apportioned and allocated by the joint task force commander or unified commander and his component commanders, respectively.

The ground alert forces, the A-7s and F-4s, will be scheduled to stand 5-, 15-, and 30-minute alert. The A-7s will meet the 5-minute alert requirement and as much of the 15-minute alert as the size of the force allows. The F-4s will cover the remaining ground alert requirements. All aircraft standing alert will have mixed munitions loads. The remaining theater fighter forces that have been allo-

cated for close air support will be tasked to perform preplanned missions, such as landing zone prestrikes. The proportion of the F-4 and A-7 fleets that are scheduled for ground alert and preplanned missions will be determined on a daily basis dependent upon the ground and air tactical situations.

How might this concept work in response to an actual operation? First, let's assume that three A-10 missions have been preplanned to provide "on station" coverage of a particular ground operation. The operation is a brigade-size search and destroy mission which is attempting to locate and engage a vc main force unit reported in the area. At 0600 hours, two A-10s check in with the airborne FAC, "on station" over the ground operation. For the first four hours, the friendly ground forces make no contact with the enemy, and the first A-10 flight is directed by the FAC to a pre-selected secondary target. The fighters quickly release their bombs and return to the FOB to refuel and rearm.

The second A-10 flight checks in with the FAC at 1000 hours for the next four-hour mission. Soon after the second A-10 flight's arrival, a ground element makes contact with an enemy force of unknown size. The ground element commander calls the FAC and requests an air strike. At the moment the air strike is requested, the FAC, through his ALO, requests that a ground alert flight be scrambled. It is important to note that the ground unit did not specifically request that the ground alert mission be scrambled, although there was a request for fighters "on station" for the operation. The reason for this Air Force-initiated request is twofold. First, the A-10 flight is soon to be expended on a target, and the next A-10 flight is not scheduled to be available until 1400 hours. Something is needed to fill the gap that will be created in the "on station" coverage schedule. And second, the size and type of the target are still unknown. It might be the vc main force unit or only hamlet guerrillas. If it is the former, then massive close air support may be needed, and getting the ground alert aircraft on the way to the target early could pay great dividends.

Using 30 minutes as an average response

time from a five-minute ground alert posture, the FAC keeps the A-10 flight on-target until the A-7 flight arrives. This is accomplished by expending only a few bombs on each pass at the target so as to keep constant firepower on the target for the 30-minute period. During the period that the A-10 flight is on-target, more information is gained on the nature of the target. This information is provided by the ground element commander, the FAC, and the A-10 pilots. Frequently the FAC is better able than the ground commander to determine what kind of target is being engaged. From his elevated view of the battlefield, he can spot enemy troop movements or positions that may be obscured from ground observation. Also, the type and quantity of ground fire directed against him and the fighters provide a good indication of the size and type of the enemy unit. In any event, a decision must be made during the first 30 minutes of target engagement as to whether a second A-7 strike will be needed. If the unit commander requests it, another A-7 flight will be scrambled. The first A-7 flight will then be directed on the target, while the second A-7 flight will provide the gap filler in the "on station" schedule. Once again, the FAC should request the second flight of A-7s if, based on his experience and knowledge of the situation, the target is lucrative. He thus once again anticipates ground request for air firepower.

This chain of decision and request will continue until the target is effectively neutralized. If the target is the beginning of a major ground engagement, fighter forces can be employed in a continuing series, thereby providing the necessary concentration of force. If the target is a small VC unit and quickly neutralized, then we can easily revert to an "on station" posture. In this concept of employment, the A-10 represents the "cork" in the fighter force "tub." When the FAC employs the A-10 flight against a "hot" target, he effectively pulls the cork which triggers a flow of fighter aircraft to the target area.

#### *advantages of the cork-puller concept*

While the greatest advantage of the cork-

puller concept is that it provides for both rapid response to fleeting targets and concentration of force in major engagements, there are some additional advantages as well. One such advantage deals with the cost of employing the fighter forces.

In a war characterized by small-unit engagements, the lion's share of the close air support requirements would be met by the A-10 force. Because of the A-10 characteristics of simplicity and maintainability, the cost of operating such a force would be considerably less than the A-7/F-4 force in the same role. In the target engagement example, only three A-10 missions of two aircraft each were necessary, whether or not a target was engaged. This is a 1.5 sortie rate per four A-10 aircraft assigned, an easy rate to maintain on a sustained basis for as simple an aircraft as the A-10. Furthermore, only a maximum of three secondary targets were struck, thereby reducing munitions expended.

Cost savings will also accrue through the use of small air munitions on the A-10. Because of the small size of the munitions, they will require little or no special equipment for up-loading on the aircraft; in fact, many could be man-handled.

Another cost advantage is realized in A-7/F-4 ground alert flights not scrambled. Since these flights are primarily employed in support of engaged troops, their use is in direct relationship to the number of "hot" targets generated. The A-7/F-4 force application against secondary targets is held to a minimum, since the only time they will be required to strike a secondary target is when they are performing a gap-filling mission in the "on station" schedule. The cork-puller concept therefore provides for the most effective and productive use of the costlier A-7/F-4 force.

Another advantage of this concept is that the A-10 is an ideal aircraft for use by USAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) in counter-guerrilla operations—in fact, in its design, consideration should be given to SOF requirements. In this regard, it should be readily exportable through the Military Assistance Program to developing nations to aid in their efforts against subversive insurgency.

*impact on fighter force structure*

In adopting the cork-puller concept, one must consider its impact on the capability of the total fighter force to conduct effective operations at higher levels of conflict. Because the A-10 requires a permissive air environment, its utility in the close air support role will decrease as the air environment becomes less permissive. Since we must be prepared to conduct effective tactical air operations at all levels of conflict, it is apparent that we cannot afford many A-10s in the tactical fighter force structure. For, with large numbers of A-10s in the force, the overall capability of the total force to effectively conduct other tactical air operations would be reduced. (This assumes that the A-10 will be purchased in lieu of multipurpose fighters.) Yet, proper execution of the cork-puller concept will not require large numbers of A-10 aircraft. In view of the numerous cost advantages which will accrue in application of the concept, it is possible that the required A-10 force could be added to the fighter force without a significant increase in cost of total force operations.

Another consideration in regard to this

concept is the lower utilization rates of the A-7/F-4 forces. Under the concept, A-7/F-4 forces will operate primarily from a ground alert posture in response to "hot" targets, and it is quite possible that low sortie rates could result. This might cause pressures to build for an overall fighter force reduction on the basis that we have more multipurpose tactical fighters than we can *efficiently* utilize. But, in my opinion, *efficient* and *effective* fighter force utilization is not measured by the number of sorties flown or the number of bombs dropped; it is measured only by the number of enemy killed and supplies destroyed.

THE CORK-PULLER concept represents my ideas on how a specialized close air support aircraft could be combined with our multipurpose fighters to enhance our ability to provide responsive and massive air firepower. I am in hopes that the concept will, at the very least, stimulate further thinking about the subject of close air support and how the Air Force can continue to improve its capability in this important role.

*Hq United States Air Force*

## Notes

1. There have been times, as at Khe Sanh and A Shau, when the enemy has mounted a significant antiaircraft threat. However, these instances are exceptions to the general state of the environment.

2. The three-aircraft flight composition is typical for F-4 and F-100 operations in South Vietnam.

3. This is not to say that the A-10 would not operate from an MOB or, for that matter, from a field more austere than an FOB; e.g., a road segment. The area and location of potential and actual ground operations would be a primary consideration in positioning theater A-10 forces.



## Books and Ideas

### LOYALTY ALONG THUD RIDGE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DON CLELLAND

**T**OASTING the pilots imprisoned in the Hanoi Hilton and other comparable hostilities, Colonel Jack Broughton dedicated *Thud Ridge* "To Our Comrades Up North." Implicitly, though, the book† is also dedicated to those who want a clear view of air warfare over North Vietnam as seen through the eyes of a participant. Spotlighting the pilots who flew in "the big leagues" of this war, *Thud Ridge* will doubtless turn out to be the definitive book on the F-105 in combat.

It is replete with vicarious adventure for the armchair warrior and chock full of stories that illuminate the complex interactions of fighters, tankers, control sites, and rescue aircraft. It is also a very bitter book. Perhaps for that reason the closing pages should be

read first: some premises may appear there.

Colonel Broughton is not in the Air Force today. He was given a general court-martial for attempting to cover up a strafing incident at Haiphong. The incident itself involved two pilots from a squadron in the wing where the author of *Thud Ridge* was vice commander. It also concerned a Russian ship, destroyed gun-camera film, and an attempt by Colonel Broughton to evade instructions from higher headquarters. Finally, as Colonel Broughton fought for the careers of the two accused pilots, the incident involved some troubling interpretations of that military *sine qua non*, loyalty.

The author says he wrote his book out of a "desire to give permanence to some of

†Colonel Jack Broughton, USAF (Ret), *Thud Ridge*, with an Introduction by Hanson W. Baldwin (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969, \$5.95), 254 pp.

the briefing room jazz that flows so wonderfully from pilot to pilot," jazz that fades too quickly into murky recall once the guns have been silenced. Judged on this basis alone, he has been successful. Like a college annual, *Thud Ridge* is a book full of verbal pictures. If the world never again sees duels between fighters and surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), the jousting done by the "fives" as they searched for their targets will suffice.

Stylistically, *Thud Ridge* profits from Colonel Broughton's use of verbatim dialogue recorded on tape during actual missions over Hanoi and environs. Complementing these staccato accounts are telling editorial insertions by the author. The combination is an approach which keeps the book's vignettes consistent, related, and easily understood. The style seems unusually well suited to bringing about what can be one of the greater contributions of *Thud Ridge*: increasing public understanding of today's air battles.

Had it been limited to this type of coverage, the book would have been sounder than it is. The author writes with color (he refers to operational types, in mock self-deprecation, as "the swine in the field"), great authority (vice commander of an F-105 wing), and a substantial military background (including service in the Thunderbirds and duty as a student at the select National War College).

Unfortunately, however, Colonel Broughton's capabilities and his rich background often fall victim to an almost exclusive identification with the problems, perils, and frustrations of his part of the war. In particular, he hung up on what he considered to be a consistent lack of good sense on the part of the high-level military leadership. Such criticism runs throughout his book, culminates in his attempted obfuscation of the aforementioned strafing incident, and gives rise to the entire question of loyalty.

General George Patton once said, "There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent." Without dismissing the possible truth of this, one is nevertheless compelled to admit that loyalty from the bottom to the top is

more easily recognized and measured than it is from the top down. This is particularly so when the "top" is represented by the highest councils of war, councils that embrace the great variety of elements that combine to make up a nation's policies.

In its simplest instance, bottom-to-top loyalty in the service is a measurement of obedience to orders. On the other hand, to ascertain whether loyalty in fact flows from the top down, one would have to be aware of all factors which influenced the highest elements of military leadership—and then judge where the generals placed the *desiderata* of their forces in the bigger picture drawn by the civilian leadership.

Probably no combat pilot has ever been completely free of the feeling that higher headquarters is painfully out of touch with the real war. Both that reaction and excesses of it are widespread. Visit any unit in Vietnam or Thailand and the most casual question along these lines will elicit an outpouring of criticism. And certainly some of it is justified. Yet, after the initial torrents have subsided, reason generally begins to counterattack emotion. It then is often acknowledged that higher headquarters, too, has to operate under irritating constraints. In some cases it is actually conceded that even in the puzzle-palace-on-the-Potomac no *carte blanche* exists for the conduct of a war. This type of give-and-take, if it does nothing else, usually improves attitudes. At the least, following an exchange of opinions, the lines of loyalty stand more clearly exposed than they did earlier.

It is in this area—loyalty—that Colonel Broughton is most vulnerable to criticism. He has no sympathy or understanding for the problems of those higher in the chain of command. His generosity and faith are reserved almost exclusively for F-105 pilots. Though doubtless personally acquainted with and friendly toward many of the officers serving in various SEA and CONUS headquarters, he persists in discussing them as though they were a breed apart who did not share an intense awareness of SAM's, MIG's, or the searing loneliness and boredom of prison camps.

What *Thud Ridge* has to say about the



emphasis on bombers (and bomber generals) following World War II, at the expense of things tactical, is not new. Nor are its diatribes concerning the inviolability of Haiphong Harbor or the Chinese border. Though he makes his questions intensely personal, Colonel Broughton adds nothing to the general inquiry as to why SAM sites were seemingly proscribed as targets until they were completed, and only then were they placed on the attack list. Objections as strong as any he makes have long echoed through the halls of the Pentagon. Perhaps through proximity to the actual offices of control, however, the generals in the building realized *early* that, while the military was pulling the triggers over North Vietnam, it was not calling the shots.

The centralization which until recently characterized the Pentagon led to an unfortunate overlap between command and control. Overreacting to the looseness of the Department of Defense in the late fifties, Secretary McNamara reshaped it to the point where the services simply were not allowed to command

their forces in response to civilian control of policy. Ironically, therefore, when military leaders at the very highest levels were losing their fight for the same tactical freedoms asked by field commanders, they were being criticized by some of those in SEA for failure to provide the proper support.

DETACHMENT is not Colonel Broughton's forte. We can be grateful for that. Involvement often stamps a book with rare passion and conviction, and *Thud Ridge* is rich in these qualities. Unfortunately, though, the author's intensity has sometimes blurred his sense of objectivity. With this in mind one cannot help recalling the approach used by Thucydides: "Of the events of the war, I have not ventured to speak from any chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I have described nothing but what I saw myself, or learned from others of whom I made the most careful and particular inquiry."

Falls Church, Virginia

## THE LONG COLD WAR, 1917-

DR. E. S. HARTSOOK

ANDRÉ FONTAINE says he wants his *History of the Cold War* to contribute to the work of clarification and revision that is now going on in regard to the cold war. And it is in this larger framework that his history, in addition to its own great and special merits, must also be viewed.† Since 1961

at least, there has been a whole stream of books and articles analyzing the origins and causes of the cold war. A good proportion of these works share what has become known as the "revisionist" view of cold war history. In this view, the United States was as much to blame as the Soviet Union, if not more so,

† André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1: *From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950*, translated from the French by D. D. Paige; Vol. 2: *From the Korean War to the Present*, translated by Renaud Bruce (New York: Random House, 1968 and 1969, \$10.00 each), 432 and 523 pp. respectively.

for the hostility that arose in U.S./Soviet relations after 1945. The revisionist view holds that Stalin believed he had negotiated a clear security perimeter in eastern Europe, with Churchill at least, and that the strong U.S. reactions to his policies there alarmed him into taking countermeasures. The revisionists are for the most part certain that the U.S. atomic bomb played a very large role in scaring Stalin into such actions. Some of them even say the United States dropped the bomb not so much to defeat Japan as to intimidate Russia and that, once the U.S. had the bomb, U.S./Soviet relations were dominated by that fact and by the Soviets' resulting fear and insecurity. Most of them would say that throughout the subsequent years U.S. policy continued to fall victim to its own mistaken view of the situation, hewing rigidly to long-outdated lines of thinking. Some do not hesitate to add their belief that there is a large group of people on both sides with a vested interest in the cold war and its continuation.

Fontaine is certainly an antidote for any easy, quick judgments concerning the cold war. Unlike most of the revisionists, who trace the origins to 1946-47, he takes the beginning back to 1917 and the October Revolution. In his view, from the time the Soviets began their revolution there has been a cold war between them and the "bourgeois" world. Moreover, Fontaine says he has not tried to prove a thesis "but simply to tell the story of what has been, after all, the greatest war of all time." His history is indeed evidence of this, for in the two volumes he endeavors to portray the cold war in such wide and deep and detailed fashion that the reader can judge about it for himself. It is as if he is creating a giant, modern-day Bayeux tapestry, taking the utmost care to include every detail and putting in all the shades and colorings, not just the black and white ones usually used in depicting the cold war. It should be added immediately that Fontaine is eminently qualified to do this tableau. He is familiar with all the latest sources on the subject, and as a journalist with *Le Monde* since 1947 he has followed most of the day-to-day developments of the cold war and met many of its leaders.

The very scope and detail of his account have enabled Fontaine to make two major contributions not easily possible in a shorter work. He has exposed more of the historical roots of the cold war, and he has included many more of its interrelated facets: contending personalities as well as contending ideologies, differing national characteristics and outlooks, and varying views of strategy and policy. By taking his story back to 1917, Fontaine shows, in his account of events immediately after World War I, how the naïve and powerless new Soviet state was victimized by most of the other powers, which in the process reinforced once more old Russia's fixation about defending itself from external attack and foreshadowed something of her subsequent paranoid attitude vis-à-vis the West. From the Locarno Pact, to Munich, to the Marshall Plan, Fontaine shows that the Soviet Union was always seeing a "conspiracy" aimed at isolating and excluding it from the rest of the world.

It has not been customary in the West to perceive the Marshall Plan as anything but white in the usual black-or-white terms of the cold war. But Fontaine, contributing one of his shadings, gives something of how it looked to the other side: the Soviets could not accept Marshall Plan aid, desperately as they needed it, because they feared it would mean interference in their internal affairs and loss of their economic and national independence. He suggests that "by making the division of Europe concrete, it [the Marshall Plan] sounded the death knell for Benes and Masaryk's attempts to preserve good relations with both sides." (Vol. 1, p. 342) In fact, he sees the whole cold war division of Europe—the U.S. clients on the one side, the Iron Curtain millions on the other—dating from the month of July 1947, the month the Soviets rejected Marshall Plan aid and the month George Kennan's article on "containment," which was to have such wide influence, appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. (p. 331) The Soviets' rejection of Marshall Plan aid in 1947, incidentally, is probably not unrelated to their current fear that growing capitalistic influence would be too great a threat to their own eco-

conomic system—as evidenced in their invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Another significant factor that comes out in Fontaine's history-in-depth is the continuity of Russian aims. These seem to remain the same as under the czars: security of indefensible borders and warm-water ports to assure supplies and aid. The demands are essentially identical, whether put to Hitler in the 1939 pact negotiations or later in the endless negotiations with the Allies. Somewhat similar is the continuing attraction—in spite of all—that Russia feels toward Germany. After World War I they were drawn together in shared ostracism by the rest of the world, and they collaborated in many ways. Even at the height of the World War II atrocities, Stalin could still separate the "German people" from the sins of their leaders. Since then some *modus vivendi* has always been pursued, and although West Germany's entrance into NATO was seen as a final hardening of the whole West against the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev resumed the Soviet wooing of Germany in the years before his exit; and today his successors appear to be taking up where he left off.

By the very nature of his extensive examination of the cold war, it is difficult to sum up the many-sided aspects of Fontaine's treatment. One has heard, for example, of the influential role of the main participants, particularly Roosevelt's and Churchill's differing views on how to run the war in Europe and what its ultimate aims should be. Here, particularly, Fontaine mines a very rich vein in explaining the intensification of the cold war after World War II. If Churchill's strategy had been followed and the Western military forces had been used to achieve more of a geographical balance with the Soviets, many of the problems over Berlin, Vienna, and Prague would probably not have assumed the proportions they did. On the other hand, if Churchill (unknown to Roosevelt) had not made his own famous October 1944 arrangement with Stalin—giving him primacy in Rumania and Bulgaria in exchange for British predominance in Greece and a fifty-fifty interest in Yugoslavia and Hungary—there would probably not have been such highly inflamed

U.S. reactions against Soviet moves in those areas. It is certainly significant that Roosevelt appeared to fear resurgence of British and French colonialism more than he did the Soviets, being genuinely scandalized, for example, at British intervention in Greece. Fontaine admirably brings out the contrast between Roosevelt's emphasis on and faith in both the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations and Churchill's almost desperate insistence on hard pragmatic factors like getting Western troops into Berlin and Prague. Similarly, the change from Roosevelt to Truman as chief U.S. spokesman must have been like changing from a warm to a cold shower for the Soviets. A few lines of Fontaine concerning pre-Truman negotiations with the Soviets will help illuminate this:

Roosevelt and Churchill . . . constantly yielded without gaining anything in return except fine words that, . . . if they meant anything at all, certainly it was not the meaning the Western allies gave them. Worse yet, when Stalin had a complaint against the West, he aired it so bluntly that he was frequently ill-mannered. But Roosevelt and, to a degree, Churchill and their lieutenants, felt obliged to address Stalin circumspectly, never saying all they thought. This strengthened the dictator's conviction that he was dealing with weaklings and hypocrites forever ready to yield to pressure and happy to settle for empty promises. This experience probably explains his post-war conduct. On the other hand, the way in which he achieved his ends contributed largely to the doubts that Western leaders subsequently entertained as to the usefulness of trying to negotiate with a partner in such flagrant bad faith. (p. 256)

Fontaine ends his history with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty a year later. He deems that the latter signified an "armistice" between the two great powers and the provisional termination of the cold war. He acknowledges that, technologically, the test ban treaty was of minor importance but that politically it signified the first time the Soviet Union put accord with "imperialism" before maintenance of unity in the Communist bloc. Coinciding as it did with the first Soviet denunciation of Mao's heresy, this action demonstrated the

primacy of national interest over ideological solidarity, which until then had been the rule. Fontaine believes that neither of the super powers won the cold war in the sense of making its "way of life" paramount over the other; that their armistice has confirmed the failure of the claims of each.

In an epilogue to this English translation of his work (originally published in French in 1965), Fontaine expresses rather more pessimistic views of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their claims to being able to solve the problems of the twentieth century. He is particularly concerned over the internal crisis in the United States and fearful that a lack of order could jeopardize its

values or even lead to some kind of fascism. In the Communist bloc, he sees the devaluation of both Russia and China by the tyranny of their bureaucracies as having made them increasingly hopeless as models for the rest of the world. Perhaps not unexpectedly, for an editor of *Le Monde*, Fontaine ends by suggesting—after repeated acknowledgments of Europe's past culpability—that *maybe* a united western Europe could try to overcome Europe's partition and "speak to the world in the language of justice and freedom with enough authority and yet without being suspected of wanting to dominate it."

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## The Contributors



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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Time Barrier: The Psychological Frontier of Student Activism" by Captain Charles M. Plummer, USAF, as the outstanding article in the January-February 1970 issue of the *Review*.

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